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The economics of the 19th century French engineer, 
Jules Dupuit, has received but scant attention. His 
contributions to various areas of economic theory, how­
ever, were appreciated in varying degrees by several 
important neo-classical theorists. These and later 
acknowledgments were made primarily to two of Dupuit's 
major economic works, and of them, only F. Y. Edgeworth 
presented excerpts from the original source. Neo-classical 
and contemporary evaluations, moreover, have focused on 
specific points of Dupuit1s analysis, and little attempt 
has been made to evaluate or appraise his total con­
tribution. The purpose of this research has been to 
investigate and analyze Dupuit1s contributions to economic 
theory and policy in a larger framework. To this end, 
translations of some of his importaht economic works have 
been required.
Dupuit presented the first important statement of 
the marginal utility theory of value, but he did not rest 
content with the statement that marginal utility diminishes 
with quantity. Adding the marginal utility functions of
ix
individuals, he obtained an aggregate marginal utility curve 
and identified it with a market demand function. This 
addition, together with the identification of demand and 
utility functions, is legitimate only under certain 
restrictive assumptions. The marginal utility of money, 
for example, must be assumed constant in order for the 
demand curve to represent utility.
Nonetheless, Dupuit used the identification to 
develop several important welfare concepts. Consumers' 
surplus or "relative utility," as Dupuit called it, was 
the difference between what individuals had to pay and 
what they would be willing to pay for a quantity of a 
good. This concept of consumers' surplus played an 
important role in Dupuit's interpretations of the 
pricing behavior of firms.
Dupuit analyzed, independently of Cournot, the pro­
fit maximizing behavior of the simple monopolist. He 
saw monopoly at the apex of a range of problems regarding 
the size and distribution of welfare. The amount of 
"absolute utility" (or what could be called total net 
benefit) was lessened by monopoly profit maximization.
Dupuit also pointed out that the interests of the profit 
maximizing monopolist could be inimical to the welfare
x
interests of consumers. It is interesting to note that 
Alfred Marshall's doctrines of "total benefit" and 
"compromise benefit" bear striking resemblance to 
Dupuit1s earlier statements on monopoly and welfare.
One of Dupuit1s most important contributions to 
economic theory was his early discussion of the discrim­
ination monopolist. Price discrimination could exist, in 
Dupuit1s view, with differences in "buyer estimates," 
with the ability to segment markets and with some degree 
of monopoly power. The motives for such a pricing policy 
were to be found in the nature of costs and in the desire 
to maximize profits. Although Dupuit discussed the 
effects of discrimination on price and revenue, he was 
primarily interested in the fact that discrimination could 
affect the size of the welfare benefit.
Marginal cost pricing as a welfare tool also finds 
its theoretical frame in the writings of Dupuit. Although 
Dupuit did not provide an explicit formulation of the 
principle, one of his bridge examples and other state­
ments strongly suggest the possibilities of such a 
pricing technique.
In the matter of policy Dupuit recommended that 
tools be carefully fit to specific problems. If
xi
industries were to be publicly owned or operated,
Dupuit proposed the maximization of absolute utility 
under the constraint of covering total costs of pro­
duction. This recovery of total costs could be achieved 
by price discrimination or by a single price technique.
It is in this area of public utilities that he departed 
most significantly from 19th century liberalism. This 
imaginative application of theoretical welfare principles 
to the problems of public policy stamps Dupuit's con­
tribution with a mark of genuine originality. In 
addition to developing microeconomic tools of great 






A British economic theorist of some reputation once 
wrote the following:
The history of . . . forgotten works is indeed,
a strange and discouraging one; but the day must 
come when the eyes of those who cannot see will be 
opened. Then will due honour be given to all who 
. . . have laboured in a thankless field of human
knowledge, and have met with the neglect or ridicule 
they might well have expected. Not indeed that such 
men do really work for the sake of honour; they bring 
forth a theory as the tree brings forth its fruit.^
The quotation is from William Stanley Jevons1 preface to
his second edition of the Theory of Political Economy in
which, as is widely known, he acknowledged- many of the
antecedents of his important exposition on marginal
utility. One might well imagine the surprise and chagrin
that overtook Jevons when printed proof first lay before
him which showed that his was not the first voyage into the
subjective theory of value. The quotation above directly
referred to Augustin Cournot and Hermann Heinrich Gossen,
■**W. S. Jevons, Theory of Political Economy (New York: 
Augustus M. Kelley, 1965), pp. xxxviii-xxxix. Quotation 
is from the preface to the second edition, 1879.
1
but it could equally apply to Jules Dupuit, whom Jevons
regarded, with great intellectual honesty, as the one
who must be "credited with the earliest perfect compre-
2hension of the theory of utility.1
Although the pride of English economists must have 
temporarily been affected by knowledge that the pathbreaking 
work in marginal utility had been made on other shores, it 
was restored somewhat in 1903 when E. R. A. Seligman dis­
covered that it was an Englishman after all who had first 
discovered the doctrine. In his article "On Some Neglected
3British Economists," Seligman advanced the case of W. F. 
Lloyd as deserving credit for the discovery in 1833, a 
decade before Dupuit. This may have been reassuring to the 
British, but one could carry on such research ad infinitum 
and arrive at philosophical formulations suggesting marginal 
utility in the writings of the Scholastics and others. In 
this sense, discovery of hidden genius is a neverending task 
since one can find anticipatory formulations for almost any 
theory. Political theory is replete with such examples and,
^Jevons, Theory, p. xxviii.
3E. R. A. Seligman, "On Some Neglected British Econo­
mists," Economic Journal, XIII (1903), see particularly 
pp. 357-361 in which Seligman concluded that "England must 
henceforth be considered the home, not only of the cost 
theory, but also of the marginal utility theory of value," 
p. 363. Also infra, p.46, n. 40.
unfortunately, the same must be said of economic thought.
f
This writer finds such doctrinal upstaging hopelessly barren 
in the manner in which much of it is written. Consequently, 
the establishment of such claims will not be the primary 
aim of the present research on Jules Dupuit's contribution 
to economic analysis. Dupuit1s distinction of being the 
first to use certain theoretical tools may emerge from the 
discussion, but this will be a tangential element only. 
Moreover, no broad attempt will be made to present a history 
of marginal utility theory, or any other theory for that 
matter. The antecedents of the theory of marginal utility, 
as well as the development of the theory, have been ludidly 
and scholarly described by several economists.^ A brief 
perusal of their works will show that there is little left 
to do in this regard. Some attempt will be made, however, 
to bring Dupuit1s major ideas up to date.
Nor is Dupuit an undiscovered genius. His contri­
butions to economic theory were acknowledged, with varying
degrees of generosity, by Jevons, Walras, Edgeworth and 
5others. Alfred Marshall, whose intellectual debt to Dupuit
^See Richard Howey, The Rise of the Marginal Utility 
School (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1960). Also 
see G. J. Stigler's "Development of Utility Theory," in his 
Essays in the History of Economics (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1965).5See Howey, The Rise of the Marginal Utility School.
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was in many respects greater than any of these, was, in 
his encyclopaedic Principles, curiously stingy in his acknow­
ledgements to Dupuit, particularly with regard to the 
doctrine of consumers' surplus, which subsequently received 
so much attention from post-Marshallian economists. Joseph 
Schumpeter remarked that in Marshall's hands Dupuit received 
but "footnote recognition and this not in the right places."^
In the late Thirties Dupuit's name was invoked in the
mushrooming literature on marginal cost pricing, particularly
with regard to the knotty problem of public utility pricing
7techniques. The French economists who are attempting to 
apply marginal cost theory to the practical problem of the 
pricing of electric power admit that Dupuit is their
Oprecursor. Moreover, any adequate history of utility 
theory does not fail to mention his contribution, even if 
only in passing. Indeed, it is in connection with his
^ J o s e p h  a . Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 840.
7See for example Harold Hotelling, "The General Welfare 
in Relation to Problems of Taxation and Railway and Utility 
Rates," Econometrica, 6 (1938) in which Hotelling used 
Dupuit's argument as the starting point for his analysis.
For reference to this literature see Richard A. Musgrave,
The Theory of Public Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959) ,
p. 137.
g See James R. Nelson (ed.), Marginal Cost Pricing 
in Practice (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), 
pp. vii-viii.
contributions to utility theory that he is best known and 
this is perhaps as it should be. In any event, Dupuit has 
already been discovered, and it will consequently not be 
the task of this research, with scholarly sleight of hand, 
to attempt to do so once more.
Unfortunately, however, Dupuit has only received what 
one might call "superficial treatment," from one scholar 
to the next, with little reference to his original writings. 
Nor have all his writings been explored, owing principally 
to the fact that they are in French and are accessible only 
to those economists who are at home in that language. Only 
in the past 15 years, under the auspices of the International 
Economic Association, have translations of two of his 
articles become available.^ These are by no means his only 
contributions, but, following Edgeworth and Jevons, all 
references regard them as the major ones, if not the only 
ones. It will be one of the aims of this research to 
"discover" his other economic writings and to examine them 
with a view to possible contributions to, or elaborations on, 
economic policy and theory not covered previously.
^Alan T. Peacock, et al. (eds.), International 
Economic Papers, "On the Measurement of the Utility of Pub­
lic Works," No. 2 (1952), and "On Tolls and Transport 
Charges," No. 11 (1962), (New York: Macmillan Company, 1952, 
1962).
Jules Dupuit, the economist, has not received any­
thing like full-scale treatment in book or article form. 
Histories of economic thought laud his contributions (when 
they mention him at all), but even then only briefly and 
usually in connection with marginal utility theory and/or 
other economic theorists. This occurs even in Schumpeter's 
unsurpassed History of Economic Analysis, in spite of con­
tributions termed "above his time.""^ Consequently it will 
be a primary aim of this research to fill this gap.
Further, it is clear that it is only Dupuit the 
theorist and tool maker that has been discussed. Dupuit 
the practitioner and tool-user has been tacitly dismissed 
with the possible exception of the celebrated marginal 
cost bridge toll example; one which most frequently comes 
to mind with the mention of his name. Thus attention must 
be devoted to Dupuit1s policy recommendations.
In brief, there will be no attempt to discover Dupuit, 
not will it be the primary aim of this dissertation to 
establish Dupuit1s priority among utility-demand or price 
discrimination theorists. The attempt to discover him 
would be unnecessary. Whether or not he was the first
10Schumpeter, History, p. 463; also see p. 949.
economist "to make use of a demand curve," as Charles Gide 
suggested, is, while important in some respects, not to be 
the major purpose of this research.^ The aim of this work 
is more modest. It will attempt to place Dupuit in the 
history of economic analysis by discussing and evaluating, 
on their own merits, his contributions to economic theory 
and policy as evidenced by his writings.
To this end his contributions will be taken topically. 
The second chapter will explore his formulation of marginal 
utility; the third that of consumers' surplus; the fqurth, 
his monopoly-price discrimination theory. The fifth chapter 
will concern itself with Dupuit's contributions to marginal 
cost pricing and with the particular applications Dupuit 
made of his economic tools to public policy. Although his 
contributions will be analyzed topically, the sixth and con­
cluding chapter will evaluate Dupuit's contributions to 
economic analysis, it is hoped, in broader perspective than 
has been possible before. It is impossible to know whether 
Dupuit has received his just due in the history of economic 
thought until this broader perspective, that is to say, all
11 Charles Gide and Charles Rist, A History of Economic 
Doctrines (New York: D. C. Heath and Co., 7th ed., 1947),
p. 501.
of his economic works, have been evaluated. This is the 
purpose of this dissertation.
Sources
The source material for this research will revolve 
around Dupuit's original writings. His major contribu­
tions are contained in articles appearing in the Annales 
des Ponts et Chaussees (bridges and roadways) and in the 
Journal des Economistes through the 1840's, 1850's and early 
I860's. Only two of these have found translation: these
are "De la Mesure de l'Utilite des Travaux Publics,"
(1844) and "de 1'Influence des Peages sur l'Utilite des 
Voies de Communication," (1849), translated as "On the 
Measurement of the Utility of Public Works" and "On the
Influence of Tolls on the Utility of Ways of Communi-
12cation" respectively. Consequently, it has been necessary 
to translate some of his other economic writings, and the 
author wishes to acknowledge the generous assistance of 
the L.S.U. Foundation in this regard. A bibliography of 
all of Dupuit's published works on economics comprises
1 2International Economic Papers, Nos. 2 and 11. 
Unfortunately only one of the four parts of the 1849 article, 
that entitled "On Tolls and Transport Charges," is trans­
lated in the Papers.
Appendix I of this work. Those works for which trans­
lations were made are indicated in the dissertation bibli­
ography and in footnote references in the text.
Additionally, Dupuit made a number of minor contri­
butions on such topics as protectionism, free trade, 
Malthusianism and others. Along with Frederic Bastiat and 
other leading French economic thinkers, he was a contributor 
to the Dictionnaire de 1'Economie Politique, published 
in 1852 and 1853. Dupuit1s name is signed to the following 
entries; "Eau" (water); "Peage" (toll); "Routes" (roads); 
"Voies de Communication" (ways of communication or trans­
portation) ; "Poids et Mesures" (feet and measures); "Ponts
1 ̂et Chaussees" (bridges and public roadways). J Excepting 
the entries on water, feet and measures and roads, which 
were the concern of Dupuit the engineer, it was felt 
necessary to translate all of the others.
A collection of his major works was published in Italy 
in 1934 under the editorship of Mario de Bernardi entitled
13 . .Jules Dupuit m  Dictionnaire de 11Economie Politique,
eds. Charles Coquelin and Guillaumin (Paris: Guillaumin and
Co., Vol. I, 1852; Vol. II, 1853). F. Y. Edgeworth, writing 
on "Dupuit" in Palgrave1s Dictionary of Political Economy, 
ed. Henry Higgs (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., Vol. I,
1926), was incorrect when he identified the first four of 
these entries as a "complete list" of Dupuit1s contributions, 
p. 655. "Poids et Mesures" and "Ponts et Chaussees" also 
carry Dupuit's signature.
10
De 1'Utilite et sa Mesure: Ecrits Choisis et Republies.^
The collection contains most of Dupuit1s major economic 
articles and the reply he elicited from M. Bordas, a fellow 
engineer. All but one of the articles it contains have 
been readily available to this writer in the original 
journals; the collection's preface, introduction and 
bibliography have been most helpful however. Moreover, the 
article not readily available to this author was an 
interesting one on water distribution, which, as Bernardi 
suggested in the introduction, represents a detailed appli­
cation of the theories developed in Dupuit's two articles 
in the Annales to a special problem.
No attempt has been made to investigate purely 
scientific tracts such as Des inondations. Examen des moyens 
proposes pour en prevenir le retour, ^  or Traite de 
11eguilibre des voutes et de la construction des ponts en 
maconnerie.^  Any works suggesting economic content have
14Jules Dupuit, De 11Utilite et sa Mesure, ed. Mario 
de Bernardi (Torino: La Riforma Sociale, 1934).
1 cJules Dupuit, Floods. An Examination of the Means 
Proposed to Prevent their Return (Paris, 1858).
-^Jules Dupuit, A Treatise on the Stability of Arches 
and on the Construction of Bridges in Stone, (eds.) J.
Mahyer and E. Vaudrey, (Paris, 1870).
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been investigated. While it is not impossible that a
purely scientific tract may contain material pertinent to
the present investigation, the probability is low enough
to remove it from consideration. The dichotomy between
Dupuit the engineer and Dupuit the economist, in other
words, must be established.
There seems to be a genuine dearth of secondary sources
pertaining to Dupuit. With the exception of the Howey
17work and a few others, several of Edgeworth's writings
and fleeting mention in a few Histories of Economic Thought,
little is available on Dupuit. One other exception that
should be mentioned is the memorial article written on the
occasion of Dupuit1s death entitled "The Life and Works of 
18Mr. Dupuit." A biography by J. Mahyer contained in the 
Bernardi collection also contains some interesting material.
All of Dupuit1s original writings were readily avail­
able to this writer in French. The greatest problem was,
17See for example Emil Kauder, A History of Marginal 
Utility Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) 
and R. W. Houghton, "A Note on the Early History of Con­
sumer's Surplus," Economica (February, 1958), pp. 49-57.
l^E. Lame Fleury, "La Vie et Les Travaux de M. Dupuit," 
translated by Candace Uter and edited by R. B. Ekelund, Jr., 
Journal des Economistes, 3rd Ser., VII (1867), pp. 161-187. 
Page references are to the translation which is available 
only in the library of Louisiana State University.
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therefore, one of translation. With the exception of a few 
minor articles and titles, the lion's share of the work has 
been left to professionals. On occasion it has been 
necessary or desirable to repeat quotations in the original 
French. Fortunately, a minimum of such citations have been 
required.
Biographical Orientation
Arsine-Jules-Emile-Juvenal Dupuit was born on May 18, 
1804 in Fossano, Italy when this region was a part of the 
French empire.^ At the age of 10, Dupuit returned with his 
parents to France where he continued his education in the 
secondary schools at Versailles, at Louis-le-Grand and at 
Saint-Louis where, as Mahyer pointed out, "he finished
brilliantly by winning a physics prize in a large compe-
, . „20 tition.
* -T
Dupuit was accepted to the School of Bridges and Road­
ways in 1824 and in 1827 he was put in charge, in the 
department of Sarthe, of an engineering district which
19J. Mahyer, "Biography," translated by Candace Uter 
and edited by R. B. Ekelund, Jr., in De 1 1Utilite et sa 
Mesure, ed. Mario de Bernardi, p. 1. Page references are 
to the translation which is available only in the library 
of Louisiana State University.
70Mahyer, "Biography," p. 1.
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encompassed roadway and navigation work. He was married 
in 1829 and was made first-class engineer in 1836.
Dupuit concerned himself with important problems 
throughout his illustrious career as an engineer. He con­
ducted experiments on the deterioration of roadways which 
resulted in his Essay and Experiments on carriage Hauling 
and on the Friction of Rotation (1837). A subsequent 
contribution on the same subject, appearing in the Annales
des Ponts et Chaussees of 1842, earned him a gold metal,
21awarded as a result of an engineer's ballot. As a result
of these contributions, Dupuit was made second-class
engineer-in-chief in 1842 and was decorated by the Legion
22of Honor on May 1, 1843.
The floods of the Loire river in 1844 and in 1846 
occasioned Dupuit1s interest in the .Theoretical and 
Practical Studies on the Movement of Running Water (1848) 
which was later (1863) revised and re-published. Floods.
An Examination of the Means Proposed to Prevent their
2-1-Five such metals for engineering tracts in the 
Annales were voted for him. See Fleury, "The Life and 
Works of Mr. Dupuit," p. 4.
22Mahyer, "Biography," p. 3.
14
Return, published in 1858 was another attack on the same 
problem.
In 1850 Dupuit was called to municipal duty in Paris 
with the title of director-chief engineer. Here he studied 
municipal water distribution and supervised the construction 
of sewers. This position culminated in the research work 
entitled Theoretical and Practical Research on the Con­
duction and Distribution of Waters (1854, 2nd ed., 1865).
In December of 1855 Dupuit was named inspector-general of 
bridges and roadways. Additionally, he served for eleven 
years (1855-1866) on the general council of bridges and
roadways, of which, Mahyer claimed, "he was one of the most
2 2illustrious members. J
Even this incomplete listing of Dupuit's engineering 
interests and publications is sufficient to illustrate 
the accomplishments of an active and fertile mind. Dupuit 
profited from each of his assignments, as evidenced by the 
specialized nature of his publications. These publi­
cations were anterior to research on particular problems.
And Dupuit's was a scholarly approach for, as Mahyer said,
23Mahyer, "Biography," p. 7.
24"for Mr. Dupuit a work was never finished."
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Dupuit's career as an engineer was no more remarkable
than his career as an economist. It is unfortunate that
his projected book on Political Economy Applied to Public
Works, to which he refers as early as 1844, was never
25brought to completion. With the exception of the 
short plea for free trade, Commercial Freedom (1861),
Dupuit1s reputation as an economic theorist must stand with 
his journal contributions, which were of considerable 
number.
Dupuit1s position on the role of the state in economic 
affairs is interesting in that it permeates his writings
and becomes the matrix for his theoretical contributions.
(
Dupuit was a liberal as regards the majority of economic 
activities. As he pointed out " . . .  the question of wheat, 
the question of sugars, question of irons, question of the 
bakery shop, etc., etc., all resolve themselves in the same 
way (absolute freedom) and cannot be resolved in any other
2^Mahyer, "Biography," p. 5.
25See for example "On the Measurement of the Utility 
of Public Works" in Papers, note 1. At other places in his 
writings reference to "chapters" frequently appear. In his 
memorial article Fleury quoted Mr. Joseph Garnier, then 
editor of the Journal des Economistes, as having said that 
Dupuit "had postponed this project until after the finishing 
of his engineering work, which was interrupted by his death," 
"The Life and Works," p. 45.
16
O Csway." His support of the Malthusian doctrine along with
the classical wages-fund doctrine adds credence to this
27view. His position on these tenets of nineteenth*
century theoretical liberalism goes far in explaining 
Dupuit1s failure to become an important force in the 
Society of Political Economists, if Fleury's account is 
to be trusted.
Dupuit, however, is remembered not for his espousal of 
absolute economic freedom, but rather for the modifications 
he thought necessary to make in this freedom. Dupuit stood 
squarely on the results of his theoretical investigations 
regarding utility. "Public utility" (or the aggregate of
0 Dupuit, "Food Crises and Means Used to Remedy Them," 
Journal des Economistes. 2nd Semester, XXII (1859), p. 365. 
Dupuit elaborated on the benefits of free trade and com­
petition in his "effects of the Freedom of Trade - A Letter 
from Mr. Dupuit," translated by R. B. Ekelund, Jr.,
Journal des Economistes, 2nd Ser., XXV (1860), pp. 516-518.
In this "Letter" Dupuit took an extreme anti-protectionist 
position, concluding that ". . . in its own interest, a state 
has no right to seek to produce that which other peoples 
are able to make at a better price . . .," pp. 5-6. This
translation is available only in the library of Louisiana 
State University. Page references are to the translation.
^See Fleury, "The Life and Works" particularly 
pp. 24-27. Paradoxically, Dupuit supported the control of 
monopolies, against the equally stringent objections of his 
peers. See infra, p. 20.
society's welfare) could be maximized, perhaps, with 
ubiquitous conditions of competition. But Dupuit was con­
cerned with the effects of monopoly and discriminatory 
pricing policies on this public utility. In such monopolis­
tic industries or in the provision of "social goods" the 
government had a distinct role to play. It was to regulate 
rates or to assume control in order to "maximize" public 
utility. Absolute economic freedom could be abridged,
Dupuit contended, in the public interest, and utility was 
the overriding criterion of the public interest. As such, 
Dupuit was the harbinger of the philosophy of a later day.
He was the first welfare economist as well, conceiving of
a social welfare function not unlike those of such contem-
2R 29porary writers as Kenneth Arrow and Abram Bergson.
The organizing principle of society, to Dupuit, was to the
utility or social welfare, and, when conflicts arose
between this utility and private interests, utility should
conquer. When this fundamental issue is kept in mind,
Dupuit1s writings exhibit a genuine cohesiveness and order.
28see Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual 
Values, Cowles Commission Monograph No. 12 (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1951).
29Abram Bergson, "A Reformulation of Certain Aspects 
of Welfare Economics," Quarterly Journal of Economics, LII 
(February, 1938).
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Dupuit dismissed the exclusive use of economic facts 
in his attempt to develop tools with which to study public 
utility. Dupuit1s penchant for the theoretical (and mathe­
matical) method raised its head in every article. As 
Fleury pointed out, Dupuit conceived "of political economy 
as a science of reason more than as a science of observation."3*̂ 
As Dupuit himself said, ". . .to better see the facts, to
better observe them, one must clarify them by the light of 
reason."3'*' In keeping with this methodology, Dupuit con­
tributed to the development of several important theories:
32those of marginal utility, demand, consumers1 surplus, 
monopoly-price discrimination and marginal cost pricing.
It will become clear that these tools were developed in 
order to analyze "public utility" with a view to enlarging 
it wherever possible.
Dupuit1s economic lineage remains an interesting 
questionmark. Fleury referred to a remark made by Dupuit
•^Fleury, "The Life and Works," p., 14.
31Dupuit, Commercial Freedom (Paris, 1861), p. 4.
3 9Actually the terms is Marshall's. Dupuit called the 
difference between cost to the consumer and the area under 
the demand curve corresponding to a given price "relative 
utility" or "utility remaining to consumers." This tri­
angle has also been called "consumers' rent" owing to the 
similarities to the Ricardian rent theory. Practice in this 
dissertation will be to use all of these terms inter­
changeably.
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in 1864 to the effect that he had studied political economy 
for 40 years. There can be little doubt that Dupuit 
was influenced by the writings of J. B. Say since he fre­
quently and respectfully disagreed with that French master 
in his own work. The ideas of Pelagrino Rossi and Joseph 
Garnier, contemporary French economists, also appear to have
had some influence on the direction of Dupuit's economic
34thought, particularly with regard to methodology. But 
it is difficult to trace the exact origin of Dupuit1s 
interest in political economy. His biographers Mahyer and 
Fleury shed little light on this issue. To add to the 
mystery, Augustin Cournot, several years the senior of 
Dupuit, published his Mathematical Principles in 1838. The 
contents of this work should have been of extreme impor­
tance to Dupuit, but he nowhere mentions it. Moreover, 
Dupuit1s education was that of the engineer, with no great 
economist obtrusively figuring in his intellectual develop­
ment. In view of the dearth of such information, Mahyer's 
statement on the matter must suffice; "political economy 
which attracts at every turn the engineer's interest, had
■^Fleury, "The Life and Works," p. 44.
"^See Fleury, "The Life and Works," pp. 14 and 44.
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been also the object of his /Dupuit's/ constant study, and
he was not less learned in that science than in that of 
3 3public works."
The unpopularity of Dupuit's ideas during his lifetime 
is less of a mystery. As noted earlier, his thoughts on 
population and on the wages-fund doctrine earned him few 
friends, but his position that the control of industrial 
and commercial associations was necessary and desirable 
". . . definitely prevented him from being one of the
n  rdignitaries of the Society of Political Economists."D 
Moreover, Dupuit1s approach to such issues was apparently
of a "preaching" nature. Fleury described his mien as
3 7". . . cold, reserved, cutting all at the same time."
Aside from his family, added Fleury, his life "had no
other events than the works of the economist, engineer
38and of the analyst." These are not usually the qualities 
35Mahyer, "Biography," p. 7.
Fleury, "The Life and Works," p. 24. Here one can
hardly avoid noting the influence of Rousseau on Dupuit.
Suspect always of factions and uncontrolled associations 
(such as monopolies), Dupuit felt that the volonte general 
or the general will, which was a criterion of the general 
welfare, should prevail. This idea is still to be found in 
French social thought. To this day the French are suspicious 
of factions which might fragment the general will and welfare.
■^Fleury, "The Life and Works," p. 47.
^8Fleury, "The Life and Works," p. 47.
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which instill strong alliance or union of interest among
contemporaries, and in Dupuit1s case, they caused him to
39be accused of absolutism and paradox.
All this accounts somewhat for'his relative neglect 
and obscurity during his lifetime. But at least one con­
temporary attempted to set the assessment aright. On the
{occasion of Dupuit1s sudden death in 1866 he wrote:
Whoever will take the trouble to look over the 
whole of the studies or even of the rapid sketches 
left by Mr. Dupuit will readily recognize that this 
total work reveals an intelligence whose scope 
passes up many of those men whose names are more 
well-known to the public than his own.^O
Unfortunately, generations of economists have not followed
up Fleury's adjuration. There hds been piecemeal appraisal
to be sure, but no real attempt to reconstruct and evaluate
Dupuit1s unique and original approach to economics. This
research, it is hoped, will contribute toward filling the
gap.
39Fleury, "The Life and Works," p. 49 and Mahyer, 
"Biography," p. 9.
“̂ Fleury, "The Life and Works," p. 34.
CHAPTER II
UTILITY - DEMAND THEORY
The Subjective Theory of Value
Considerations of economic welfare and social well­
being directed Jules Dupuit's attention to the study of 
political economy in the early 1840's. As chief engineer 
of bridges and highways, Dupuit sensed the need for 
analytical tools which could give some measure of the 
desirability of all public projects. Moreover, the desire 
to devise tariffs and railroad rates for the "public good" 
goaded him, as it were, into an investigation of political 
economy. The quest for sound public policy in these 
matters required an economic definition of, in his words, 
"the conditions which these /public/ works must fulfill 
in order to be really u s e f u l . D u p u i t ,  however, found 
contemporary economic theory wanting of such a measure and
^Jules Dupuit, "On the Measurement of the Utility of 
Publ-ic Works, " translated by R. H. Barback, International 
Economic Papers, No. 2 (London: Macmillan, 1952), p. 83.
This article originally appeared in the Annales des Ponts 
et Chaussees, 2nd Ser., VIII (1844). Page references, 




at the same time recognized that the key to the problemf
lay in the psychological concept of utility. Dupuit
believed that all earlier utility theories were "vague,
2incomplete, and often inaccurate," and consequently of 
little value in the measurement of public welfare. Accord­
ingly, he set out to reshape the concept of utility into a 
tool of practical import.
Dupuit and J.B. Say; A Critique of Classical Value Theory
3Dupuit prefaced two of his major articles with cri­
tiques of utility theory, exhibiting a basic familiarity with 
major classical writers on the subject. His sharpest criti­
cisms were directed against J. B. Say, and quotations 
abound, in Dupuit1s critical work, from Say's Cours 
d 1Economie Politique and Traite d 'Economie Politique.̂
^Dupuit, "On the Measurement," (1844),p. 83.
Dupuit, "On the Measurement of the Utility of Public 
Works," Annales, (1844), and "On Utility and Its Measure,"
translated by Eleanor Evans and edited by R. B’. Ekelund, Jr., 
Journal des Economistes, 1st Ser., XXXVI (July to September, 
1853), pp. 1-27. This latter translation is available only 
in the library of Louisiana State University. Page refer­
ences will be to this translation. Since the titles of 
these two works are somewhat similar, subsequent references 
will list the short title and date of publication.
^Unfortunately, Dupuit did not provide page references 
to the Say quotations in either of the articles, but the 
International Economic Papers1 translation supplies them 
for the 1844 work.
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The major issue raised by Dupuit concerned the meaning 
of the word "utility." Say treated utility as the "faculty 
which things possess to be able to serve man in any
Cpossible way," and cited the example of the court mantle 
cloak (manteau de cour), to Say an apparently useless item, 
having utility jLf a price could be attached to it. Say 
thought further that "this price is the measure of the 
utility which men judge the thing to have . . . "  and that 
"this price is the basis of the demand for produces and con­
sequently of their v a l u e . B u t  Say thought that value 
could not exceed costs of production, for if it did, it 
would pay the consumer to produce it for himself. In sum, 
utility was the basis for demand and value, and price (or 
value in exchange) was a measure of utility. Say approved 
and accepted Smith's distinction between value in use and 
value in exchange, which amounted to asserting that all 
goods could not be treated under one theory of value.
Water, in this familiar paradox, possessed much value in 
use, but no exchange value. Diamonds, on the other hand,
C■̂ Say quoted in Dupuit, "On Utility and its Measure, " 
(1853); (hereafter "On Utility"), p. 1.
^Say quoted in Dupuit, "On the Measurement of the 
Utility of Public Works," (1844); (hereafter "On the 
Measurement."), p. 83.
had an abundance of exchange value, but were of little use. 
Say, attempting not to become embroiled in the confusion, 
noted that it would be preferable to reserve to the word 
"value" only the meaning implied by the phrase "value in 
exchange." He thought that the term "utility" was too 
capricious to use as a synonym for the word "value."
It is clear that Say thought that "real value," or 
value in exchange, was determined by costs of production 
and that the resultant market price was in fact a measure 
of the utility of that product. In this he followed the 
general notions of Adam Smith. But Say hastened to add 
that "one should not draw the absurd conclusion that, by
7raising the price by force, one increases . . . utility."
To illustrate this, he used a wine tax case in which he 
indicated that a tax of 5 cents (sous) per 10 cent bottle 
merely shifted 5 cents per bottle from the consumer or 
producer to the tax collector. Here Say regarded the 10 
cent, or cost of production as the "real value" of the 
s wine, and the 5 cents as contribution nothing to utility.
With respect to the wine-tax example, Dupuit readily 
accepted the fact that the 5 cents tax on wine added no
7Say quoted in Dupuit, "On Utility," (1853), pp. 6-7.
Qutility to the product. But at the same time it was
equally obvious to Dupuit that the product had to have at 
least 15 cents worth of utility, or the consumer simply 
would not buy wine. To substantiate this view, Dupuit 
invoked the fundamentals of consumers' surplus theory.
This theory will be treated systematically in Chapter III 
of the present dissertation, but it is useful at this 
point to show that Dupuit, in rejecting_the cost of pro­
duction theory of value, used the utility argument as the 
basis for his consumers' surplus theory. To wit, with 
reference to the wine-tax example, he said that "all those 
who attach to the purchase of wine a value greater than 15 
sous will buy, and will derive a kind of profit which will 
vary according to the significance which they put upon
qtheir acquisition." Thus, m  arguing that market price 
and cost of production are not measures of utility,
Dupuit arrived at his own measure— a measure not given by 
value in exchange, but by the highest price that one would 
offer for a quantity of a good. Carried to its logical 
end, this concept inevitably led Dupuit to the notion of a
8"0n the Measurement," (1844), p. 85.
^"On the Measurement," (1844), p. 85.
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"consumers' surplus, 1 that is, that the difference between 
this highest price one would pay, and the price actually 
paid (value in exchange) for fixed quantity of output 
accrued to the consumer in the form of a surplus or net 
gain in satisfaction. The utility afforded by a product, 
thus conceived, is not measured by market price, as in 
Say's scheme, but it is related to maximum-offer price; 
and this maximum-offer price, to Dupuit, was determined 
by taste, income, and individual circumstances.
The Smith-Say Paradox and the Marginal Utility Theory
Although Dupuit thought that the measure of the utility 
of any quantity of a good was the maximum price the con­
sumer would be willing to offer for it, utility, in his 
view, was not synonomous with value, but was only one 
element of value. In Dupuit's words:
. . . utility and value are two different
properties not independent, but having between a 
coupled relationship in which enters another 
circumstance, which is rarity. In order for 
something to have value, two essential conditions 
are: necessary: first, that it be useful . . .;
second, that it not be in such great quantity as 
to satisfy completely all d e s i r e s . 10
Here the solution to the water-diamond paradox was at
hand; utility and scarcity provided the key. The exchange
10"0n Utility," (1853), pp. 10-11.
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value of diamonds was high because quantity was restricted
so that "only those who are disposed to make the greatest
sacrifices'1̂ ^ could afford to procure them.
Dupuit thus attempted to show that water and diamonds
both follow the same law of exchange value. And it is in
the very solution to the paradox of value that Dupuit found
himself giving a starring role to marginal utility in price
determination. It is, therefore, necessary to investigate
12this argument in detail. Figure 2-1 of the community's
total, average and marginal utility functions, although
not introduced by Dupuit at this point, can be used to
13analyze his ideas.
Dupuit's example was one of a city receiving water in 
abundance from a stream flowing through it. Water there 
would have no value in exchange. But, he continued:
•'--'-"On Utility," (1853), p. 11.
12Dupuit attacked the value m  use - value in exchange 
dichotomy in the 1844 Annales article, but in not so clear 
a fashion as in his 1853 revision. His clearest statement, 
that of 1853, is used here.
I3The total utility function does not necessarily have 
to be drawn so that marginal and average utility decrease 
over the entire range of output. Conceivable marginal and 
average utility could increase with the first units of 
output. See Richard H. Leftwich, The Price System and 
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. . . the enemy comes, blockades the city,
diverts the stream, the inhabitants have now at 
their disposal only the drops which escape from 
the works of the enemy or that of a few wells 
which dry up easily; there is no longer any more 
for all usages, everyone is more or less deprived; 
water then has a value. . .If the enemy, per­
fecting its works, succeeds in diminishing 
progressively the quantity of water which enters 
the city, its price is going to rise more and 
more and one will not care to exchange a liter 
of it against a diamond.-*-4 (emphasis supplied)
In the above quotation, Dupuit said that utility indeed
was a determinant of value, but that it was not the only
14"0n Utility," (1853), p. 11.
determinant, since quantity available of water must also 
be considered. With reference to Figure 2-1, Qt would be 
the quantity originally appropriated by the inhabitants of 
the city, for at this point, total utility is at a maximum 
and the marginal utility of water is zero. Let some quantity, 
say Qn, be the quantity of water originally available.
Between quantity Qz and quantity Qt, the average utility of 
water is positive, but no one will yet pay a price for 
water because the marginal utility is still negative in 
that region. Let us recall that Dupuit posited the 
assumption that the enemy allows only "drops" to flow 
through and that the inhabitants only had a "few wells which 
dry up easily." Dupuit here seemed to have indicated 
that the progressive diminution of the quantity of water 
available creates a positive and progressively increasing 
marginal utility for water among the inhabitants. But 
the material which follows the above quotation seems to 
make this conclusion less tenable. Dupuit remarked:
Let us say, then, with all the economists, 
that utility or value in use is the basis of 
value, but that it is not the only one. Permit 
us to take the liberty of borrowing from arith­
metic a comparison: . . . the value of a
fraction . . . depends evidently on its numer­
ator, the greater the numerator, the greater 
the fraction, but it also depends on its 
denominator, the greater the denominator, the
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smaller the fraction . . . The numerator is 
the utility, the denominator is the quantity at 
the public's disposal, the value in exchange 
/price/ is the value of the fraction.^
It thus appears that Dupuit held that price, or exchange 
value, was equal to average utility, or U/Q. But it is 
clear that he was merely trying to solve the Smith-Say 
dilemma through an analogy; that is, he reconciled 
utility with scarcity in the determination of value. He 
met Smith and Say on their own grounds in formulating 
exchange value in terms of a ratio of utility to quantity 
available. In other words, the concept of average utility 
was used by Dupuit to direct thinking towards a solution 
to the diamond-water paradox. But his belief that this 
relationship (between average utility and quantity avail­
able) was an inadequate explanation of price is revealed 
in the sentences following the above quotation:
Heaven forbid that we consider this compar­
ison /average utility/ as expressing exactly the 
connection which exists between the value in 
exchange of an object, its utility and the number of 
similar objects actually available; it is only an 
indication of the general sense of their influence. 
The formula which ties these three quantities 
together is much more complex and it /average
15 "On Utility’,' (1853), pp. 11-12.
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utility/ only presents us with . . . this 
analogy, that value increases with utility and 
diminishes with number.^ (emphasis supplied)
If average utility (U/Q) is not an expression of exchange 
value, but is only an indication of the mutual inter­
action of utility and quantity, then some other expression 
defines value. Presumably Dupuit meant this "more com­
plex" expression "which ties these three quantities 
together" to be marginal utility.
Dupuit must be criticized for allowing his argument 
to lose force. His original statement of marginal utility 
in the example of the besieged water supply was clear 
enough. But he lapsed into an analogical statement of 
average utility at a crucial point in his refutation of 
the water-diamond paradox. The fraction of which he spoke 
was average utility, and it would be incorrect to assert 
that such an expression together with the quantity avail­
able equals price or exchange value. For such an 
expression to possess validity, a rather bizarre theoretical
16"On Utility," (1853), p. 12.
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17curiosity must obtain. In his eagerness to show that 
utility, along with quantity available, played an important 
role in price determination, Dupuit invoked an unnecessary
1 7'A rather special form must be ascribed to the total 
utility function for this to be a possibility. A "roof­
shaped" total utility function which emanates linearly 
from the origin to a maximum and, abruptly becoming 
negatively sloped and linear once more, contains the 
possibility. The total utility curve can be thought of 
as consisting of two segments, with the utility maximum 
dividing them. For the first segment the rate of change 
in total utility is constant and marginal utility and 
average utility coincide. The marginal utility function 
becomes discontinuous where total utility is at a maximum 
and then negative at all greater quantities of water. All 
quantities less than that corresponding to maximum total 
utility would bear a constant positive price, quite with­
out reference to whether one is speaking of average or of 
marginal utility as the determinant of exchange value.
Since both the average and marginal curves coincide in 
this case, one could say that either or both determine 
price. It is clear that Dupuit did not have this case in 
mind, however, for as the seige continued, the "pro­
gressive" diminution of water available caused price to 
"rise more and more," a situation which would not have 
occurred had the identity and consequent constancy of 
marginal and average utility obtained.
Moreover, with reference to Figure 2-1, depicting a 
"normally" sloped total utility function, Dupuit could not 
have maintained that average utility and quantity available 
determined price, for, since water was free before the 
seige, quantity Qz would have been taken. But at quantity 
Qz, total utility is zero and there is no value in exchange 
or value in use attached to water. If Dupuit felt that 
average utility determined exchange value, there would be no 
particular significance to quantity Qt, the utility 
maximizing quantity, on that diagram. The conclusion that 
water possessed neither exchange value nor utility before 
the seige must follow. Since Dupuit knew that this was 
not the case, it must be concluded that he only intended 
an analogy. The analogy was ill-timed, and confusing 
however.
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analogy which drew attention from his initially correct 
statement.
Exoneration is possible, however, when one considers 
the manner in which Dupuit hedged his argument. He clearly 
stated that a more complex expression (than average 
utility) determined price, but he cryptically neglected to 
return to it. A clear mathematical expression for marginal 
utility at this point would have added great force to his 
evaluation of Say and classical value theory. The conclusion 
that he did not fully understand marginal utility would be 
naive and unguarded in view of his pristine treatment of it 
elsewhere in his writings. It is likely, moreover, that 
in the issue raised by the classical paradox (that of the 
determinants of price), Dupuit found, in embryonic form, 
the "neo-classical" theory of value. Dupuit thought that 
utility and demand had to be considered along with quantity 
available in the determination of price. He felt that 
Smith and Say would have had only to relate the concepts 
of utility and scarcity (already in their possession) to 
point the analysis of value in the right direction. This 
relationship may have provided a more fruitful line of
35
18inquiry than labor units, scarcity as in the case of
18 9 oland, or even bare costs of production. u In short,
Dupuit seemed to be chiding the classical economists for
not having seen what was obvious to him, and for not
having understood what, with modest reflection, should
I QSee Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (New York:
Modern Library, 1937), pp. 30-31. Smith, of course, only 
held such a theory in the "rude state" of society. David 
Ricardo was one of the most insistent proponents of the 
labor theory; see Chapter I in the Principles of Polit­
ical Economy and Taxation (Homewood, 111.: Richard D.
Irwin, 1963) .
19See Smith, Wealth, Book I, Chapter XI, pp. 144- 
176, particularly p. 145 e_t passim; and Ricardo, Principles, 
pp. 506 and Chapter II.
20 See Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic 
Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954),
pp. 308-309, for a discussion of Smith's cost of pro­
duction theory of value. George Stigler, in an inter­
esting article entitled "Ricardo's 93% Labor Theory of 
Value," Journal of Political Economy, LV (April, 1947), 
thinks that Ricardo's value theory should be more properly 
termed cost of production. The "conventional wisdom" 
holds that he doggedly held to the labor theory, however, 
although he apologized liberally for it in the case of 
the introduction of machinery and in the case of non- 
reproducible goods.
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21 . . .have been obvious to them as well. Dupuit's criticism
is well taken, and is of value. It is unfortunate, however, 
that his usual boldness did not prevail. Much of the sting 
of his theoretical critique is lost in the analogy, and, 
more pointedly, in the failure to elaborate on his "more 
complex expression." But the discussion was not in any 
sense worthless, and the genuine uniqueness of Dupuit's 
attack on the famous paradox is not to be denied.
Dupuit1s Demand Curve
The purpose of this section will be to present and
evaluate Dupuit1s formulation of demand curve theory. Dupuit,
2 2as will be shown, did not have the "last word" on demand,
21 Dupuit said, for example, that "J. B. Say, after 
having perfectly defined what was to be understood by the 
utility of wealth, has often confused it with value, pre­
tending that this value of exchange was the measure of 
utility. Now, the nature of a measure is to increase or 
decrease proportionately with the measured quantity . . .
In order that the opinion of J. B. Say be admissable, it 
would then be necessary that value always be proportionate 
to utility. Now, that is not the relation which exists 
between these two quantities," "On Utility," (1853), pp. 4-5. 
Dupuit added in another passage that "the capital error_of 
J.B. Say /and all of classical economics, one might add/ is 
not to have misunderstood value in use or utility, but to 
have rejected it from science . . . "  "On Utility," (1853), 
pp. 14-15.
2 2See Leon Walras, Elements of Pure Economics. trans­
lated by William Jaffe (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., 1954), pp. 443-446. The Elements was first 
published in three volumes appearing from 1974 to 1877.
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and his exposition received criticism before the end of
23the nineteenth century. Moreover, it is important to 
indicate at the outset that Dupuit1s pure theory of the 
demand curve and his consumer1s surplus theory are inex­
tricably intertwined. His original purpose in studying 
political economy, it will be remembered, was to find a 
measure of "public utility." One measure was consumer's
surplus, and the demand curve, or the "curve of consump- 
24tion" as Dupuit labeled it, was a convenient tool to
show and manipulate such a surplus. It was as a means of
depicting consumer's surplus, then, that Dupuit drew the 
25demand curve. Thus, although the two concepts are 
linked to Dupuit's presentation, the following will attempt 
to treat the theory of the demand curve in isolation.
2 2It is doubtful, moreover, that the state of demand 
theory has reached its apogee even tocJay„ See, for example, 
H. H. Liebhafsky, The Nature of Price Theory (Homewood, 
Illinois: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1963), p. 531.
24Dupuit used the French term courbe de consommation 
in referring to the demand curve. See "On Utility,"
(1853), p. 373 in the Journal.
2 SIt will be explained later that this is legitimate 
only if some rather restrictive assumptions are met. See 
for example Paul A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic 
Analysis (New York: Atheneum, 1965, originally published 
in 1947), Chapters VII, VIII, particularly pp. 199-200, 
and Chapter III of the present dissertation.
38
Cournot and Dupuit on Utility and Demand
Nineteenth century French writers, it would seem, were
especially inventive regarding economic theory, forging
0tools in advance of their contemporaries in England.
As early as 1838 an important book dealing with the tools
\
of economic analysis appeared in France. Augustin Cournot“p
published in that year his Researches into the Mathematical 
Principles of the Theory of Wealth, w h i c h ,  as indicated 
in Chapter I, apparently went unnoticed by Dupuit.
Cournot, as evidenced by the book, was the first writer to 
discuss in mathematical terms (and in terms of geometrical
presentation) the functional relationship between price
\
and quantity. Additionally, he made important contri­
butions, which were obviously above his time, to the theory
0 J. A. Schumpeter is reputed, perhaps aprocyphally, 
to have once said that of the four great economic theorists, 
three were French: Quesnay, Cournot and Walras. The
fourth presumably was Marshall. See P. A. Samuelson, 
"Economists and the History of Ideas," American Economic 
Review. LII (March, 1963), pp. 3-4.
2?A reprint of this classic work has recently become 
available. See Researches, translated by Nathaniel T.
Bacon with an essay by Irving Fisher (New York: Augustus
M. Kelley, 1960).
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of monopoly and duopoly.^® But it is clear that Cournot 
eschewed considerations of utility in his formulation of 
the "law of demand," for he said:
The abstract idea of wealth or of value in 
exchange, a definite idea, and consequently 
susceptible of rigorous treatment in combina­
tions, must be carefully distinguished from the 
accessory ideas of utility, scarcity, and suitabil­
ity to the needs and enjoyments of mankind, which 
the word wealth still suggests in common speech.
These ideas are variable, and by nature indermin- 
ant, and consequently ill suited for the founda­
tion of a scientific theory.^9
Although Cournot thought utility a "variable and indeter­
minate idea," he disclaimed any opinions as to the truth or
28Modern theorists dealing with problems of imperfect 
competition often use Cournot's mineral springs model (with 
conjectural variation of zero) as their point of departure. 
See Edward H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Com­
petition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1962), pp. 32, 221-222. William Fellner finds that 
"it was Augustin Cournot's great achievement to have 
discovered the distinction feature of the oligopoly problem. 
The distinctive feature to which Fellner refers is that the 
kind of assumptions one makes concerning rivals reactions 
determines the kind of solution one obtains in any given 
problem. See Competition Among the Few (New York: Augustus 
M. Kelley, 1965) , p. 56 e_t passim. Until recently, it has 
been thought that Cournot's model yielded indeterminant 
results in the absence of an assumed conjectural variation 
of zero. But Irwin M. Grossack, in an interesting inter­
pretation of the Cournot model, has shown that the "con­
jectural variation of zero" assumption can be dropped with 
the model still yielding determinant and plausible results. 
See "Duopoly, Defensive Strategies, and the Kinked Demand 
Curve," Southern Economic Journal, XXXII (April, 1966).
29Cournot, Researches, p. 10.
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error in discussions on the utility of things. As he 
pointed out, "we only mean that generally neither the 
truth or error is capable of proof; that these are ques­
tions of valuation, and not soluble by calculation, nor
30by logical argument." Cournot was not saying here that
utility has nothing to do with the law of demand, for
further on in his book he pointed out clearly that the
law of demand "depends evidently on the kind of utility
of the article, . . .  on the habits and customs of the
31people, on average wealth . . ." Notwithstanding this 
concession to utility, Cournot consistently entertained only 
an "empirical" approach to the law. As he lucidly pointed 
out:
Observation must therefore be depended on 
for furnishing the means of drawing up between 
proper limits a table of the corresponding 
values of D and p; after which, by the well- 
known methods of interpolation or by graphic 
processes, an empiric formula or a curve can 
be made to represent the function in question; 
and the solution of problems can be pushed as 
far as numerical a p p l i c a t i o n s . ^
-^Cournot, Researches, p. 11, note.
r> I Cournot, Researches, p. 47.
Cournot, Researches, pp. 47-48.
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Dupuit, as will become apparent, also used observation in 
obtaining the demand curve; but Dupuit gave the data he 
observed a different interpretation.
From Utility to Demand
Arguing with the flavor of Carl Menger, who later
33elaborated on the point, Dupuit showed that the marginal
utility that an individual obtained from a homogeneous
stock of goods is determined by the use to which the last
units of the stock are put. In doing so, he clearly
pointed out that the marginal utility of a stock of some
particular good diminishes with increases in quantity. If
one grants his psychological premise that "each consumer
himself attaches a different utility to the same object
according to the quantity he can consume,"^4 his argument
follows with ease. The example is once again water.
Dupuit argued:
One distributes water on a city which, 
situated on a height, could procure it only with 
great pains. There was then such a value that 
the hectolitre per day was 50 francs by annual 
subscription. It is quite clear that every ’
Carl Menger, Principles of Economics (Glencoe, 
Illinois: The Free Press, 1950), see particularly pp.
129-130. Menger's Principles was originally published in 
1871.
■^Dupuit, "On Utility," (1853), p. 17.
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hectolitre of water consumed in these circum-3 3stances has a utility of at_ least 50 .francs, 
(emphasis supplied)
Dupuit here suggested that each unit of a given quantity
of water will have a different utility. But why should
each increment of the same commodity possess a different
utility? Dupuit continued his argument, supposing that
due to the installation of pumps, costs of production for
water have fallen by 20 francs:
What happens? First, the inhabitant who 
consumed a hectolitre will continue to do so and 
will realize a benefit of 20 francs on his first 
hectolitre; but it is highly probable that this 
lower price will engage him in increasing his con­
sumption; instead of using it parsimoniously for 
his personal use, he will use it for needs less 
pressing, less essential, the satisfaction of 
which is worth more than 30 francs, since this 
sacrifice is necessary to obtain water, but is 
worth less than 50, since at this price he
relinquished this consumption.^6 (emphasis 
supplied)
Thus, each increment of the same commodity carried a 
different utility because additional units will allow 
"less pressing, less essential" needs to be met. The 
additional utility (marginal) derived from additional 
units of the same commodity must decline. Dupuit,
35"On Utility," (1853), pp. 17-18. 
^"On Utility," (1853), p. 18.
extending the example, supposed that when price fell to
20 francs, the individual would demand 40 hectolitres "to
be able to wash his house every day; give them to him at
10 francs, he will ask for 10 to be able to water his
garden; at 5 frs. he will ask for 20 to supply a water
font; at one fr. he would want 100 to have a continuous 
37flow, etc.1' It is the least pressing need, not the 
most pressing need for a commodity which defined the value 
of the entire stock of goods. Dupuit1s argument can be 
conveniently summarized in Figure 2-2.
FIGURE 2-2
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37"On Utility," (1853), p. 18.
Assume that the consumer is originally in equilibrium 
when the price of water is at and quantity taken is q^. 
Now assume with Dupuit that the price of water falls to p£• 
At the lower price for water the individual is in dis­
equilibrium at point c. The marginal utility of the last 
unit of his existing stock is greater than the now lower 
marginal utility of water represented by the lower price.
In terms of price, what he would pay for q^ of water is 
greater than the price he must pay for quantity q . He 
could buy the same quantity of water (q̂ ) at a lower total 
expenditure, but Dupuit assumed that the consumer would not 
do this. Attached to each incremental unit of water between 
quantity q^ and quantity q  ̂ is a marginal satisfaction 
greater, albeit diminishing, than that which would obtain 
for the incremental unit corresponding to price P2. Thus, 
in an effort to maximize total satisfaction, the individual 
will increase his purchases of water up to, but not beyond, 
quantity q^.
In opportunity cost terminology, at q^, (assuming 
the consumer 'to originally be in equilibrium), the marginal 
satisfaction of an extra franc's expenditure on any other 
good is less than the marginal utility of quantity q^
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to the consumer. In order to equalize the marginal utility 
per franc's expenditure, the consumer must increase the 
quantity of water purchased until the marginal satis­
faction per franc's worth of the last unit purchased 
equals the marginal utility per franc's worth of all other 
goods in the consumer's collection.®®
This fundamental relationship between marginal utility, 
total utility and price are given repeatedly in Dupuit's
writings. A numerical example can be found in Appendix
3 9II of this dissertation. It is clear from these 
examples and formulations that Dupuit understood the 
relationships between total and marginal utility. Total 
utility for any given quantity was the area under the 
marginal utility curve up to that quantity. When price 
becomes zero, total utility is at a maximum and total 
revenue is zero. Dupuit was the first French economist, if
This line of reasoning must lead to a demand curve 
of unit elasticity since total expenditures remain con­
stant on water. Dupuit, however, was unaware of this 
logical implication. Infra, Chapter III, p. 64.
®®Appendix II is taken from "On Utility," (1853), 
p. 42.
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not the first economist,^® to have clearly explained this 
relationship.
The marginal utility curve described above is Dupuit's 
courbe»de consommation. and although most of his examples
^ I n  Chapter I it was indicated that E.R.A. Seligman 
in his article "On Some Neglected British Economists," 
Economic Journal, XIII (1903), advanced the case of W.F. 
Lloyd as the "first thinker in any country to advance what 
is known today as the marginal theory of value," p. 363. 
Additionally Seligman1s article is replete with quotations 
from Lloyd's Lecture on the Notion of Value (1833). If 
these quotations are representative, it must be admitted 
that Lloyd understood the fact that marginal satisfaction 
diminished with quantity. Little else can be said for 
Lloyd, however. His ideas, verbally expressed, are dis­
jointed and he presented no rigorous demonstration of them. 
Moreover, no less an authority than Alfred Marshall credited 
Dupuit with first "formally describing . . . small incre­
ments of price as measuring corresponding small increments 
of pleasure," relegating to Lloyd the role of having 
"anticipated" utility analysis. See Marshall, Principles 
of Economics (London: Macmillan, 8th edition, 1920),
p. 101. George Stigler finds that the statement that 
utility diminishes with quantity is a commonplace and that 
"the first statement in print of a commonplace is adventi­
tious . . . the statement acquires interest only when it
is logically developed or explicitly applied to economic 
problems." Lloyd's, according to Stigler, was an adventi­
tious act and he credits Dupuit with having first elaborated 
on and applied the principle. See "The Development of 
Utility Theory" in Stigler's Essays, pp. 78-79. At least 
one contemporary British writer remains unconvinced of 
Stigler's assessment of Lloyd. B. J. Gordon in "W. f .
Lloyd: A Neglected Contribution," Oxford Economic Papers,
New Series, 18 (March, 1966), has reaffirmed Lloyd as the 
first important expositor of marginal utility, and, 
investigating Lloyd's other writings, finds him "a fore­
runner of the Marxian critique of the operations of a 
system of laissez-faire capitalism," as well; p. 64.
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are concerned with transportation and communication, it 
is certain that the same laws applied to all goods and 
services. He provided explicit directions in his article 
on Toll on the manner in which a demand curve should be 
constructed:
If, in a table of two columns, one inserts 
in the first all the prices, from 0, the one 
which corresponds to the greatest consumption, up 
to the price that stops all consumption and in 
the second, regarding the price, the corres­
ponding quantity consumed, we will have the 
exact representation of what we call the law of 
consumption.
Dupuit neatly constructed such a demand curve in 
1844, six years after Cournot's Researches was published. 
His construction was apparently independent of Cournot's
41Dupuit used the general term voies de communica­
tion which signified any mode or method of transporta­
tion, hauling or communication.
42Jules Dupuit, "Toll," Dictionnaire de 1'Economie 
Politique, Ch. Coquelin and Guillaumin, (eds ), trans­
lated by Eleanor Evans and edited by R. E. Ekelund, Jr., 
(Paris: Guillaumin and Co., 1852-53), p. 8. Page refer­
ences are to the translation.
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43however. Like Cournot, Dupuit gave the equation for 
the curve of consumption as y = f(x), or alternatively,
= f(p). Additionally, Dupuit, as Walras was later to 
do, placed the independent variable (price on the x axis 
and the dependent variable (quantity) on the y axis.
Modern microeconomic diagrams, following Marshallian 
tradition, reverse this procedure because Marshall treated 
marginal demand price as a function of quantity. Dupuit's 
construction is reproduced below as Figure 2-3.44
4^See F. Y. Edgeworth, "Dupuit," Palgraves Diction­
ary in which Edgeworth stated that Dupuit "does not appear 
to have seen" Cournot's book, p. 654. This research 
seems to lend support to Edgeworth's statement. Additional 
corroboration on this point was given by Rene Roy in his 
centenary estimate of Cournot. See his "L'Oeuvre 
Economique D'Augustin Cournot," Econometrica, 7 (April,
1939). Roy cited the neglect of Cournot's works in the 
nineteenth century, especially in France, and added that 
he found "une preuve dans le silence manifeste7 ̂  cet 
<^gard par un autre e'conomlste fran^ais, 1' Ing^nieur des
Ponts et Chauss^es Jean Dupuit, qui fut le con-
temporain de Cournot," p. 143.
44This figure is labeled Fig. 1 in Dupuit's 1844 
article "On the Measurement," p. 108.
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FIGURE 2-3 
DUPUIT'S COURBE DE CONSOMMATION
N
0 p p1 p" P
Dupuit described his construction as follows:
If . . . along a line OP the lengths Op,
Op', Op'' . . . represent various prices for an 
article, and that the verticals pn, p'n', p''n''
. . . represent the number of articles consumed 
corresponding to these prices, then it is possible 
to construct a curve Nn'n''P which we shall call 
the curve of consumption. ON represents the 
quantity consumed when the price' is zero, and 
OP the price at which consumption falls to zero.^
It is obvious that this curve is identical in conception
to Figure 2-2; that is, Dupuit's demand curve is a marginal
utility curve. Dupuit made his meaning clear, with
reference to Figure 2-3, by stating that "the utility of
. . . np articles is at least OP and . . . for almost
all of them the utility is greater than O p . ^  Since the
4S "On the Measurement," p. 106.
^ " O n  the Measurement," (1844), p. 106.
50
relationship between price and quantity is an inverse one, 
the demand curve drawn by Dupuit has a negative slope, 
regardless of the axis chosen for the independent variable.
Dupuit considered total revenue by supposing that the 
demand curve in Figure 2-3 is one for a bridge. He then 
explained that if it is wished to raise a fixed sum of 
money (A), by levying a toll on the bridge it is nec­
essary to solve the equation xy = A, where y = f(x). He
continued: "if it is wished to raise the greatest revenue,
/^y V  4 Vwe must solve the equation = 0." Dupuit said that
total revenue is at a maximum when marginal revenue is 
zero; alternatively, when the derivative of total revenue 
with respect to price is z;ero, total receipts are maximized.
Characteristics of Dupuit1s Demand Curve: Some
Problems with His Theoretical Formulation
Dupuit1s consumer's surplus argument follows facilely
from the above discussion, but it is important at this
point to collect some of the characteristics of Dupuit's
demand curve and to consider some of the assumptions which
he did (or did not) make in his construction as well.
(1) Dupuit1s demand curve was derived from observation.
As chief engineer of bridges and highways, Dupuit observed
47 "On the Measurement," (1844), p. 107.
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an "operative" law of demand in all of his everyday
activities. This was not new. Six years earlier Cournot
had commented on the mathematical relationship between price
and quantity demanded. But Dupuit1s analysis was richer
in the sense that he drew from his profession examples
illustrating his theoretical contentions. He was under
no illusion with respect to the problem of identification,
however, since he candidly admitted that this "series of
relationships /demand/ is not known for any commodity
since it depends on the volatile will of human beings; it
48is today no longer what it was yesterday." Thus he knew 
that the problem of obtaining an empirical function was 
compounded since the variables were constantly changing.
But the demand curve was nevertheless a "fact of exper-
49lence" to Dupuit "which has been verified statistically."
(2) Dupuit pushed demand theory a step beyond Cournot's
formulation by correctly distinguishing the law of marginal
utility and by identifying the marginal utility curve with
50the demand curve itself. Additionally, Dupuit described 
48 "On the Measurement," p. 103.
^^"On the Measurement," p. 103.
^While Marshall had certain reservations with respect 
to this identity, his demand curve, excepting several impor­
tant points, was Dupuit1s. See Schumpeter, History, p. 839.
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the relationship between total and marginal utility
(demand) in tabular form.^
(3) Dupuit assumed that the price that consumers
would offer for a quantity of any good is determined by
the utility of that good alone and not by the utility of
other goods. Dupuit of course assumed that the utility
function for the good could shift, for he said that the
demand curve, "would not only be different for each
bridge, each canal, each railway, each object but even
different for the same bridge, the same canal, the same
railroad and the same object with time which modifies
52use, habits, needs and caprices of man." But nowhere 
did he indicate that the demand or marginal utility 
function might shift due to a change in the utility 
afforded by other goods in the consumer's collection.
In short, he contemplated no complementary or substitute 
goods. Consequently, it must be concluded that Dupuit 
assumed that all utility functions were independent 
(additive) since he gave no information to the contrary.
51 See Appendix II. 
52Dupuit, "Toll," p. 9.
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(4) Dupuit assumed that income was a determinant of
demand for a particular good. Although he did not state
this explicitly, he indicated the assumption indirectly
with the comment that " . . .  the poor man does not attach
to the advantage of passing the bridge the same price or
53the same utility as the rich one . . . ," and again when 
he spoke of the "sacrifices"^4 which individuals are 
disposed to make for goods. There is a strong pre­
sumption, evidenced by such statements, that Dupuit
55thought that money income was a determinant of demand.
(5) Although it will remain to develop the point
in detail, Dupuit implicitly and unintentionally assumed 
that the marginal utility of money income or expenditures 
is held constant in addition to the utility functions of 
other goods as the price of the good in question is 
increased or decreased. Algebraically, if y represents 
all other goods in the consumer's collection, and m is 
the consumer's money expenditure, when the price of
53"On Utility," (1853), p. 23.
54"On Utility," (1853), p. 24.
55 . . .Such statements give Walras' criticism that Dupuit
failed to see that /the maximum pecuniary sacrifice . . .
/depends in part on/ . . . the consumer's means" an air
of inaccuracy. See Elements, p. 445 et passim.
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56good x is decreased, the following would obtain:
S S  >  M i  = MUmpx py
Dupuit assumed that the consumer re-attained equilibrium 
by increasing quantity taken of x (thus decreasing the 
MUx) up to the point where the ratio of MUx/px is once 
again equal to the MUy/py and to the MU of money income. 
Since Dupuit nowhere assumed that either the MU functions 
or the demand functions of other goods (or the marginal 
utility of money expenditures) shift with changes in the 
price of x, this conclusion is clear. It is for this 
reason that Dupuit1s demand curve will always have a 
negative slope.^
Dupuit would be formally correct in identifying the 
demand curve with the marginal utility curve only in the
56See P. A. Samuelson, Foundations, and "Constancy 
of the Marginal Utility of Income," in 0. Lange, F. McIntyre, 
and T. 0. Yntema (eds.), Studies in Mathematical Economics 
and Econometrics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1942). Samuelson proved that in equilibrium " . . .  the 
marginal utility of expenditure upon each and every 
commodity must be the same, equal moreover to the marginal 
(rate of) utility derived from an extra dollar of expendi­
ture distributed optimally over all of the goods," 
Foundations, p. 190. Additionally, "the marginal utility 
of income, as well as depending upon the particular 
cardinal index of utility selected, is also a function of 
all prices and income," Studies, p. 76.
57Indeed, economists in the past have invoked the 
assumption of constancy for this very purpose, i.e., to 
show that demand curves have a negative slope. For a 
discussion of the marginal utility of money as it relates 
to consumers' surplus, see Chapter III, Infra, pp.64.
case of a unitarily elastic demand function for all 
independent demands. All of his numerical examples 
depicted demand curves of varying elasticity however. The 
curves are more elastic in the upper reaches and less 
elastic in the lower portions (see Appendix II). Moreover, 
if Dupuit were assuming unit elasticity ubiquitously, 
there would be little point in giving the condition
= o for maximizing total revenue; for with a demand 
curve of unitary elasticity the total revenue function 
has no slope.^8
Thus, one of several conclusions must follow. First, 
Dupuit could have assumed that all demand functions were
^This can be shown by considering a demand function 
in the following form, with k and n both positive con­
stants;
q = kp“n 
pq = TR = kp_n+1
The elasticity of the demand function is:
If the demand curve is of unit elasticity, n = 1, and 
TR = k. Thus,
The slope of the total revenue function (or marginal 
revenue) would equal zero for the entire range of output 
and price combinations.
Ep dp q -n
dTR = 0 
dp
independent with respect to changes in price and income 
(and that the marginal utility of money was constant) and 
consequently that all demand curves were of unit elasticity. 
Second, it could be concluded that Dupuit proceeded a^ i_f 
demand functions were not independent and that the 
marginal utility of money was not constant, unaware that 
his analysis called for unit elasticity or at least some 
explanation of his assumptions. Finally, one could 
maintain that Dupuit was aware of the results yielded by 
his implicit assumptions and chose to ignore the impli­
cations of them, perhaps due to the inconvenience of 
dealing with shifting demand functions and changing 
marginal utility of money vis-a-vis changes in price. He 
may have felt that in partial equilibrium analysis small 
price changes would have little effect on demand 
functions for other goods and on the marginal utility of 
money, and could thus be safely ignored. In short, he 
might have taken a Marshallian view of the matter.
The implications of the first possibility would be 
really restrictive. Although empirical demand curves are 
difficult to obtain, a. priori information casts a jaundiced 
eye on the proposition of ubiquitous unit elasticity. 
Moreover, Dupuit himself never indicated in any of his
examples that he intended to portray such a function. On 
the contrary, all of his numerical illustrations show 
demand curves of varying elasticity. The third con­
clusion is equally untenable, for to assume varying 
elasticity of the demand curve in the first place would 
require some statement about the shifting of demand 
functions for other goods or changes in the marginal 
utility of money when the price of the good in question 
changed. Additionally,this would mean that the demand 
curve could no longer be identified with the marginal 
utility function, and Dupuit needed this identification 
for the consumer's surplus theory. The marginal utility 
function can be represented by the demand function only 
in the case of constant elasticity of demand for all 
goods. Since Dupuit's examples assumed changing elasticities, 
he would have also have had to assume independent demand 
functions and changing marginal utility of money; but if 
he made this latter assumption, he would have to face the 
fact that the demand curve for a good is no longer identi­
cal to the marginal utility function for that good. In 
short, Dupuit was involved in a contradiction. He showed 
that demand elasticities vary and a± the same time identi­
fied the demand curve with the marginal utility curve.
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The second conclusion is most plausible. Dupuit 
proceeded as if utility functions were independent and 
as if the marginal utility of money varied, quite unaware 
of the conclusion that his implicit assumptions required. 
Dupuit was myopically concerned with the demand curve for 
a good, and if he was cognizant at all of the contra­
diction woven into his analysis, he chose not to present 
it in print. This issue of the marginal utility of money, 
as the following chapter will show, is of special import 
to the validity of the consumer's surplus theory.
CHAPTER III
DUPUIT AND CONSUMERS' SURPLUS 
The Theory of Consumers1 Surplus
Dupuit developed a workable theory of demand if not 
one adequately supported by protective assumptions, and 
he enthusiastically pointed out some of the implications 
of his theory. If one grants Dupuit the assumption that 
the marginal utility curve for a good is the demand curve 
for that good, several important corollaries can be 
drawn from the fusion. If the price of a good is a 
measure of its marginal utility then the area under the 
demand curve must equal the total utility of the good up 
to that point. When price is zero, total utility is 
maximized.
Dupuit's courbe de consommation (Figure 2-3) is 
reproduced below in Figure 3-1, and, for convenience, the 
axes are reversed. It will become obvious that Dupuit 
firmly grapsed the consumer's surplus concept which was 









form."'' Dupuit argued that the total utility of Or1 '
articles is equal to the area Or''n''P under the demand
curve. This total utility is called absolute utility by
Dupuit or 1 1utilite absolue. From this absolute utility
Dupuit deducted cost of production which is represented
by the price of the article multiplied by quantity 
2consumed; this is equal to the area Or''n''p''. Dupuit's 
relative utility, or what is now called consumers' surplus, 
which accrued to consumers is the difference between 
absolute utility and "costs of production." With reference 
to Figure 3-1, consumers' surplus is equal to the area of 
the triangle, (curvilinear), p''n''P.
■''Schumpeter, History, p. 1061.
Dupuit's theory of costs is treated in some detail 
in Chapter V of this dissertation. See infra, pp. 193-194; 
also see Appendix III.
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To Dupuit, the utility under any demand curve is
"always separated in 3 parts; the utility collected by the
proprietor /total receipts or cost of production/, the
utility collected by the public /consumers1 surplus/, and 
3lost utility. 1 At quantity Or' 1 xn Figure 3-1, this 
latter utilite perdue is represented by the triangle 
Nn1' r ' A l t e r n a t i v e l y  it can be found by subtracting 
the area representing absolute utility from the total 
area under the demand curve.
A change in relative utility or consumers' surplus 
could be calculated, according to Dupuit, in the following 
manner: assume that price falls from p ’1 to p' and that
quantity taken increases from r'1 to r 1. After the price 
decline (decline in Dupuit's "cost of production"), abso­
lute utility is increased to Or'n'P, and this, less costs 
of production, Op'n'r', yields a total consumers' surplus 
of p 'Pn', or a net gain in consumers' surplus represented 
by p 'n'n''p ''.
In this way Dupuit developed his measure of the 
utility (or "benefit") of public works and of goods in 
general. It was to be an area under a demand curve
3Dupuit, "On Utility and Its Measure," (1853), p. 44.
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identified with a utility curve. Absolute utility, it will 
develop, is the measurement which Dupuit preferred.^ But 
in any case, the spotty history of an important tool of 
welfare economics had begun.
Problems with Dupuit1s Measurement
Immediately several lacunae in Dupuit's analysis 
stand out. In the first place Dupuit's demand curve is a 
horizontal summation of individual demand curves. It is 
clear from the construction of his function that Dupuit 
intended his demand curve to be of this character. Such 
an additive utility function may not be legitimate due to 
interpersonal utility comparisons. Specifically, the 
interpersonal comparison enters when Dupuit used a market 
demand curve, which is the summation of individual demand 
curves to depict a utility surplus accruing to consumers of 
the product under consideration. The problem does not 
arise with the addition of demand curves, but with the 
addition of utility curves. A price may not represent the 
same utility to different individuals, since the price one 
would pay for a given quantity of a good depends not only 
on the utility afforded by the good, but on the income he
^Infra, Chapter V, pp. 191.
j
possesses as well. What the individual would have paid 
for the quantity varies with the amount of income he holds 
as well as with the utility the good provides. This might 
be called the "problem of the apostrophe." If the concept 
under consideration is consumers1 surplus, utility comparison 
is invoked; this problem is avoided, however, with con­
sumer 's surplus. Dupuit1s discussions involved both 
concepts, but he put the greatest emphasis on consumers1 
surplus. It should be remembered that this additional 
problem appears when the discussion turns to consumers' 
surplus. Strictly speaking, then, differences in income 
distribution would prohibit a utility summation, but as 
will be developed later, Dupuit circumvented this problem 
by boldly stating that income distribution was not of the 
economists' concern.
More fundamentally Dupuit tacitly assumed that utility 
is a measurable quantity. Utility to him was not an 
abstract unit measured in "utils" or other subjective 
units of satisfaction; rather the measure was a real one.
The true measure of the utility of an object is the 
"maximum sacrifice which each consumer would be disposed
5to make to procure it." Consumer's surplus or relative
^Dupuit, "On Utility and Its Measure," (1853), p, 24.
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utility to the consumer is measured by the difference 
between the maximum amount the consumer would be willing 
to pay for each unit in his entire stock and what he must
s
pay for the entire stock. As stated above, it is the area 
under the demand curve above the total expenditures 
rectangle, and it is a money measure. But this measure 
cannot be a valid one if the marginal utility of money 
expenditures is allowed to change with changes in price. 
Here, as with the pure demand theory, the problem is one 
of distinguishing marginal utility curves, and on the one 
hand, from demand curves, on the other/ Dupuit never did 
make the distinction with the result that his measure, 
with the exception of one case, would be either under­
stated or overstated.
An example may' help to illustrate this conclusion.
A decrease in the price of a good, X, will induce a 
"substitution" effect for good X. The consumer, as always 
with a price decline, will receive an increase in real 
income. But the increased quantity taken by the consumer 
may also be the result of an "income effect;" that is, the 
consumer may choose to realize all or part of the real 
income increase (oaqsed by the price decline) in more X. 
This is the case of the "normal" good. If the demand
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curve is inelastic under these circumstances, the marginal 
utility of money expenditures decreases and the opposite 
would obtain with an elastic demand. In either case for 
a price decline, the demand curve for a "normal good" 
overstates consumer's surplus. Under the same circum­
stances, the demand curve for an "inferior good" would 
understate consumer's s u r p l u s .  ̂ Variation in total 
expenditures on the good is the result of an "income 
effect,” and the presence of an "income effect" therefore 
means that the marginal utility of money expenditures 
changes. With no income effect there would be no change 
in total expenditures and, consequently, no change in the 
marginal utility of money expenditures. If this were not 
the case, each cent in the money measure of the surplus 
would possess a different utility and the sum of money 
would not accurately describe a utility difference.
This leads straightway to the conclusion that given demand 
curves of varying elasticities, the marginal utility curve 
is not to be identified with the demand curve. Only in 
the case of unitary elasticity of the demand curve could
^These are the conclusions of John R Hicks. See 
his "The Four Consumer's Surpluses," Review of Economic 
Studies, XI (Winter, 1943).
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Dupuit claim that consumer's surplus, calculated cardinally, 
is equal to the area under the demand function. This pro­
blem is indigenous to Dupuit1s consumer's surplus theory 
due to his failure to identify an "income effect" or, 
alternatively, a varying marginal utility of money.
Another objection to Dupuit's money measure of 
consumers' surplus, ignoring for the moment the preceeding 
objections, is one arising when the demand curve does not 
intersect the price axis. In such a case the offer price 
for the first unit(s) of the commodity would be infinite. 
Consumers' surplus may be infinite also and thus unmeasur­
able. Dupuit skirted this problem, however, when he 
discussed the possibility of measuring changes in or limits 
to consumers' surplus. He said for example:
. . . that when one cannot know something it
is already quite a lot to know the limits of one's 
ignorance . . . One will not know that the utility
of the canal will be only 5 million, but one could 
know that it will not be six and it would be enough 
to give up its construction; one will not know that 
the utility of a bridge will be 120,000 fr. but one 
could know that it will be more than 80,000 and thatnis sufficient to show that it will be very useful.
The problems of the constancy of the marginal utility 
of money expenditure (and all that this implies) together
7Dupuit, "On Utility and Its Measure," (1853), p. 46.
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with Dupuit1s tacit interpersonal utility comparisons 
associated with the market demand curve (although later 
avoided by Dupuit by assumption) are indeed inhibiting 
factors in the measure of consumers' surplus. This does 
not mean that he could not use the demand curve as an 
approximation of this surplus, or that the definition 
of the surplus was useless or invalid. Moreover, the idea 
would not disappear, and Dupuit would not be the last 
economist to proceed in such fashion.
Early Criticisms of Dupuit1s Consumers' Surplus Concept
The Bordas Reply
The space of three years was time enough for Dupuit 
to incur a major reply on his attack of established notions
Qconcerning utility. Bordas, a fellow engineer and 
apparently an individual of some economic sophistication, 
wrote a critique entitled "Of the Measure of the Utility 
of Public Works - Answer to the article of the chief 
engineer, Mr. Dupuit, inserted in Number 6 of the Annales
QThe article is signed simply "M. Bordas." See 
R. W. Houghton, "A Note on the Early History of Consumer's 
Surplus,/1 particularly pp. 51-52, where Houghton reviews 
this reply briefly. The Bordas article is reprinted in 
the Bernardi collection.
of 1844."^ The article, in large measure, consisted of a 
melange of confusions (Bordas1) on the meaning of the 
word utility. Bordas defended Say's cost of production 
theory of value, gloriously reasserting the water-diamond 
paradox. Bordas, caught in a quagmire of terminology, 
made some rather "reactionary" statements on utility when 
one considers the discourse he was attacking. At one 
point, for example, he stated frankly that "current 
price . . . depends on the intrinsic value of the
monetary measure and on that of the object given in 
e x c h a n g e , a n d  that "the utility of . . . tea is 
inherent to this substance and . . .  it does not at all 
depend on the price at which it is sold."'̂ '*' Clearly he 
had no appreciation for Dupuit’s marginal utility theory 
or for the solution it provided to the value in use - 
value in exchange dichotomy.
Nonetheless, Bordas brought out some important and 
relevant points in his assessment of Dupuit1s consumers1
^Bordas, "Of the Measure of the Utility of Public 
Works," translated by Eleanor Evans and edited by R. B. 
Ekelund, Jr., Annales des Ponts et Chaussees, 2nd Ser., 
(1847). References are to the unpublished translation 
available only in the library of Louisiana State University.
l^Bordas, "Of the Measure," p. 5.
■^Bordas, p. 13.
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surplus concept. These criticisms were to be echoed 
repeatedly against the doctrine, and to some extent, Bordas 
presaged Professor Nicholson's criticisms of Alfred 
Marshall's formulation of consumers' surplus.^-2 Bordas 
knew that there was some connection between the utility 
of a certain quantity of a good and the maximum sacrifice 
which an individual would be willing to make for it. 
Although Bordas admitted to a link between the utility 
of an object and the maximum sacrifice, he made explicit 
a point that Dupuit did not make clear in the 1844 article 
concerning this maximum sacrifice. The point is that the 
sacrifice depends on a person's income and on the price 
of other goods as well. As Bordas stated:
Let us suppose that it is a matter of 
appreciating a kilogram of meat and that a per­
son is asked to state the sacrifice that he is 
ready to make to procure it. Will it be poss­
ible for this person to answer categorically? 
Evidently not. Indeed, doesn't this sacrifice 
depend on the means of this person as well as 
the current price of other alimentary products 
which are capable of being substituted for the 
meat? . . . Therefore, what theory can one 
establish on so variable a basis and which 
depends on the taste as well as the means of 
each consumer?-*-^
-'-2See J. S. Nicholson, Principles of Political 
Economy (London: Macmillan and Co., 3 Vols., 1893) and 




Here Bordas asked a legitimate question. Should not the
price of potatoes be assumed constant in the process of
determining the utility for meat in money terms? He asked
this in another example as well. Referring to Dupuit1s
method of determining the utility (and consumers' surplus)
of a good, quarry rock, Bordas asked,
. . . while the rock will be taxed by a tax
increasing by degrees, will it be necessary to 
sell the brick at its original or at its new 
price? Or should a tax be levied both on the 
rock and the brick? The result will be quite 
different according to what will be done.-*-̂
If the price of brick is not held constant, Dupuit's measure
of consumers' surplus cannot be valid. The demand curve
for rock would shift erratically under such circumstances.
Bordas attacked Dupuit for lack of clarity on this issue.
Moreover Bordas implied in these passages that, since the
necessary assumption of "other things equal" generally
does not obtain in any practical case. Dupuit's measure of
consumers' surplus is practically useless. He was within
the bounds of legitimate criticism on the former point
since Dupuit failed to involve the explicit assumption of
constancy of the prices of other goods.
14Bordas, pp. 46-47.
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Bordas also cast a jaundiced eye on Dupuit's tacit 
interpersonal utility comparisons. Dupuit, in measuring 
the desirability of bridges and other public projects, 
compared the utility produced by the project with the costs 
of the project raised by taxation. The utility of the 
project was measured, in the case of a bridge for example, 
by placing incrementally increasing tolls and their 
corresponding quantities yielded a measure of consumers' 
surplus. Bordas objected to this calculation since,
. . . it will be necessary, before applying 
it, to logically establish the relationship which 
ties the decrease of revenue of the taxpayer, to 
the sum of the relative utilities which constitute 
this method . . . This connection seems, in effect, 
very difficult, for the quantities to be matched 
or compared, although expressed in money, are 
nonetheless of a different kind.
Bordas1 statement is clear. The marginal utility of a 
dollar collected from the taxpayer does not necessarily 
equal the marginal utility received from a dollar spent 
on any particular public project. In ignoring the problem 
altogether Dupuit made yet another interpersonal compari­
son. The building of public projects required taxation 
and consequently a redistribution of income. But such 
a redistribution required an illegitimate interpersonal 
welfare pronouncement. If the marginal utility of money
•‘■^Bordas, p. 48.
was the same (and constant) for every individual in the 
economy, or alternatively, if the distribution of income 
were of no concern to the economist, it would be possible 
to say that welfare is increased by a transfer if_ the 
increase in consumers' surplus (in money terms) exceeds 
the money amount of the subsidy. Under such conditions 
a net increase in the money measure of utility is all 
that is needed. But if some such assumption is not 
invoked, can one say out of hand that there is an increase 
in welfare by redistributing income from personal consump­
tion to public projects if the money measure of the 
increase in consumers1 surplus is greater than the money 
amount of taxation required? Conceivable such a transfer 
may involve a diminution in aggregate utility although 
there is a net money measure increase. This would occur 
if the utility decrease surrounding the tax receipts 
exceeded the utility increase to the consumers of the 
public good (which was the money measure of the increase 
in consumers' surplus). Bordas correctly pointed out that 
"The whole question consists in knowing on what side the 
difference lies. "-*-6 This issue of interpersonal comparisons
^Bordas, p. 48.
centers around differences in the distribution of income 
as did the problem of the market demand function 
representing a utility measure, and the Bordas criticism 
struck squarely at Dupuit's theory. But Bordas overlooked, 
or at least did not mention, Dupuit's position on income 
distribution. In the 1844 article Dupuit maintained that 
income distribution did not matter with respect to utility 
calculations, and that it was not in the province of 
political economy, but was the proper concern of the 
state. "Because the losses and gains counterbalance each 
other," said Dupuit, changes in the distribution of 
wealth are not to be considered in utility calculations. 
Although Dupuit1s assumption that income distribution 
"does not matter" was not an especially good one, Bordas 
failed to recognize that Dupuit had any assumption whatso­
ever on the question.
In what is the most interesting passage of the reply, 
Bordas was on the threshold of unlinking demand curves 
from utility curves. In the passage Bordas assumed that 
because of a new process in the manufacture of stockings,
1 7Dupuit, "On the Measurement of the Utility of 
Public Works," (1844), pp. 98-99.
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the price falls from 6 francs to 3 francs. If the consumer 
set aside 24 francs a year to buy 4 pair when the price was 
6 francs per pair, after the price decrease he will be able 
to buy 8 pair. But, said Bordas:
In order to consume as many before, he would 
have been obliged to set aside for the acquisition 
of this product, a sum of 48 francs and to sub­
tract 24 francs from his other consumptions. His 
situation, in relation to the former state of 
things, is then the same as though he were making 
an annual gain of 24 francs, or that his income 
had been increased by this sum. If, instead of 
consuming 8 pair of stockings, he only consumed 
7 and used the 3 francs left over to buy other 
objects of which the price would not have varied,
his relative gain would not be more than 21 1 Afrancs. -LO
Since money expenditures on stockings do not change 
in the first part of the illustration, neither can the 
marginal utility of money expenditures change. The 




When Px declines, if expenditures remain constant on x, 
the marginal utility of total expenditures cannot change, 
and the increase purchases of x lead to a decline in MUx. 
This may be called "Dupuit's case" since the demand curve 
can be identified with the marginal utility curve for x,
■'■̂ Bojrdas, p. 16.
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and declines in price can be associated with proportional 
declines in marginal utility.
It is in mentioning the other alternative open to the 
consumer that Bordas came close to exposing an error in 
Dupuit1s consumers' surplus theory. In this example the 
consumer took only 7 pair of stockings when the price 
falls to 3 francs per pair, as in the indifference curve 
treatment of Figure 3-2.
The consumer is in equilibrium at A 1. Now the price 
of stockings is reduced to 3 francs per pair and the budget 
line of the consumer assumes a new position. The new 
point of tangency with indifference curve 1^ is at point
FIGURE 3-2 
THE BORDAS VARIATION
M O N E Y
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B', after equilibrium is re-established and all effects 
have been accounted for. The new quantity taken, q^, can 
be explained by both income and substitution effects in 
the following manner: remove an amount of money income from 
the consumer equivalent to the increase in real income. 
Clearly the consumer would choose combination C 1 of money 
income and stockings. Thus, due to the decrease in price 
alone, the consumer increased purchases of stockings by 
an amount qQq^. The substitution effect is represented 
by q0q2• T^e simultaneous price decrease - real income 
increase however caused him to increase his purchases to 
q]_. But in equilibrium at B', total expenditures on 
stockings have declined from yQr to yQm, or alternatively, 
expenditures on all other goods have increased from Or to 
Om. In short, a part of the increase in real income is 
not realized with additional stockings, but with other 
goods. Now, the demand curve for stockings cannot depict 
consumer's surplus for several reasons.
In the first place, given the inelastic demand curve 
for stockings, which would result from the indifference 
curves of Figure 3-2, part of the increase in real income 
consequent to the price decline is spent on other commod­
ities. This is a part of consumer's surplus which the
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demand curve for stockings does not show. Moreover, since
expenditures on other goods have increased, the marginal
utility of money expenditures has decreased vis-a-vis
MUxthe price decline. Given the formulation Px = MUe-, t^e 
change in the marginal utility of x can no longer be 
assumed proportionate to the change in the price of x.
A price elasticity of anything but unity would guarantee 
this conclusion because expenditures on any good cannot 
remain constant in the face of any other coefficient.
Although Bordas did not draw any of these impli­
cations from his discussion of "income effects," it is 
to his credit that he recognized their existence, 
particularly at such an early date. He did see that the 
entire real income increase caused by a price decrease may 
not be spent entirely on additional units of the same 
commodity, and that the additional expenditures would disturb 
the demands for other goods. Had Bordas carried the 
argument a step further and shown that such "income effects" 
may disturb the marginal utility of income or money 
expenditures, he would have presented a most convincing 
theoretical argument against the use of demand curves to 
measure consumer's surplus. His discussion, as is, could 
at least be said to presage the theoretical interests of
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the Russian economic theorist Eugen Slutsky or the British
19economist John R. Hicks. In any case, Bordas should be 
considered in the vanguard of the critics of consumers' 
surplus theory.
Dupuit1s Rejoinder
Dupuit took the opportunity to reply to Bordas in
his article "De 1'influence des peages sur l'utilite des
voies de communication," which appeared in the Annales of 
201849. The article is divided into four sections, the
■^J. R. Hicks, Value and Capital (London: Oxford
University Press, 1946). Also see his "The Four Consumer's 
Surpluses," Review of Economic Studies, XI (Winter, 1943), 
and "A Reconsideration of the Theory of Value," Economica,
XIV (1934). Professor Houghton in his "Note on the Early 
History of Consumer's Surplus," sketches in several of the 
Bordas criticisms, but with the notable absence of the "in­
come effect passage." Moreover he makes a rather poor assess­
ment of this point when he refers to a like criticism made 
later by Walras. Said Houghton, "Dupuit's implied confusion 
(identification?) of demand and utility curves was of 
course a must less serious blunder (abstraction?) than 
Walras believed. . .," p. 52. Unfortunately, Professor
Houghton does not offer one jot of evidence to defend his 
point. The presence of a real income effect and of a vary­
ing marginal utility of money expenditures strikes the death 
blow to demand and utility curve identification and, there­
fore, to the use of demand curves to measure a "utility" 
surplus. Since Dupuit did not hedge his theory with pro­
tective assumptions, his use of demand curves for such 
measurement is illegitimate on a theoretical level at least, 
except in some rather rare circumstances. Houghton shows 
no appreciation for this crucial issue in his note.
2 2Dupuit, "De 1'influence," Annales des Ponts et 
Chaussees, 2nd Ser., 1st Sem., (1849), pp. 170-248.
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first three sections consisting of the rejoinder, the fourth 
entitled on "Tolls."2  ̂ The lion's share of the first 
three sections consists of an attack on Bordas1 confusion 
on the meaning of the word utility. Dupuit dwelled upon 
the ambiguities found in Bordas with a gusto befitting the 
first important contributor to thq theory of marginal 
utility.
Dupuit criticized Bordas for having had not one, but
four separate definitions of utility: "1st, in ordinary
language, 2nd, in political economy; 3rd, that when it is
2 2joined to the word public; 4th, in my article." Dupuxt
added sarcastically that "I swear that I do not yet today
understand the nuances which, in the spirit of Mr. Bordas,
23distinguish these four exceptions," and found that
"he /Bordas/ has added to the errors of these economists
24others proper to himself."
21Unfortunately, only the fourth selection "On Tolls 
and Transport Charges" has been translated. See Inter­
national Economic Papers (1962). Subsequent footnote 
references are to the untranslated material of the first
three sections of the article. Page references are to the
original.
22Dupuit, "De 1 1 influence," p. 178.
22Dupuit, "De 11 influence," p. 178.
2^Dupuit, "De 1 1 influence," p. 180.
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Dupuit replied to Bordas' charge that utility was
unmeasurable with two rather dubious arguments. In the
first place, avowed Dupuit, J. B. Say had thought utility
measurable, although Say had admitted that utility " . . .
has nuances, a diverse importance, an intensity, degrees."25
Although their measures differed, Dupuit pointed out that
they both thought utility was a measurable quantity.
Thus, with subtle incantation, Dupuit brought J. B. Say
to his side against Bordas. Dupuit also indicated that
Bordas had not proved that utility was unmeasurable and
that, in consequence of this fact, the Bordas attack had
simply been negative. "I would have preferred to have
found demonstrations," said Dupuit.2  ̂ Neither of these
arguments are very convincing, but it was in this manner
that Dupuit held to his original position. He consistently
maintained that the maximum sacrifice that a consumer
would be willing to make for an object is the measure of
the utility of the object. He firmly asserted that
" . . .  there is not an axiom of geometry more evident for 
27me." In addition to the conjured arguments in defense
2^Dupuit, "De 1 1 influence," p. 181.
2^Dupuit, "De 1'influence," p. 182.
2^Dupuit, "De 1 1 influence," p. 183.
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of utility measurement, Dupuit ignored the issue raised 
by Bordas on the necessity of interpersonal comparisons 
in practical applications of the theory.
Bordas had discussed, in his reply, the matter of the 
determinants of the "maximum sacrifice," and on this issue 
Dupuit did capitulate. In the 1844 article Dupuit did 
not clearly explain that the maximum sacrifice that a 
consumer would give up for a quantity of a good depended 
on income, tastes and the price of other goods. Bordas 
correctly chided Dupuit for having forgotten these other 
determinants. Dupuit1s comments on the issue, however, seem 
to indicate that he had acknowledged these determinants 
all along (which he had failed to do), thus jading Bordas' 
applicable criticism. This point is clearly brought out 
in the following passage in which Dupuit discussed the 
determinants of the "maximum sacrifice" (or price) that an 
individual would pay for meat:
Would this price be the same for all persons? 
Evidently not. Because not only does this price 
depend on the income of that person, as Mr. Bordas 
observes, but on his taste for meat, on his hunger, 
on the price of other nourishing commodities, and 
on a thousand other circumstances impossible to 
enumerate in a complete manner; but all these cir- 
cjimstances do not mean that this price does not
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exist for each object, for each person and at 
each instant.28 (emphasis supplied)
Here Dupuit clearly implied that he wished to invoke the 
ceteris paribus assumption when calculating the demand 
curve and consumers' surplus. The explicit content of 
his "other things equal" is composed of the following 
items: money income of the consumer; the price of 
related goods, and; tastes or intensity of desire. One 
is left to guess what "thousand other circumstances"
Dupuit had in mind. Thus in defending his theoretical 
position, Dupuit concluded that such a maximum sacrifice 
does exist for each person and at "each instant."
Nonetheless, Dupuit seems to have missed the flavor 
of Bordas' criticism which was that the measure of con­
sumers' surplus could not be valid since, in a practical 
case, the determinants do in fact change. Dupuit's 
calculations are not made at "each instant," and he should
? QDupuit, "De 1'influence," p. 184. This important 
passage reads as follows: "Ce prix sera-t-il le m£me pour
toutes les personnes? ^videmment non. Car non-seulement 
ce prix de'pend de la fortune de cette personne, comme le 
fait remarquer M. Bordas, mais de son go'ut pour la viande, 
de sa faim, du prix des autres denrees alimentaires et de 
mille autres circonstances impossibles k enumerer d 'une 
mani^re complete; mais toutes ces circonstances n 'emp^chent 
pas que ce prix n'existe pour chaque objet, pour chaque 
personne et k chaque instant. (emphasis supplied).
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have acknowledged and made allowance for the fact. Instead,
he avoided any further discussion on the demand determinants
and proceeded, with great pains, to show that Bordas was
in error and that the utility for various units of a stock
of a good were in fact different. As Dupuit himself put
the matter, "I have only wanted to make understood the
diverse degrees of utility that the same product has for
29the same consumer." Unfortunately, Dupuit let the 
matter rest there and did not go on to probe into the other 
variables which affect demand and consumers' surplus. 
Although he admitted that "a thousand other circumstances" 
affect the demand curve, he was apparently content to 
enumerate several important ones, and then to proceed, in 
an actual measure, as if these could be held constant.
This last conclusion follows from his statement that the 
utility of a canal should be compared "with the anterior 
state."30
Dupuit's rejoinder, as a whole, was rather dis­
appointing. Although he took due note of Bordas1 point
^Dupuit, "De 1'influence," p. 187. These "diverse 
degrees of Utility" are none other than the marginal 
utilities.
^Opupuit, "De 1 1 influence, " p. 202.
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that income and the price of other goods affect demand 
and, therefore, his measure of consumers' surplus, he did 
not rigorously investigate Bordas1 germinal suggestion, 
although it was hardly more than that, that price changes 
may have "income effects." If the issue of the marginal 
utility of money had been clarified at this early date, 
later theorists would have been spared considerable con­
fusion. In sum, although Dupuit clarified the fact that 
other variables, besides the utility of the particular 
product, impinged on the maximum sacrifice, he was deaf 
to several of Bordas' criticisms. As Dupuit himself 
summed it up, "I persist in the considerations on utility 
that I developed in 1844; I do not wish to change the
■D "Jformula that I gave for the measure of utility." x
Walras and Dupuit's Concept of Consumers' Surplus
At the hands of Leon Walras, Dupuit's ideas on 
monopoly theory, to be discussed in Chapter IV of this
"^Dupuit, "De 1' inf luence, " p. 205.
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dissertation, fared quite well. But while Dupuit1s 
monopoly theory came off virtually unscathed in Walras1 
formidable Elements, the doctrine of consumers' surplus 
was left in disarray. Walras wished to call attention to 
"an egregious error which Dupuit committed in a matter 
of capital importance" with respect to consumers' sur­
plus. After having presented the theory of consumers' 
surplus as Dupuit had given it in the 1844 article,
34Walras concluded that "all these statements are erroneous." 
This conclusion followed, according to Walras, for several 
reasons. In the first place, Walras maintained that 
Dupuit neither considered the effect that the utility 
and price of other goods would have on the "maximum 
sacrifice" for the good in question, nor did he under­
stand that the "consumer's means" also contributed to the
22Walras, Elements, pp. 435-436. "Unfortunately," 
said Walras, "economists have no_t thought, it worth their 
while to look into this theory /Dupuit's/, with the result 
that their ideas on the subject of monopoly are reduced to 
a state of confusion which is accurately reflected in their 
verbal obfuscations," p. 435. For the filiation between
Dupuit and Walras on the issue of monopoly see Chapter IV,
infra, p. 162. Houghton in his "Note on the Early History," 
claims that Walras "lifted" his illustrative examples on 
discriminatory pricing from Dupuit, p. 52.
33Walras, Elements, p. 443.
^Walras, Elements, p. 445.
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35determination of this sacrifice. This much of the 
attack was clearly misdirected since Dupuit had, in his 
rejoinder to Bordas, acknowledged that the price of other 
goods and the consumer's means affected this sacrifice. 
Moreover, in the same article, Dupuit implied that these 
factors should be held constant. Walras was apparently 
unaware of Dupuit1s precise statement on the matter, and 
the point merely repeated the one made by Bordas much 
earlier.
A second point made by Walras was more significant.
In the elegant general equilibrium framework set out by 
Walras for an economy, income or "wealth" is measured in 
terms of a numeraire commodity, one of constant purchasing 
power. This numeraire is also the commodity in terms of 
which the prices of all others are expressed. Walras 
found that "Dupuit failed to see that the maximum 
pecuniary sacrifice in question depends in part, . . .  on 
the quantity of the wealth (measured in terms of
■^Walras, Elements, p. 445.
36In the Elements, however# Walras referred to both 
of Dupuit1s major articles. But there is no indication 
in Walras' writing that he was acquainted with the Bordas 
reply or that he had read the salient passages of Dupuit's 
rejoinder.
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3 7numeraire) which the consumer possesses." Thus, this
maximum sacrifice is determined not only by the utilities
of all other goods in the consumer's array, but also on
the quantity of wealth he holds in terms of the numeraire
commodity. In the Walrasian system, however, the
"marginal utility functions of every participant, for
every commodity . . . are functions of the quantity of this
3 Rcommodity alone . . Since the demand curve is
determined by the quantity of wealth which the consumer
holds, together with other variables, Walras felt that
Dupuit1s egregious error was his "complete failure to
distinguish between utility or want curves on the one
39hand, and demand curves on the other."
The Walrasian criticisms are important for the con­
sumers' surplus doctrine, although some of them would not 
have been necessary had Walras given Dupuit's works a 
more careful reading. Walras' view of the economic system, 
moreover, was truly catholic, quite without parallel up 
to his time, while Dupuit's frame of reference was more
■^Walras, Elements, p. 445.
38Schumpeter, History, p. 1005 et_ passim.
3^Walras, Elements, p. 446.
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modest. As pointed out earlier, Dupuit1s aims in political 
economy were simply to find a standard by which public 
projects could be evaluated. The problem itself is not 
suggestive of the interdependencies of the general 
equilibrium system. The tools which Dupuit developed were 
partial equilibrium concepts. He had no truck with a 
general equilibrium theory of exchange in which demand in 
one market truly depended on all other variables in the 
system. Dupuit was content to let the "thousand other 
circumstances1 remain constant.
Additionally, it is surprising that a theorist of
Walras' gifts did not have one contribution in the Elements
of a correct measure of consumers' surplus, especially
after having attacked Dupuit's formulation with such a
vengeance. This is even more surprising when one considers
the fact that Walras had so few reservations concerning
40the measurability of utility.
These points should not be construed as apologetics 
for Dupuit, since the criticisms of Walras were, in point 
of fact, fertile. But equally important for the history 
of economic theory is the fact that these criticisms were 
largely ignored, especially by English economists. While
40Walras, Elements, pp. 115 and 117.
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Dupuit1s ideas on consumers1 surplus received such utter
rejection at the hands of the most important French theorist
of the day, his thought was being woven into the fabric
41of Alfred Marshall's Principles of Economics. Dupuit 
himself could not have chosen a more influential home for 
his theory of consumers' surplus.
Dupuit and Marshall on Consumers' Surplus
While it is correct to maintain that Dupuit's theory 
of consumers' surplus found a home in Marshall's Principles, 
the statement, taken by itself, must be qualified. Dupuit's 
ideas were absorbed into the Principles, but through the 
"back door." Chapter VI of Book III, which contains 
Marshall's discussion of consumers' surplus, does not 
provide a single reference to Dupuit. But as Schumpeter 
has remarked in this connection, "the essential idea - 
not every detail - is Dupuit’s." Schumpeter continued, 
"Marshall does not mention Dupuit's name, and only
41In 1870, twenty years before Marshall's Principles, 
Jevons had lauded Dupuit's contributions to utility theory. 
Marshall had discussed consumers' surplus theory earlier 
in his privately circulated Pure Theory of Domestic Values. 
(1879) .
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inadequate amends are made for this by means of a statement
42occurring in another and far distant place."
There certainly can be little doubt, on perusing 
these passages of Marshall's book, that his mentor was 
Dupuit. Although Marshall made some: important quali­
fications to the bare statement of the doctrine, his 
definition paralleled Dupuit1s exactly. For example, in 
referring to the measure of the consumer's surplus of an 
object to an individual he remarked:
The excess of the price which he would be 
willing to pay rather than go without the thing, 
over that which he actually does pay, is the 
economic measure of the surplus satisfaction.
It may be called consumer's surplus.43
The famous example in which Marshall examined the mechanics
of the determination of this surplus was that of the
commodity tea. His individual had the following demand
schedule for tea:








42Schumpeter, History, p. 1061.
43Marshall, Principles. 8th edition, p. 124.
Marshall wanted to use consumer's surplus as an "aid in 
estimating r o u g h l y ' " ^  some of the benefits accruing to 
his individual when the price of tea is 2s. His method 
is identical to Dupuit1s. For example, in calculating 
the surplus to the individual when price falls to 14s 
from 20s, Marshall observed:
When the price falls to 14s, he could, if 
he chose, continue to buy one pound. He would 
then get for 14s what was worth to him at least 
20s; and he would obtain a surplus satisfaction 
worth to him ah least 6s., or in other words a 
consumer's surplus of at least 6s.^ (emphasis 
supplied)
When the price has finally declined to 2s, the total 
utility using Marshall's measure is 59s. Total con­
sumer's surplus at 2s is found by subtracting total 
expenditures (Dupuit's cost of production) on tea, 14s, 
from total utility, yielding a surplus of 45s. This 
is none other than Dupuit's measurement. But while 
Marshall unabashedly stated the doctrine in Dupuit's 
fashion, he, unlike Dupuit, shored up the theory on all 
sides with protective assumptions.
Marshall, Principles, p. 125.
45 Marshall, Principles, p. 125.
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The Marshallian demand curve, according to the pre­
vailing interpretation,^^ is drawn assuming the following 
variables constant: (1) tastes and preferences of pur­
chasers; (2) money income, and; (3) the price of every 
other commodity- Given these constants, the real income of 
the consumer increases (decreases) as the price of the 
good in question decreases (increases). By dint of this 
fact, there would be an income effect when the price of 
tea declined in the above example from say 20s to 14s, 
unless demand is unitarily elastic. A money income 
equivalent to the increase in real income could be pre­
sented to the consumer instead of the price decline so that 
he could purchase 2 pounds of tea at the old price. This
^See Milton Friedman, "The Marshallian Demand Curve," 
Journal of Political Economy, LVII (December, 1949), pp. 
463-495. This essay is reprinted in his Essays in Positive 
Economics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), 
pp. 47-99. Professor Friedman gives a different interpre­
tation to what Marshall "really meant." He thinks that 
Marshall meant (or at least should have meant) to hold real 
income and the average price of all other commodities con­
stant while constructing the demand curve. "The currently 
accepted interpretation can be read into Marshall only by 
a liberal - and, I think, strained - reading of his remabks," 
says Friedman, Essays, p. 48. As a measure of consumer's 
surplus, as Friedman points out, both the "real income" 
demand curve and the money income demand curve would yield 
error. If the fraction of expenditures devoted to the 
commodity is small, "the estimates will approach the correct 
value," p. 72. Friedman is also careful to point out 
that the analysis of consumer's surplus in Marshall "must 
be distinguished from his definition of the demand curve," 
p. 73.
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47is the same procedure used in analyzing the Bordas case,
AOand it is Professor Hicks' "equivalent variation."
Unless the demand for tea was unitarily elastic, total
expenditures on tea and on all other goods would vary.
The marginal utility of money expenditures or income
would vary inversely with this change; or in Marshall's
terminology, there would be a variation in the marginal
49utility of money. When the margxnal utility of money
varies, the demand curve can no longer be associated
with the marginal utility curve, as previously indicated.
Moreover, if the price decline yielded smaller total
expenditures on tea, the consumer, in Marshall's own
terms, "would get an element of consumers' surplus from
buying other things at prices which now yield him no 
50rent." Thus Marshall protected the demand curve as a 
47See Figure 3-2 of this chapter.
40°See Hicks, Value and Capital, p. 331.
4^See Samuelson, Foundations, p. 190, and "The Con­
stancy of the Marginal Utility of Income," in the Essays, 
p. 80. Samuelson finds that "it is reasonably clear from 
everything that Marshall has written and from the cast of 
his thought that he definitely intended to convey the 
meaning of money simply as a euphemism for income or expen­
diture, reckoned in pounds or dollars," Foundations, p. 190. 
50Marshall, Principles, Note VI, Mathematical 
Appendix, p. 842.
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measure of consumers' surplus by explicitly assuming "that
the marginal utility of money to the individual purchaser
51is the same throughout." It is for thxs reason that
Marshall chose tea for his example, since expenditures on
"unimportant" commodities are a small part of total
expenditures. Hence, when the price of tea varied, the
change in income or money expenditures would be negligible.
Had Marshall allowed a variable marginal utility of
"money" in his own words, "The substance /of the argument/
would not be altered," but the "form would be made more
52intricate without any corresponding gain."
Marshall, Principles, p. 842. Professors Friedman 
and Samuelson each give a different interpretation to this 
constancy. Friedman suggests that Marshall assumed con­
stancy of the marginal utility of money with respect to 
income, "The Marshallian Demand Curve," in Essays, pp. 71- 
72. Samuelson thinks that Marshall assumed constancy with 
respect to changes in price, but not income. See his 
"Constancy of the Marginal Utility of Income," in Studies,
p . 80.
52Marshall, Principles, p. 132. Directly after this 
statement, Marshall cryptically discussed the Giffen para­
dox, treating it as an "exception." Here the income 
effect would "outweigh" the substitution effect with an 
"inferior" good. Marshall does not consider that the 
change in money expenditures may be considerable vip-a-vis 
price changes for commodities which constitute a large 
portion of a consumer's total expenditures, i.e., "important" 
commodities. In the words of Schumpeter, "Marshall knew 
why he used tea as an example" in the consumer's surplus 
argument, History, p. 1061. For the most exhaustive 
treatment of the paradox in the literature see G. J.
Stigler, "Notes on the History of the Giffen Paradox,"
Journal of Political Economy, LV (April, 1947).
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Marshall craftily avoided other problems with his 
measure. For example, if it is reasonable to assume that 
a certain amount of a commodity is necessary for life, then 
the utility of units of the commodity up to this amount (or 
the price he would be willing to pay for them) is infinite. 
Consumer's surplus is also infinite. If tea in the example 
above were such a commodity, and one pound was necessary 
for life, how would the utility of increments of the 
first pound be calculated? Marshall artfully eliminated 
the problem when he said that "we must . . . take life for 
granted, and estimate separately the total utility of 
that part of the supply of the commodity which is in 
excess of absolute necessaries.
In the early editions of the Principles Marshall was 
unqualifiedly enthusiastic with regard to utility measure­
ment. Professor Stigler has pointed out that while
^Marshall, Principles, p. 841. Mathematically, if 
y = f(x) is the equation for the demand curve with y as 
price and x as quantity demanded, total utility is measured
/ f(x)dx , where a is the amount consumed.
*o
If an amount b is necessary for life, the function will be 
infinitely great for values of x less than b. Ignoring the 





Marshall became increasingly reticent on the issue in
later editions, he "seems never to have been seriously
54skeptical of the measurability of utility." Stigler's
assessment is borne out in Marshall's chapter on consumer's
surplus in the eighth edition. In this chapter Marshall
not only claimed that utility was measurable, but was
unreservedly prepared to make interpersonal comparisons,
although there are passages elsewhere which seem to con-
55tradict this view. One passage m  the chapter is 
especially significant and it deserves to be quoted in 
full:
On the whole . . .  it happens that by far the 
greater number of the events with which economics 
deals, affect in about equal proportions all the 
different classes of society; so that if the money 
measures of the happiness caused by two events are 
equal, there is not in general any very great 
difference between the amounts of happiness in the 
two cases. And it is on account of this fact that 
the exact measurement of the consumers1 surplus in 
a market has already much theoretical interest,
-^Stigler, "The Development of Utility Theory," in 
Essays, p. 130; also see pp. 128-129.
~̂*In Chapter II, Book III, for instance, Marshall 
stated that "price will measure the marginal utility of 
the commodity to each purchaser individually: we cannot 
speak of price as measuring marginal utility in general, 
because the wants and circumstances of different people 
are different," Principles, p. 100.
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and may become of high practical importance,^6 
(emphasis supplied)
Thus Marshall had few qualms concerning utility measure­
ment. It is equally obvious from the position of the 
apostrophe in consumers', that Marshall was not above 
interpersonal utility comparisons. His justification is 
the interesting point however. Marshall assumed, not 
unlike the modern macroeconomic theorist, that differences 
in income distribution "cancel out." A measure of 
aggregate consumers' surplus was for this reason feasible 
in Marshall's mind.
The Two Formulations Compared
It is interesting and instructive to contrast the 
Marshallian formulation with Dupuit's. On the issue of 
interpersonal comparisons Marshall knew that differences 
in income distribution could prohibit the addition of 
individual surpluses. But, to obtain a measure of con­
sumers' surplus for tool using, he invoked the assumption 
that differences in income distribution do not matter, 
buttressing the assumption with the alleged fact that such 
differences cancel out. Dupuit also thought that income
5®Marshall, Principles, p. 131.
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distribution could be neglected in the measure of aggregate 
consumers' surplus, but for a different reason. He refused 
to consider problems of income distribution by simply 
eliminating them from the concern of the economist. While 
Dupuit1s justification is perhaps more questionable, it is 
interesting that the conclusions are identical in both 
cases. But Marshall's reasoning on this point is unques­
tionably superior in the final analysis.
As in this last case, so goes a large part of the 
comparison of Marshall and Dupuit on consumers' surplus 
theory. Whereas Marshall at least recognized the problem 
of a varying marginal utility of money, Dupuit was 
damningly silent on the issue. Although Marshall was 
probably unaware of all the implications of his assumption 
of constancy, he did recognize the necessity of such an 
assumption in order to depict consumers' surplus as the 
area under the demand curve. Dupuit proceeded unaware.
Dupuit did bridge the difficulties of measuring the 
surplus of a commodity "necessary for life" by stating that 
the usefulness of the tool did not hinge on knowledge of 
the entire demand curve. The knowledge of a limited 
segment of the curve would be sufficient to estimate
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changes in consumers' s u r p l u s . M a r s h a l l  also devised 
a way to avoid the pitfall of an "infinite surplus." The 
adequacy of the separate approaches could be compared, but 
the issue itself is not a crucial one.
Although one could scarcely maintain that Marshall's 
presentation is no improvement over Dupuit's, Marshall's 
analysis is often given an unguarded amount of praise. 
Several contemporary economists, for example, have under­
stated the completeness of Dupuit's contribution in com­
paring it with Marshall's. Professor Stigler, in referring 
to Dupuit's presentation of consumers' surplus theory 
says that "there is no intuition of the difficulties in 
the concept," and that it is "Marshall's measure without
C Qhis restrictions." Professor Blaug, moreover, claims 
that "when we compare Dupuit's original paper with 
Marshall's refinements of the same concept, we are struck
C Qby the inadequacy of Dupuit's discussion." While there 
is some truth in these assertions, there can be little 
doubt that they were made without benefit of Dupuit's
57Supra, Chapter III, pp. 66-67.
58Stigler, "Development" in Essays, pp. 82 and 80 
respectively.
^Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962), p. 298.
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rejoinder to Bordas. As indicated earlier in this chapter, 
Dupuit acknowledged in that rejoinder that consumers' 
surplus depended on income and on the price of other 
goods and the "thousand other circumstances," indicating 
at this time that he wished to hold them constant.^
Although the content of Marshall's ceteris paribus is 
somewhat richer than Dupuit's, Dupuit explicitly included 
income, the price of related goods and his thousand other 
circumstances. This should be taken into account in any 
assessment of Dupuit's contribution to consumers' surplus.
Additionally, the end result is the same for both 
economists. Marshall concluded with Dupuit that:
It will be noted . . . that the demand
prices of each commodity, on which our estimates 
of its total utility are based, assume that 
other things remain equal, while its price rises 
to scarcity value . . .61
One of the most striking features emerging from a comparison
of Marshall and Dupuit on consumers' surplus is their
uncommon similarity in analyzing the problem. Both of them
wanted a tool of practical import and both were willing to
invoke a great deal of ceteris paribus to arrive at it.
^^Supra, p . 8 2.
61Marshall, Principles, p. 131.
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The major difference distinguishing the two presenta­
tions, then, is the realization, on Marshall's part, that 
constancy of the marginal utility of money must be assumed. 
Moreover, Marshall did understand some of the problems 
associated with interpersonal utility comparisons, although 
he summarily dispensed with them by assumption. All this 
suggests that the gulf which is currently thought to exist 
between the two interpretations may not be so distant when 
one considers all of Dupuit1s writings on consumers' surplus.
There is still another reason why Dupuit's theoretical 
performance on the matter of consumers' surplus should not 
be judged so blatantly inferior to Marshall's. Marshall 
had the benefit of received doctrine on the issue, that is, 
Dupuit‘s, and although Marshall claimed to have arrived at 
marginal analysis independently, the writings of Jevons, 
Walras and the members of the Austrian school were available. 
The marginalist "revolution" was in full swing by Marshall's 
time. Economic theory had advanced in the period between 
Dupuit and Marshall, although admittedly not as much in 
England where the members of the British Historical School 
were voicing a plethora of criticisms against the ortho­
doxy. Consequently, when each economist is put into his 
respective theoretical milieu, Dupuit's analytical
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performance does not necessarily suffer beside Marshall's. 
Unfortunately no such allowances are given by contemporary 
appraisals of the two contributions.
Some Post-Marshallian Developments
Marshall's formulation of the theory of consumers' 
surplus in the Principles was, as Professor Hicks has 
noted, "immediately recognized as the most striking novelty
C-\ 0in the book." While, as has been indicated, the theory 
was certainly not a novelty in view of Dupuit's earlier 
formulation, Marshall did much to popularize the idea.
The theory gathered force through its acceptance by 
several continental economists^ in addition to the
R. Hicks, "The Rehabilitation of Consumers' 
Surplus," Review of Economic Studies, VII (February, 1941) 
108.
6 3For an excellent example see Maffeo Pantaleoni,
Pure Economics. translated by T. Boston Bruce (London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1898). It is interesting that although 
Pantaleoni discussed the Marshallian formulation, he 
acknowledged the doctrine's originator, Dupuit, p. 136.
In this connection, the contribution of two Austrian 
economists cannot be ignored. In T. Rudolph Auspitz and 
Richard Lieben's Untersuchungen uber die Theorie des 
Preises (Leipzig: Duncker and Humbolt, 1889) an analysis 
of consumers' surplus was given before the publication of 
Marshall's Principles. In the French translation of 
their work, Recherches sur la Theorie du Prix (Paris:
Giard and Briere, 1914), Lieben claimed that the two 
authors had had no knowledge of Marshall's privately
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Cambridge coterie. At the same time, however, an under­
current of dissent began to appear. Representative of this
criticism was the writing of J. Shield Nicholson who, in
64his three volume Principles of Political Economy , took 
issue with many of the Marshallian assumptions.
Professor Nicholson raised serious objections to 
Marshall's attempt to measure consumers' surplus cardinally 
in money terms. He thought it quite impossible to measure 
utility in terms of a commodity, money, whose value itself 
fluctuated with quantity. As he pointed out:
ri o (continued) circulated Pure Theory of Domestic 
Values (see Houghton, "Note on the Early History of Con­
sumer's Surplus," pp. 53-54). From this Houghton makes 
the largely gratuitous conclusion that "since their con­
sumer's surplus analysis was completed by 1889, it clearly 
can owe nothing to Marshall and is simply a development of 
Dupuit's work," p. 54. This of course may be so, but it 
is within the realm of possibility that Auspitz and Lieben 
developed their concept independently. Lieben, in a note 
"On Consumer's Rent," Economic Journal, IV (1894), defended 
Edgeworth's support of Marshall's assumption of constancy 
(of the marginal utility of money) without mentioning 
Dupuit's earlier formulation. Moreover, the reasoning in 
the Unterschungen was in terms of total utility curves and 
"offer curves." This does not convey the flavor of 
Dupuit's demand curve approach to the topic. It is clear 
that Marshall's analysis was much closer to Dupuit's in 
diagramatic presentation.
^Nicholson, Principles of Political Economy; also 
see his Elements of Political Economy (London: Macmillan
and Co., 1903).
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. . . a_change in the_cost of some things must 
change his ^/the consumer1s/ so-called subjective 
valuation of other things. The money measure, then, 
of the final utility of anything varies not only 
with his desires and means of satisfaction in 
respect of that thing, but with his desires and 
means in respect of all other things.65
Nicholson, apparently unimpressed with Marshall's qualifi­
cation that the marginal utility of money could be held 
constant with respect to unimportant commodities, found 
instead that "in all cases we must consider the marginal 
utility of money" and that "the great mass of the people 
spend the bulk of their earnings on a very few c o m m o d i t i e s . " ^
C\ *7He also took issue with Marshall's mathematical convention 
regarding commodities necessary for life since he felt that 
"all incomes are limited."uo Untenable as well, m  
Nicholson's view, was the Marshallian contention that the 
demand curves of individuals within socio-economic groups 
could be summed in order to obtain total consumers' surplus. 
Marshall had suggested that this could be done since the 
rich, middle and poor classes in society had similar incomes,
65Nicholson, Principles, I, p. 59.
66 Nicholson, Principles, I, p. 64.
6 7Supra, note 53, of thxs chapter.
6 Q Nicholson, Principles, I, p. 63.
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tastes, etc. The obvious fault with such a construction,
thought Nicholson, was that "the marginal utility of money
is very different in the three groups, and what the differ-
69ence is is plainly inderterminate."
Nicholson's criticisms, almost predictably, centered
around the issue of the necessity of a varying marginal
utility of money. This argument against the use of the
Marshallian triangle under the demand curve to measure
consumers' surplus was to become the most important
criticism against the doctrine, a criticism which ultimately
brought on its total eclipse as well as that of other
Marshallian arguments. But a doctrine of such deceptive
analytical simplicity would not die so effortlessly.
Important neo-classical economists rose to its defense.
F. Y. Edgeworth, for example, with specific reference
to Nicholson's critique of the doctrine, issued a reply
7 0m  the Economic Journal. Edgeworth defended, in 
cavalier fashion, Marshall's use of averages in estimating 
aggregate consumers' surplus as well as other Marshallian 
assumptions. But Edgeworth missed Nicholson's major point
^Nicholson, Principles, I, p. 64.
70F. Y. Edgeworth, "Professor J. S. Nicholson on 
'Consumers' Rent,'" Economic Journal, VI (1894).
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respecting the importance of the marginal utility of money
in the cardinal calculation of consumer's surplus. Nicholson
pointed out this fact in his rejoinder: "my principle
objection to his ^/Edgeworth's/ criticism is that it is not
directed to the main point at issue, namely the measurement
71of utility by money."
The correctness of Marshall's technique of holding the
marginal utility of money constant was really not the issue
7 2in question, as Edgeworth apparently thought. The 
important issue was whether such an assumption did damage 
to the use of the Marshallian demand curve to depict con­
sumer' s surplus. The protracted debate, which ultimately 
destroyed the consumers' surplus theory of the Principles, 
centered around this question. If the marginal utility of 
money can be assumed constant with respect to changes in 
price or real income, then it is incontestable that the 
demand curve can be used to depict the surplus. But is such
71 J. S. Nicholson, "The Measurement of Utility by 
Money," Economic Journal, IV (1894),342.
7 2Edgeworth sarcastically remarked that "the very 
genius of the applied calculus consists in not considering 
such variations when they are of an order of magnitude which 
may be neglected," "Professor J. S. Nicholson on 'Consumers' 
Rent, '" p. 156 .
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an assumption wholly reasonable? Marshall thought it so 
for unimportant commodities, but such a limitation would 
severely limit the usefulness of the tool. As one modern 
writer on the subject has said:
Use of the Marshallian triangle when the 
MUm /marginal utility of money/ is not constant 
involves measurement in money, the marginal 
utility of which changes in the course of the 
measurement. While there are pitfalls in using 
units of measurement, money, which do not have a 
constant relationship to the thing being measured, 
utility, there must also be objections to using 
any money of constant utility to measure changes 
in a case where the utility of money is not in
fact constant.73
This, then, is the most serious problem with the money 
(demand curve) measure of consumers' surplus. The 
Marshallian demand curve would, with a changing marginal 
utility of money, or alternatively, with an "income effect," 
either overstate or understate the loss or gain associated 
with price changes. Thus it is necessary to change the 
curve to account for this variability in the utility of 
money, or, as an alternative, the Marshallian definition 
of consumer's surplus itself could be changed to fit the 
curve. Contemporary economic theory contains contribu­
tions along both lines.
73'"David M. Winch, "Consumer's Surplus and the Com­




For reasons given in the section above, the Marshallian 
money measure of consumer's surplus fell into disrepute. 
While a consumer's surplus still existed, the Marshallian 
approach demanded a constant marginal utility of money to 
measure it. This constancy was untenable in any practical 
case, and the very concept smacked of subjectivity. For 
reasons such as these, consumers' surplus as a partial 
equilibrium welfare tool soon became passe. The emerging 
distinction between welfare economics and "positive" 
economics contributed to the downfall. It is also notable 
that Marshall's brilliant pupil A. C. Pigou, who followed 
Marshallian dicta in many other respects, failed to lend 
the weight of his authority to the consumers' surplus 
theory judging the attenuating problems "insuperable 
in p r a c t i c e . H i s  objection, it should be noted, was 
directed against aggregate consumers' surplus as in the
74Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (London: Macmillan 
and Co., Ltd., 4th edition, 1962), p. 57. This is not 
the case with some of Pigou's earlier writings. In his 
"Monopoly and Consumers' Surplus," Economic Journal, 14 
(September, 1904), for example, Pigou used the Dupuit- 
Marshall approach in showing how a monopolist, via dis­
crimination, could attack consumers' surplus and appro­
priate it as profits. He did not mention Dupuit, 
however, and his earlier beliefs did not carry over into 
the Economics of Welfare. See p. 388 of Pigou's article 
and Chapter IV of this dissertation.
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national dividend and not against the partial equilibrium
concept, which, in the Economics of Welfare, Pigou
eschewed entirely. The insuperable problems to which he
referred occurred when the economist attempted to add
individual surpluses in order to obtain a measure of total
surplus for one good and then proceeded to add all of
these together for the entire surplus accompanying the
75national dividend. Most of the theoreticians of the
period did not get past the problem of the marginal
utility of money.
The doctrine, however black its history, has enjoyed
a renascence clothed in a new and perhaps more wearable
coat. Sir John R. Hicks sought a more "objective" theory
of value, and in 1934 forcefully reintroduced concepts^
7 7originated by Edgeworth. Hicks used the "marginal rate 
of substitution" and indifference curves to prove all of 
the familiar properties of demand curves, and, importantly,
75It must be noted that Marshall returned a like 
verdict on the aggregation of surpluses. See his 
Principles, p. 131, n. 1.
7 6Hicks and Allen, "A Reconsideration of the Theory 
of Value."
77See Edgeworth's Mathematical Psychics, an Appli­
cation of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences (London:
C. Kegan Paul and Co., 1881). This work has been 
reprinted by Augustus M. Kelley, 1961.
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his analysis was framed in a manner which avoided depend­
ence on rigid cardinality. In the course of his
presentation Hicks translated Marshall's constant marginal
78utility of money into "exactly definable terms." Hicks
pointed out that:
If the marginal utility of commodity Y is 
constant, the marginal rate of substitution 
between X and Y must depend on X only. If the 
quantity of X is given, the marginal rate of 
substitution (or the slope of the indifference 
curve) is given, too; the tangents to the indiffer­
ence curves at all points with the same abscissa 
must be parallel . . . and the income elasticity
of demand for X must be zero.^
78Hicks and Allen, "Reconsideration," p. 64.
IQ Hicks and Allen, "Reconsideration," pp. 64-65. This 
dissertation has consistently made use of Professor Hicks' 
interpretation of Marshall's constancy of the marginal 
utility of money. Hicks thinks that Marshall meant the 
marginal utility of money to be constant with respect to 
changes in income. Samuelson, however, found that "the 
marginal utility of income cannot be invarient under 
changes in income and each and every price," and he 
interprets Marshall's "true" meaning as "constancy of the 
marginal utility of income with respect to n prices but 
not with respect to income," Foundations, pp. 191-192.
The implications of Samuelson's interpretation are that 
the income elasticity of demand for each good must be 
unitary and that the price elasticity for each good in 
terms of its own price must equal minus one. This squarely 
contradicts Hicks' conclusion that the income elasticity 
of demand is zero. Also see, of course, Samuelson's 
"Constancy of the Marginal Utility of Income," in Studies 
in Mathematical Economics and Econometrics.
This statement acquired new import in the early 1940's when 
Hicks wrote a series of articles reaffirming the value of 
consumers' surplus as an economic tool; and in the process, 
amending Marshall's demand curve measure. In the "Rehabil­
itation of Consumers' Surplus" Hicks reasserted the fact 
that constancy of the marginal utility of money "implies 
that the consumer's demand schedules are unaffected by 
changes in his real income."80 The Marshall-Dupuit demand 
curve measure, in other words, did not account for the income 
effect. Marshall could not hold that the income effect 
caused by price changes was non-existent, except in the 
case of a constant marginal utility of money which implied 
an income elasticity of zero and a price elasticity of 
unity. The Marshallian demand curve fit the definition in 
this case, but it could not measure consumer's surplus 
if a substantial income effect was provoked by price 
movements. There is still a Marshallian consumer's surplus 
consistent with his definition, but the Marshallian demand 
curve does not measure it. Hicks retained Marshall's 
definition and chose to " . . . adjust the ordinary demand
80 J. R. Hicks, "A Rehabilitation of Consumer's Sur­
plus, " p. 109.
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curve so as to allow for the effects of the changes in 
real income . . ."81
Hicks went about this modification using two theoretical 
techniques to arrive at the same adjustment. The "four 
consumer's surpluses" which Hicks discerned can be illus­
trated with the aid of the traditional Marshallian demand 
curve, or with indifference curves. The indifference curve 
technique possesses a greater degree of theoretical neat­
ness, while the presentation in terms of the ordinary 
demand curve shows more clearly the shades of difference 
between the Marshallian measure, on the one hand, and 
Hicks' four measures, on the other. For the sake of 
contrast, the latter method will be presented below.
In his article entitled "The Four Consumer's Surpluses," 
Hicks chose to illustrate his measures by enlisting the 
aid of the ordinary demand curve. Hicks assumed that the 
good under consideration was "normal" with respect to income 
changes (he also considered the case of the inferior 
good), and he retained Marshall's assumption that the prices 
of other consumer goods remain constant during the course
® ■'"Hicks, "Rehabilitation," p. 109.
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O 2of measurement. Hicks assumed that the individual 
possessing a given amount of money income faces given market 
prices for n-1 commodities to which he must confine his 
purchases. Given this situation the individual will 
allocate his income in a particular manner. A new 
commodity is introduced with only one unit available.
Whether the individual will purchase this nth commodity or 
not clearly depends on its price. And, as Hicks pointed 
out:
There will be some price which will separate 
the high prices, at which he will not purchase, 
from the low prices at which he is just on the 
edge of purchasing. I shall call this price his 
marginal valuation of the unit. (Evidently it 
is the same thing as Marshall's "marginal utility 
in terms of money")
If the actual price is less than the marginal valuation, the
unit will be purchased. The marginal valuations of all
units can be determined once the market price is given,
and a marginal valuation curve, such as AV in Figure 3-3
84below, can be constructed. Curve AV is the marginal 
valuation curve corresponding to market price OH. At
^Hicks, "Rehabilitation," p. 109.
8 3Hicks, "The Four Consumer's Surpluses," p. 31.
84-Figure 3-3 of this chapter corresponds to Hicks' 
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price OH, quantity HP will be purchased since, given price 
OH, all units of the good less than quantity HP have
marginal valuations greater than OH. Point P is found by
extending a horizontal from price OH to the marginal
valuation curve. A new marginal valuation curve Av would
correspond to a lower price Oh. In the case of a normal
good (as in Figure 3-3), the increase in real income
occassioned by the price decrease will shift the new
marginal valuation curve Av to the right and above the
one corresponding to higher price OH. Other things being
equal, an increase in income will raise the marginal
valuation of any given quantity of the good. This is the
Hicksian "income effect," and he identified it with the
movement from one curve to the other; the substitution
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effect of a price fall, therefore, consists of movements
8 5along the marginal valuation curves. The ordinary 
Marshallian demand curve can be traced out by connecting 
the equilibrium points, resulting in the dotted line 
APpD. It is clear that when the income effect is of 
little significance the Marshallian curve approaches the 
marginal valuation curves. But when this is not the case, 
Hicks provides alternative measures for consumer's surplus.
When the marginal utility of money is allowed to 
change, or identically, when there is an income effect, 
the gain to the consumer from a price fall can be viewed 
in several ways, some of which have already been discussed 
in connection with the Bordas example (Figure 3-2). At 
the core of Hicks' macro-oriented compensation principle 
is this development of the various "variations" as measures 
of consumer's surplus. Hicks inquired into the amount of 
money income which, taken from the consumer at the new 
price Oh, would leave the consumer no better off than he 
was at the former price OH. The amount is called price 
compensating variation, and it is obtained (with reference 
to Figure 3-3) in the following manner: allow the
^ S e e  "The Four Consumer's Surpluses," p. 33.
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consumer to purchase HP units at price OH and, for the 
following unit, lower price only as far as necessary for 
him to purchase it. Continuing in this fashion, a curve 
HPC can be traced where, at C, the consumer is neither 
better nor worse off than at point P. The segment PC 
lies above marginal valuation curve PV since the consumer 
is better off than if he were forced to pay OH for he 
units. But segment PC is below Marshallian segment Pp 
since he is in a worse position than if he were allowed 
to purchase all these units at Oh, although he does 
purchase a marginal unit at price Oh. At C the consumer 
is in the same position as if he had been allowed to 
purchase all the units at price Oh, but he has been 
forced to part with an amount of income equal to HPch 
which is the compensating variation and a measure of 
consumer's surplus.
This Hicksian measure can be conveniently contrasted 
to Marshall's measure which, geometrically, is equal to the 
area HPph. Marshall’s money measure assumed that the 
marginal utility of money was the same at positions P 
and at p, a condition which could not possibly obtain 
with an income effect. The marginal utility of money does 
in fact vary on the Marshallian curve. A positive income
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effect would mean that the first cent added to the con­
sumer's income would have a higher marginal utility than 
the last cent. In order to get the demand curve to 
express consumer's surplus, Marshall had to assume that 
each cent in the money measure of consumer's surplus added 
a constant amount to total utility. Hicks' compensating 
variation assumes, more properly, that, with an income 
effect, each cent in the money measure added a diminishing 
increment to the total utility of the consumer. Hicks' 
compensating variation takes account of this diminishing 
marginal utility of money and is less than the area under 
Marshall's demand curve.
Analogous reasoning can be used with the Hicksian 
measure of consumer's surplus termed by him "price
Q /Tequivalent variation. Here Hicks asked the question,
"what amount of money income would be required, in the 
absence of the price decrease, to raise the individual to 
the level of satisfaction attained at p?" Hicks employed 
similar reasoning by asking the consumer, starting at p, 
to state the maximum price he would require for the 
diminution of his holdings of the commodity, one unit at
^ S e e  "The Four Consumer's Surpluses," p. 35.
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a time. The segment pE can be traced out with such 
information. Area HEph is yet another measure of consumer's 
surplus, termed "price equivalent variation" by Professor 
Hicks. At point E the consumer is no worse off than at 
p, but he is consuming at price OH. The Hicksian equiv­
alent variation is a larger money sum than Marshall's 
money measure under the demand curve because the value of 
money in terms of goods is different in the two situations 
P and p. The equivalent variation takes account of the 
increased level of satisfaction attained at p. In order 
to maintain this new level of satisfaction at price OH, 
the sum of money given to the consumer will have to be 
greater than the money amount under the Marshallian curve, 
since the marginal utility of money would have declined 
at p.
Hicks' compensating and equivalent variations take 
account of this non-constant marginal utility of money. 
Hicks, however, did not couch his discussion in terms of 
increments of utility; rather his concepts measured con­
sumer's surplus as a perfectly determinant amount of money 
income. The measures are, without question, superior to 
Marshall's measure in all cases where income effects
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8 7cannot be neglected.
Hicks also extended his analysis to the case of an 
inferior good. The normal good case, however, appears 
sufficient to illustrate why the Marshallian triangle, 
except in some rather unusual circumstances, cannot be 
employed as a valid measure of consumer's surplus. In
87In addition to the price compensating and price 
equivalent variations, Professor Hicks considered what he 
called the quantity compensating and quantity equivalent 
variations. The quantity compensating variation, for 
instance, would measure the change in income required to 
offset the rise in quantity acquired at the lower price.
In order to obtain this measure, with reference to Fig­
ure 3-3, Hicks proposed that the individual continue down 
the segment PC, again paying the maximum price he would 
offer for additional units of the commodity until point M 
is reached. At M the individual is no better or worse off 
than at P, and he is consuming the same quantity as at Oh, 
but an amount of income HPch minus cpM has been extracted 
from him. The result is the quantity compensating vari­
ation. Similarly, the quantity equivalent variation is 
the amount of income which, if presented to the individual, 
would allow him to maintain the level of satisfaction at 
p while consuming the quantity associated with the former 
price OH. Its geometrical measure can be obtained by 
having the consumer follow segment pE, presenting him with 
the minimum price required to make him part with the 
commodity, aiunit of time. Arriving at position m, the 
consumer obtaips the same amount of the commodity as at P, 
but he has received an amount of income, HEph plus PmE, 
which maintained the level of his satisfaction as at 
position p. This is the quantity equivalent variation. 
Hicks has expressed a preference for these latter two 
quantity measurements as most accurately reflecting 
Marshall's real intent; see his Revision of Demand Theory 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 96, n. 2, and Chapter
X for still additional refinements of the measures.
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all these cases, Professor Hicks' "new"measures are more 
appropriate.
The Status of the Dupuit-Marshallian Measure
The partial equilibrium concept of consumer's surplus
was used by Hicks as a path to his famous "compensating
principle," which was that a given policy change is
desirable if the gainers can compensate the losers in
money with a resultant net gain. As one writer has pointed
out, "the concept of consumer's surplus, by itself, is
of little value in welfare theory, since any policy change
88affects large numbers of individuals." Hicks' measure 
is, however, free from interpersonal comparisons since it 
does not pretend to measure changes in satisfaction but 
rather the amounts of money income required to offset 
these changes in satisfaction. Under the Hicksian tech­
nique, therefore, the problems surrounding the aggregation 
of consumers' surplus are avoided. A high-level debate 
has grown up around the Kaldor-Hicks "criterion," which
o nwas soon modified by Tibor Scitovsky. An excellent 
summary of the issues involved, which cannot be covered
^Winch, "Consumer's Surplus," p. 406.
8 8̂See Tibor Scitovsky, "A Note on Welfare Propositions 
in Economics," Review of Economic Studies, 9 (November, 
1941) .
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here, together with some important contributions to the 
debate, is to be found in I.M.D. Little's Critique of 
Welfare Economics.
Although many of the issues on the validity of 
welfare measures are, as yet, unresolved, it is inter­
esting to note that at least one author has recently 
proposed a return, under certain conditions, to the 
Marshallian triangle as a measure of economic gain.
David M. Winch has shown that, in all circumstances 
involving market situations subject to measurement by 
demand curves where compensation is_ not actually made 
or where it is impossible, the Marshallian demand curve is 
a useful measure of the change in society1s welfare. This, 
even though the marginal utility of money is not constant. 
Winch believes that welfare shifts should be viewed from 
society's criteria and for this reason can neglect the 
changing marginal utility of money. The validity of 
the measure hinges on how society regards a redistribution 
of income. As Winch points out:
Any_.net gain or loss resulting from aggre­
gation ^of the gainers' and losers' utilities in
^Ol.M.D. Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957).
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terms of money/ . . .  is an accurate measure­
ment of the gain or loss of welfare only if 
society is indifferent to the distribution 
involved. If the redistribution is considered 
good in itself, aggregation underestimates a 
net gain and underestimates a net loss.
Policy decisions can therefore be based on the 
gain criterion in cases where the effects of 
the policy change would manifest themselves in 
price changes and where compensation is not 
practicable.91
Thus the Dupuit-Marshallian formulation of consumers'
surplus may still possess some usefulness as a practical
policy guide,at least where the Hicksian compensation
principle is inapplicable. This writer, along with
Professor Winch, does not share Samuelson's view that
"the subject is of historical and doctrinal interest,
with a limited amount of appeal as a purely mathematical 
92puzzle." On the contrary, the concept invented by
Dupuit over a century ago may be, as Winch has shown, of
practical import. Certainly a doctrine possessed of such
a long and interesting history, as well as one which brings
the economic aim of "maximum satisfaction" into full focus,
should not be merely exhibited in a showcase for what
93Samuelson calls "superfluous" theories.
91Winch, "Consumer's Surplus," p. 422.
^^Samuelson, Foundations, p. 195.
^Samuelson, Foundations, p. 195.
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CHAPTER IV
DUPUIT'S MONOPOLY - PRICE DISCRIMINATION THEORY
Introduction
Augustin Cournot presented, in what was surely one 
of the most remarkable theoretical performances in the 
history of economic analysis, an elegant mathematical 
formulation of monopoly theory. The familiar conditions 
for profit maximization are analysed both for the mono­
polist with and the monopolist without costs of pro­
duction.^ Cournot meticulously showed that the 
monopolist would maximize his net receipts or, alternative­
ly, would produce where marginal costs equaled marginal 
revenue. He proceeded to discuss other important aspects 
of monopoly theory, including the famous duopoly case 
(mineral springs example) and provided an admirable
■'■See Mathematical Principles, p. 57. Chapters V and
VI of Cournot's work contain the corpus of his contribution 
in this area.
2Supra, note 28, Chapter II.
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3analysis of the incidence of taxation. Cournot, however, 
neglected an important aspect of monopoly theory in his 
contribution. This neglected issue was the problem of 
price discrimination.^
Price discrimination and the problems surrounding it 
has always been of special interest to economists dealing 
with public utilities and public regulation of business.
A brief perusal of transport and public utility pricing 
policies would suggest the existence of such discrimin­
ation. Observation of such policies brought Jules Dupuit 
to a discussion of this important aspect of monopoly 
theory, and with his discussion, Dupuit filled an impor­
tant void left by Cournot. Moreover, as the following 
discussion will show, Dupuit1s presentation of simple 
monopoly pricing, especially in view of the fact that 
Cournot's writings were unknown to him, had a flavor 
peculiar to itself.
3Cournot felt that, since the legislator had the 
power to alter the distribution of taxes, "the theory of 
the incidence of taxation is one of the great objects of 
investigations in Political Economy," Mathematical 
Principles, p. 67. In 1838 Cournot pointed out that a 
lump sum tax on a monopolist would "have no direct 
influence on the price of the article which he produces, 
and consequently none on quantity produced, and that it 
will not be a burden to the consumer in any way," p. 68.
"^See Schumpeter, History, p. 978.
Dupuit1s Monopoly Theory
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In the course of his economic writings Dupuit was led 
to investigate the problem of monopoly pricing. Conditions 
existing in the French railroad companies were of particu­
lar interest to him. As scores of later economists were 
to show, Dupuit pointed out that " . . .  the interest of 
ordinary capitals is regulated by the law of supply and
demand . . . while the roads of transportation capitals
5are monopolies." Thus, generally speaking, "ways of 
communication," or forms of transportation were sheltered 
from competition. Dupuit illustrated this point by 
comparing the economic principles which determine house 
rent to those affecting transport rates. Exorbitant 
rents for lodging, according to Dupuit, could not exist 
for very long for "if it was known that house rental 
yields a revenue superior to the rental of other capitals, 
speculation would focus very quickly on the construction of 
houses and equilibrium would be established^ The entry
^Jules Dupuit, "Toll," translated by Eleanor Evans
and edited by R. B. Ekelund, Jr., Dictionnaire de
l'Economie Politique (Paris: Guillaumin and Co., II, 1853), 
p. 2. Future page reference is to the translation avail­
able only in the library of Louisiana State University.
6Dupuit, "Toll," p. 3.
and exit process prohibits monopoly rents over the long-
run in dwelling houses, but as Dupuit indicated, this
freedom to enter the railroad industry is inhibited by
certain factors indigenous to that industry. Enormous
amounts of capital, in the first instance, restricted the
possibility of entry to an extremely limited number of
persons. Additionally, Dupuit claimed that because of
the uniqueness of the first enterprise, a "new one can
survive only at the expense of the first and . . . the
profit which is sufficient for one is not sufficient for 
7two." He also showed that the economies of being 
established stood as a formidable barrier to the entry 
of new firms. Competition in such circumstances, would, 
because of the revenue effects on the separate firms,
have disastrous results. Dupuit1s statement on this
8matter implied that the sudden encroachment of a com­
petitor on a monopoly railroad line would "spread" the 
fixed traffic too thin for either to survive. Costs, 
moreover, would be higher for the new enterprise, since 
"the first enterprise . . . had the choice of layout;"
and the second enterprise arrives "after habits are
7Dupuit, "Toll," p. 4.
^Dupuit, "Toll," pp. 4-6.
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formed, /and/ relations ^ ar®/ established."^ Because of 
such barriers to entry, these transportation firms "are 
necessarily monopolies and the proprietor of a capital 
monopoly, can draw a superior revenue from it than that 
of capitals submitted to competition."^
Dupuit's analytical contribution to monopoly theory 
emerged when he addressed himself to the principles on 
which the simple monopolist, as constituted above, behaves. 
In the course of his discussion on the effects of tolls 
and transport charges on utility, Dupuit uncovered the 
rule of monopoly profit maximization. The following 
table (Table 4-1) reproduced from the 1849 article "on 
Tolls and Transport Charges,"'*’’*’ will be useful in illus­
trating Dupuit1s grasp of this well-known principle.
^Dupuit, "Toll,p. 5. 
l°Dupuit, "Toll," p. 6.
■^Jules Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges, " 
translated by Elizabeth Henderson, Annales des Ponts et 
Chaussees (1849) in International Economic Papers, No.
11 (London: Macmillan, 1962), p. 21. It should be noted
that this is the same demand curve and utility calcula­
tion used by Dupuit in another connection. See Appendix 
II.
TABLE 4-1




Yield of the toll
Gross Net
0 100 445 0 -200
1 80 425 80 - 80
2 63 391 126 0
3 50 352 150 50
4 41 316 164 82
5 33 276 165 99
6 26 234 156 104
7 20 192 140 100
8 14 144 112 84
9 9 99 81 63
10 6 69 60 48
11 3 36 33 27
12 0 0 0 0
The example above refers to a tariff or rate which a 
monopoly railroad may charge for passage„ Here Dupuit 
considered the case of an unregulated monopolist free to 
charge a rate which would maximize profits. Dupuit else­
where pointed out that "if the road or bridge or canal 
/or any other undertaking/ is private property, the owner 
company has only one aim, and that is to get the largest
1 opossible income from the toll." Thus the monopolist 
with no costs of production facing the demand schedule 
above would charge a rate of 5 in order to maximize
12 Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 11.
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profits or gross receipts. But Dupuit expanded the
example to the monopolist with costs of production.
Dupuit supposed that the monopolist's "cost of traction"
could be represented by the figure 2 per unit of passage.
These traction costs may be identified with marginal or
average variable costs. In this case, as Dupuit correctly
pointed out, "the rate which maximizes net yield is not
the same as that which maximizes gross yield. The latter
rate was 5, the former is 6, and it would grow indefinitely
with the cost. It follows that when traction cost
/marginal cost/ diminishes, the toll must diminish to
13yield maximum receipts."
It is notable that Dupuit did not reason in terms of 
the familiar marginal revenue-marginal cost criterion 
for profit maximization. Dupuit did not extend the 
argument as did Cournot who symbolically produced the 
marginal condition for profit maximization, and consequently 
stated that "the producer will always stop when the increase, 
in expense exceeds the increase in receipts."^  Dupuit, 
however, correctly stated that if the level of marginal
1 3Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 20.
14Cournot, Mathematical Principles, p. 59.
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(or traction) costs increased, the profit maximizing
tariff would increase and output would decrease. The
net receipts, additionally, are net only of variable
expenses. Fixed costs, such as "certain administrative
expenses, interest on construction expenditure, etc.,"
must also be covered in the long run. Consequently,
Dupuit1s net receipts are not monopoly profits as are
his gross receipts (without costs of production).
Referring to the above chart, Dupuit said that "if fixed
costs were more than 104 and it were possible to charge
only one uniform rate, the railroad would be a losing
15proposition with any tariff."
Dupuit1s approach to the profit maximizing condition 
is no less valid for being different. Moreover, Dupuit 
had an illustrious follower in the use of the net revenue 
approach. Alfred Marshall in his chapter on monopoly-*-^ 
used a concept similar to Dupuit1s in order to discuss 
and pprtray monopoly revenue. Marshall, eschewing the 
marginal method, proceeded to develop and refine what he 
called the "monopoly revenue s c h e d u l e . M a r s h a l l ' s
- ^ D u p u i t ,  "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 21.
-^Marshall, Principles (8th ed.), Chapter XIV,
Part V, "The Theory of Monopolies."
■^Marshall, Principles, p. 479.
approach was to subtract the supply price for each amount 
of the commodity from the corresponding demand price. 
Marshall, unlike Dupuit, included other costs, such as
interest on capital, "salaries of directors, etc." in his
18Supply price. After supply price is subtracted from 
demand price, the residue, or monopoly revenue, is set 
against the corresponding quantity in order to obtain the 
monopoly revenue schedule. This latter schedule, together 
with the demand curve and "constant revenue curves," are 
elegantly combined and constructed by Marshall to show that 
the monopolistic seller will always maximize monopoly 
revenue. Although this technique has not been favored 
with economists' attention, there can be little doubt 
that, with reference to this analytical apparatus, 
Marshall's presentation was more akin to Dupuit's than to 
Cournot's. Again, as in the case of the consumers' 
surplus argument, Marshall enlarged the analytical value 
of the tool by probing the implications of the monopolist's 
net revenue. Specifically, Marshall showed (among other 
things) that due to various economies of scale, to the 
ability to finance technological improvement, both
18Marshall, Principles, p. 479.
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associated with monopoly market structure, "the supply 
schedule for the commodity, if not monopolized, would 
show higher supply price than those of our monopoly 
supply schedule. 1 Marshall went further and stated 
that, given that the monopolist had unlimited command 
over capital, equilibrium quantity under free competition 
would be less than that for which the demand price is 
equal to supply price under monopoly.
Marshall also indicated other interesting features 
of monopoly control, some of which are strikingly evoca­
tive of Dupuit1s views. One of these issues is the 
important relationship between monopoly revenue and con­
sumers 1 surplus which will now be investigated in some 
detail.
Dupuit supplied a utility calculation for his rail­
road example as indicated by Column three of Table 4-1 
of this chapter. The net revenue maximizing price would 
be a tariff of 6 in that example. Absolute utility pro­
duced by this tariff would be 234. This utility is 
segmented in the following fashion, according to D u p u i t
19Marshall, Principles, pp. 484-485.
20Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 21.
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Utility lost in traction cost 52
Utility accruing to the owner of
the railway 104
Utility remaining to the 26 pass­
engers 78
234
If we momentarily depart from Dupuit1s presentation and
assume that fixed cost is exactly 104, there is no monopoly
revenue. In the short run, the 104 accruing to the owner
of the railway is of the nature of an economic rent on
21fixed investment, but as Dupuit succinctly pointed out, 
these fixed costs must be met by the monopolist in the 
long run. Thus, under the assumption that fixed costs 
are 104, there would be no monopoly revenue. Consumers'
surplus is produced, however, in the amount of 78.
Although Dupuit1s theory of discrimination will be 
developed in detail further in this chapter, it is signifi­
cant at this point to show that Dupuit knew that this 
consumers' surplus of 78 could be diminished (or increased) 
by a policy of price discrimination used to enhance 
monopoly revenue. Dupuit assumed that fixed cost in the 
above example was 110, clearly indicating losses to the 
railroad under the one-price policy. But Dupuit assumed
^See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price (New 
York: Macmillan, 1962), pp. 99 and 104.
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that discrimination was possible, and that 14 passengers 
could be induced by some form of differentiation to pay 8, 
while 12 could be carried at 6 . Here Dupuit took discrim­
ination to mean the selling of one and the same commodity 
at more than one price. The same 26 passengers now yielded 
a net revenue of 1 3 2 . This is the so-called "necessary 
case" and monopoly revenue is now 22 at the former output; 
consumers' surplus has decreased from 78 to 50, however. 
Thus Dupuit did not view the relationship between monopoly 
net revenue and consumers' surplus as necessarily a sym­
biotic one. Monopoly profits could be increased at the 
expense of consumers' surplus.
Although Marshall did not discuss price discrimination 
in any context, he went to great lengths in his chapter on 
monopoly to point up the implications of this dichotomy 
between monopoly revenues and consumers' surplus. Although 
Marshall knew that the profit maximizing monopolist was not 
concerned with consumer welfare, it was his position that 
the simple monopolist may calculate the effects that their 
pricing decisions have on consumers' surplus. He proposed 
that the consumers' surplus arising from the sale of the
"^Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 21.
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commodity at any price be added to the monopoly revenue and
that the money sum of the two be called the total benefit.
And, according to Marshall,
. . . if the monopolist regards a gain to the 
consumers as of equal importance with an equal 
gain to himself, his aim will be to produce just 
that amount of the commodity which will make this 
total benefit a maximum.^
Marshall modified the total benefit theory for the
event in which the monopolist did not regard a gain in
consumers' surplus as equal to a gain in monopoly revenue.
24The result was his theory of compromise benefit. A 
monopolist behaving on the principle of compromise benefit 
would calculate the monopoly revenue to be had at any 
given price and add to it some percentage (one-half, one- 
third, etc.) of the corresponding consumers' surplus. He 
would then set out to maximize this compromise benefit. 
Marshall knew that monopolist's were not philanthropic in 
the role assigned to them by economic theory, and yet he 
thought that some industries, and he specifically mentioned 
railroads, felt a communion of interests with the public.
^Marshall, Principles, p. 487.
^Marshall, Principles, p. 489. This "theory of 
the altruistic entrepreneur" may be an example of Marshall's 
partial recantation of strict laissez faire precepts.
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Additionally, Marshall thought that the government should
be interested in maximizing consumers' welfare, although
he strongly indicated that they should do so only under
the constraint of equating total revenue to total costs,
25an applxcation of compromise benefit.
The bulk of Marshall's analysis of the relationship 
between monopoly revenue and consumers' surplus is a 
reiteration of Dupuit's invention. Dupuit, it is true, 
assumed that the unregulated simple (and discriminating) 
monopolist was a profit maximizer, an assertion challenged 
by Marshall to some degree. But the fundamental point 
that, at any given quantity, there exists an inverse 
relationship between consumers' surplus and monopoly 
revenue, and additionally, that rates could be changed to 
yield various combinations of consumer utility and monopoly 
returns was Dupuit's. Although Dupuit's example shifts 
from one of simply monopoly to one of discriminating 
monopoly, the similarity between Dupuit and Marshall is
2 5As Marshall pointed out, "even a government which 
considers its own interests coincident with those of the 
people has to take account of the fact that, if it abandons 
one source of revenue, it must in general fall back on 
others which have their own disadvantages. For they will 
necessarily involve friction and expense in collection, 
together with some injury to the public, of the kind which 
we have described as a loss of consumers' surplus . . . "  
Principles. p. 488.
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still clear in this regard. Both economists showed that 
the monopolist's pricing decisions impinge on and are 
important to the consumers' surplus of the commodity.
With the aid of another of Dupuit numerical examples 
(which directly follows that reproduced in Table 4-1 of 
this chapter), the points of analogy in the two statements 
can be i l l u s t r a t e d .^6 Dupuit's example (Table 4-2) is 













Number of passengers 26 26 33 41 50 63
Traction costs 52 52 66 82 100 126




78 50 81 92 122 161
Net utility 182 182 210 234 252 265
Profit on the 
assumption that 
fixed cost equals 110 - 6 22 19 32 20 - 6
“̂ Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 22.
immediately alive to the revenue possibilities of such a 
device. The Table clearly shows that net receipts can be 
increased by selling a given quantity discriminatorily. 
Taking the tariff (4,7) as an example, Dupuit1s calcu­
lations can be approached in the following manner. Of the 
41 possible passengers at a toll of 4fr. (see the demand 
curve of Table 4-1 of this chapter), Dupuit assumed it 
possible to distinguish 20 who would pay a toll of 7 fr. for 
the journey. This would yield total receipts of 224 
francs (20 X 7 + 21 X 4). Subtracting traction costs 
(which remained constant at 2 fr. per passenger) from 
total receipts yields net receipts of 142. The total 
utility corresponding to the 41 journeys is, from Table 
4-1, 316. Subtracting the monopolist's total receipts 
from this total utility results in a consumers' surplus 
(or "utility remaining to passengers") of 92. Net utility 
is the sum of net receipts and consumers' surplus. Profit 
is the difference between total receipts and total costs 
of production (fixed and traction costs), or 224 - (82 +
110) = 32. Dupuit's "profit" in the table is analogous 
to Marshall's monopoly revenue. Since Dupuit assumed 
profit maximizing behavior, he pointed out that "the 
tariff (4,7) yields decidedly more than the others and
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that is the one which a private company would adopt.',2̂
This profit maximizing two-class tariff nevertheless results 
in an improvement in consumers' surplus (or "utility 
remaining to passengers") over the simple monopoly rate 
of 6 . Output would increase and average price would 
decline as well.
But the new profit maximizing prices and output do 
not maximize consumers' surplus, and this was an important 
point in Dupuit's presentation. Should the monopolist be 
imbued with the public interest or should the government 
assume ownership of the enterprise, some sort of "compromise 
benefit" policy would be established, as Marshall later 
argued. But Dupuit, much earlier than Marshall, considered 
a "compromise benefit" policy and its effect on consumers' 
utility. This can be shown by the following statement 
which refers to Table 4-2.
The tariff (2,6) maximizes utility /net utility 
and consumers' surplus/, though it does involve the 
railway in a loss of 6; but this loss can be avoided 
by raising the second-class price just a little above 
2, which would reduce utility to about 260 and pass­
engers to 60. This is the tariff which the govern­
ment would adopt, because it would cover all costs.
The railway operated by a private company would
2^Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 22.
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serve only forty-one passengers and give them a 
utility of 92; if operated by the government, it 
would serve sixty passengers and give them a 
utility of about 160.28 (emphasis supplied)
While Dupuit did not consider the altruistic monopolist, he 
considered the case of a "compromise benefit" policy 
instituted by the government. Dupuit seemed to indicate 
that a privately owned enterprise could attain the same 
results, but he did not dwell on the idea and in the 
quotation, he reverted to the statement that the mono­
polist will maximize profits.
The treatment of costs under government ownership is 
identical in both Marshall and Dupuit. Although Dupuit's 
argument may have changed in the marginal cost pricing 
case (see Chapter V of this dissertation), in this case 
at least, both realized that consumers' surplus could be 
maximized by giving the commodity away, but both Dupuit 
and Marshall had serious misgivings on the attenuating 
difficulties of financing the losses and both recommended 
that the government "compromise" and recover costs. Dupuit 
wanted the government to maximize "utility remaining to 
passengers" under the total cost constraint and this is 
none other than the theory which was to receive the
28Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," pp. 22-23.
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appelation "compromise benefit" from Marshall at a much 
later date.
In sum, Dupuit1s contributions to the development of 
simple monopoly theory, particularly when one appreciates 
their apparent influence on Alfred Marshall's Principles, 
were considerable. His approach to simple monopoly profit 
maximization was used by Marshall in preference to 
Cournot's marginal apparatus, although Dupuit1s theoretical 
ideas were melded with practical examples, possessing, 
therefore, none of the theoretical neatness exhibited by 
Cournot. Having been, however, the first major developer 
of utility theory, Dupuit was able to see welfare impli­
cations in monopoly pricing. Cournot lacked the analytical 
apparatus which would have enabled him to analyze these 
implications.
By means of examples Dupuit showed that the profit 
maximizing behavior of the monopolist could be inimical 
to the interests of the consumer, if maximization of 
consumers' surplus was the criterion. A "compromise 
benefit" policy could be instituted by a private monopolist 
or by the government, although he implicitly deemed the 
former far-fetched and did not discuss the possibility. 
Dupuit's simple monopolist ends up a discriminating
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monopolist, the analysis of which is a first-rate contri­
bution it itself; but this in no way obscures the relation­
ship Dupuit plotted between monopoly revenue and consumers 1 
surplus. And it is this important relationship and a 
discussion thereof which mysteriously re-emerged in 
Marshall's chapter on monopoly without a scintilla of 
credit to Dupuit.
The "compromise" and "total benefit" theories, terms 
with an aura of originality, were merely refurbishments 
of concepts obtrusively present in one of Dupuit1s major 
articles. Other elaborations were largely in the form of
2 9some elegant (perhaps over-elegant) Marshallian graphics.
It is not impossible that Marshall arrived at the "com­
promise benefit" theory independently. But there is a 
strong presumption, especially in the light of Professor 
Schumpeter's remarks with regard to Marshall's treatment 
of Dupuit's consumers' surplus theory, that his neglect 
of Dupuit in regard to monopoly theory was merely repre­
sentative of the typically ungenerous attitude Marshall 
harbored for the French economist throughout his writings.
2q̂See Fxgure 36, Principles, 8th ed., p. 488, for 
example.
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In the final accounting, however, Dupuit1s discussion of 
monopoly pricing and of the effects of it on the size and 
distribution of economic welfare was a unique and positive 
contribution to the economic tool-kit.
Dupuit's Theory of Price Discrimination
The genuine originality of Dupuit as an economic 
theorist is nowhere more forcefully displayed than in his 
theory of monopoly price discrimination. Even so astute 
a theorist as Cournot, who devoted the space of two 
chapters in his book to monopoly theory, did not discuss 
the problem and its implications. Indeed, Dupuit's 
contributions in this area were not to be surpassed until 
the writings of Pigou and Edgeworth.3*3
The existence of multiple prices for the same commodity 
(produced under similar or identical cost conditions) 
apparently fascinated Dupuit, evidenced by the fact that he 
discussed such phenomena in most of his economic works. 
Dupuit, in his various articles, outlined some of the 
motives and conditions necessary for discrimination to be 
feasible. Although he did not possess the concept of 
price elasticity of demand, Dupuit recognized that the
30Infra, p. 163.
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maximum price that a buyer would offer for a commodity
would not be the same among different individuals; he
knew, further, that this difference in "buyer estimates"
was necessary for discrimination. As he pointed out when
discussing discriminatory tolls on bridges:
Why two different prices for one same ser­
vice? Because the poor man does not attach to the 
advantage of passing the bridge the same price or 
the same utility as the rich one . . . On a canal or
on a railroad, the tariffs distinguish between the 
classes of merchandise and travelers and imposes 
upon them variable prices although costs are almost
the same.
Thus Dupuit implicitly indicated that discrimination is
possible because the poor man and the rich man possessed
different elasticities of demand for passage on the bridge.
Differences in "buyer estimates" were, however, not
the only explanation for discrimination. Dupuit found
another motive in the special cost characteristics of
32certain industries. The presence of high fixed costs 
or of common costs in such industries would be sufficient 
to induce discriminatory pricing to increase utilization
3lDupuit, "On Utility and Its Measure," (1853), p. 23.
OO #J Contemporary explanations of this characteristic 
are very much similar to Dupuit's. See D. P. Locklin, 
Economics of Transportation (Homewood, Illinois: Richard
D. Irwin, Inc., I960), p. 134 et passim.
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of plant. Dupuit argued as follows:
. . . when one realizes the manner in which 
things happen on the canals, on the railroads, 
one recognizes that, if one could dispose of the 
number of travelers and of the quantity of mer­
chandise, their double or triple pould be trans­
ported without perceptibly increasing the costs.^3
How did Dupuit explain these low marginal costs present in 
such industries and how did this fact lead to discrimin­
ation? Dupuit's intent on the matter becomes clear as he 
continued:
From this, it results that it is impossible 
to know what is the real cost of a traveler or a 
ton of merchandise at a given distance; that it 
is the nature of all production to be broken down 
into general fixed_costs /commo.n_costs/ and pro­
portionate costs /variable costs/. Now, for 
certain productions, the general costs consti­
tute almost all of the expenditure and they can 
be paid by such and such a product and dispensed 
with the others. It is thus that in commerce, 
merchandise is found which is sold in a consistent 
manner well below cost price, when this price is 
calculated by applying the general costs; that 
stems from the fact that they are paid by other 
products in the manufacturing of which they 
concur . . . There is almost no industry where
this phenomena is not present, but no where does 
it appear more remarkably than in the railroads
Differences in cost did not explain price discrimination 
to Dupuit; rather it was the mass of costs common to "certain
33Dupuit, "Toll," p. 15.
■^Dupuit, "Toll," pp. 15-16.
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productions" which provided a motive for discrimination.
As long as the "proportionate" or variable costs could be 
covered it was profitable to allow additional traffic to 
move. As Dupuit himself put the matter, "all tolls, which 
result in turning away from a roadway travelers or mer­
chandise which could benefit from it without their 
transportation being burdensome or abusive, are badly 
established tolls," (emphasis supplied).33 The large mass 
of common costs provided a powerful stimulus for price 
discrimination, for, although some traffic did not pro­
vide as large a contribution to fixed expenses as other 
traffic, the additional costs due to the new business would 
be met, as well as providing some contribution to the 
mass of common costs.
It should be noted that Dupuit definitely stated that 
discrimination due to high fixed costs, as well as discrim­
ination in general, was not only to be found in railroad 
pricing or in public utilities. He knew that discrimination 
was practiced ubiquitously by business men involved in 
both public and private undertakings. Some of his most 
lucid examples of discriminatory practices were drawn from 
strictly private enterprise, such as ones involving theatre
35Dupuit, "Toll," p. 15.
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36 3 *7tickets, book printing, and others. Price discrimin­
ation is ". . . well known in commerce, and it has been 
exploited for a long time. This is what serves as a basis 
for all the speculations which are protected from compe­
tition either by the secret of fabrication or by any other 
circumstance which assures the benefit of monopoly to the 
seller."®® Dupuit1s observation that the practice of 
price discrimination permeated monopolistic structures 
goes far in explaining why he devoted so little time to a 
discussion of the simple monopoly market structure. His 
role as a theorist concerned with price discrimination is 
best defined by one of his own enlightening quotations. 
"Today," said Dupuit, "the problem is one of according 
scientific treatment, if we may say so, to a question in 
the solution of which business men have already made good 
progress by just going ahead at random."®® Observation 
of actual business practice, then, brought Dupuit to 
his "scientific treatment" of price discrimination.
36Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 16.
■^Dupuit, "Toll," p. 16.
38Dupuit, "On Utility and Its Measure,." (1853), p. 21.
®®Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 16.
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Dupuit was as adamant in his insistence that price 
discrimination was due to monopoly power as was Pigou some 
decades later when he entered into the celebrated debate 
with Professor Taussig.^ Briefly Taussig's position 
was that discrimination existed on the railroads because 
of the over-riding presence of joint costs. Pigou took 
Taussig to task and denied that preponderance of con­
ditions of true joint supply on the railroads, asserting 
instead that discrimination in that area was due to 
monopoly power coupled with high common costs. Although 
Dupuit did not specifically entertain a discussion of 
joint supply, with one exception to considered later in 
this chapter, he adhered to the belief, as did Pigou, 
that discrimination was the result of monopoly power.
After discussing differential tolls imposed on users of 
a canal, Dupuit compared these discriminatory charges with 
the price of transportation on roadways where competition 
existed:
^®The debate began with Professor F. W. Taussig's 
"A Contribution to the Theory of Railway Rates," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 5 (1891), and continued with Pigou 
and Taussig, "Articles and Controversies between Pigou and 
Taussig," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 27 (1913); A. C. 
Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (1920), chapters 17 and 18. 
Taussig put in a final word in his "The Theory of Railway 
Rates Once More,"Quarterly,Journal of Economics, 47 
(February, 1933).
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Never would a_transport contractor /in 
active competition/ be imprudent enough to say 
to his clientele: From A to B, I will ask 10 fr.
per ton for sand; but I will ask 48 for pit coal 
and 87 for flour. Never does one find in the 
same truck . . . merchandise paying transport 
prices so different. This is very simple; for 
the contractor could profitably transport sand 
at 10 fr.; he would have an enormous profit 
transporting flour at 87 and very soon numerous 
competitors would come to make more reasonable 
offers to the public and would bring the price 
back to a level almost similar to cost price. The 
toll differential /on the cana/7 is_ then a_ result 
of monopoly; competition would necessarily cause 
it to disappear. The rate of toll then is not 
determined by any economic law, it is only the 
result of the will of the one who imposes it.^ 
(emphasis supplied)
Consequently, it was Dupuit1s position that the practice 
of discrimination required a degree of monopoly power.
It is true that in the presence of competition, granting 
joint supply, differential rates could still exist, but 
Dupuit did not consider this case. He apparently felt 
that monopoly was the dominating element allowing dis­
crimination and that a large mass of costs common to the 
venture provided an added incentive for the monopolist to 
engage in this form of pricing. Monopoly power, to Dupuit, 
was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for dis­
crimination; "buyer estimates" also had to be considered.
As he pointed out, "The one who exploites a monopoly can
41Dupuit, "Toll," p. 13.
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very well arbitrarily fix the price of the services he
A Omust render, but he does not control their number . . ."
The cruc4 al issue of demand conditions also had to be 
considered.
Dupuit briefly considered the case of "time-jointness," 
in which supply (capacity) offered at a given time cannot 
be transferred to another time.^2 Such a situation demanded 
rate discrimination in Dupuit1s view. His example was one 
of a goods train which had to leave at a fixed hour regard­
less of the amount of freight on board. "In these circum­
stances," said Dupuit, "additional freight does not occasion 
proportional additional expense and there is room for a 
considerable reduction of the t o l l . T h e  low marginal 
costs of carrying additional traffic would justify rate 
discrimination. Closely linked with this is the problem 
of obtaining better utilization of capacity. Dupuit posed 
a problem of half-empty railroad carriages. In this 
situation a small increase in "traction costs," or marginal
^2Dupuit, "Toll," p. 14.
43See Donald H. Wallace's classic article, "Joint 
and Overhead Cost and Railroad Rate Policy," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics (August, 1934) for an excellent dis­
cussion of all aspects of this variety of jointness.
44Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 20.
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costs, would permit "three times as many" passengers
• n 45"as is the case today" to be carrxed by rail. To bring 
the railway to better utilization Dupuit advised:
Raise the fare for days when the rush of 
travelers obliges you to put on two locomotives, 
lower it for days when passengers are few. Why 
not issue full season tickets, or season tickets 
with a supplement, or valid only for certain days 
or certain trains.^6
Dupuit seemed to imply here that the existence of excess
capacity justified differential rates. His dictum was to
raise rates at "peak" loads, where marginal costs increase
sharply and to lower them when less-than-capacity loads
occasioned low additional costs for extra traffic. All
this would lead to better utilization of capacity, a goal
which Dupuit evidently thought desirable. Moreover he
thought the goal attainable, but only through the use of
discriminatory pricing practices. Thus, excess capacity
together with the existence of high fixed costs provided
an additional goal to the monopolist to practice price
discrimination.
Price discrimination could not be practiced if a unit
of the commodity sold in one market could be transferred
-̂’Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 25. 
4f Dupuit,"On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 25.
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to another market. If this were allowed, arbitrage would
soon bring the price of the commodity or service to
equality. In short, the markets must be separable in some
fashion. As Pigou later showed, "services applied directly
by the seller to commodities handed to them for treatment,
such as the service of transporting different articles,
47are . . . entirely non-transferable." Pigou was getting
at the fact that coal cannot be transferred into steel, 
nor can steel be transformed into flour in order to take 
advantage of differential rates. Dupuit was cognizant of 
the problem of non-transference, but he did not belabor it; 
his statement on the matter is suggestive, however, of his 
position on another important issue. Dupuit contrasted 
passenger with commodity traffic on the railroad with 
respect to the railroads ability to discriminate. He 
observed:
Passengers cannot, like goods, be classified 
by external characteristics and must be left to 
classify themselves. Hence a host of measures 
which are not always understood by the public, 
and sometimes not even by the railway company.^8
It can thus be concluded that Dupuit looked upon the unit
of service offered for sale, i.e., the transport unit, as
47Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, p. 276.
^^Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 20.
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homogeneous on the supply side with respect to the trans­
portation of goods at least. It was this non-homogeneity 
on the demand side for transport, owing to differences in 
"external characteristics," that permitted discrimination. 
Thus the demand for copper transportation was independent 
and distinct from the demand for coal transportation. 
Discrimination could then take place due to the fact that 
differences in external characteristics of units carried 
made transportation a kind of multiple-product industry. 
Although the unit offered for sale, transport service, 
was homogeneous, the fact that the demand was heterogeneous 
may be said to change the character of the unit offered 
for sale.
Different conditions existed in the passenger market. 
Dupuit knew that, regarding passenger traffic, product 
differentiation was in order. Passengers are generally 
indistinguishable by "external characteristics;" Dupuit 
thus reasoned that the unit offered for sale would, of 
necessity, have to be differentiated in order to success­
fully practice discrimination. By offering first-class, 
second-class, etc., passage, the railroad itself created a 
non-homogeneous supply. The method and intent of the rail­
roads in this matter was well-understood by Dupuit as the
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following excerpt illustrates:
It is not because of the few thousand francs 
which would have to be spent to put on roof over 
the third-class carriages or to upholster the 
third-class seats that some company or other has 
open carriages with wooden benches . . . What
the company is trying to do is to prevent the 
passengers who can pay the second-class fare 
from travelling third class; it hits the poor, 
not because it wants to hurt them, but to frighten 
the rich . . . And it is again for the same reason 
that the companies, having proved almost cruel to 
third-class passengers and mean to second-class 
ones, become lavish in dealing with first-class 
passengers. Having refused the poor what is 
necessary, they give the rich what ig super­
fluous . 49
The statement is surely a classic in the literature of
price discrimination. Dupuit saw that such activity
could not exist in a society in which "all citizens are
about equal in rank and wealth" or in which all citizens
are "brought up like Spartans" and "appreciate neither
deep-piled carpets nor soft c u s h i o n s . in such a
society, "a single uniform tariff would be the only
51possible solution."
49Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 23.
50Dupuit,, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 24. 
^Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 24.
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Types and Desirability of Discrimination
In the Economics of Welfare Professor Pigou scientific­
ally outlined three types of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . ^  Unfortunately 
Dupuit1s presentation was not so systematic. At several 
points in his writings he indicated that what is now called 
first-degree discrimination should act as the "foremost 
principle" on which pricing should be b a s e d . ^3 In order 
to "greatly extend the utility" of certain services, Dupuit 
recommended that the private entrepreneur "impose on each 
traveler, on each merchandise, only a price inferior to 
the one which would prevent them from using the road."~^
Such discrimination would of course increase producers'
In Pigou1s own words, "a first degree would involve 
the charge of a different price against all the different 
units of commodity, in such wise that the price exacted 
for each was equal to the demand price for it, and no 
consumers' surplus was left to the buyers. A second degree 
would obtain if a monopolist were able to make ri separate 
prices, in such wise that all units with a demand price 
greater than x were sold at a price x, all with a demand 
price less than x and greater than _y at a price an<3 so 
on. A third degree would obtain if the monopolist were 
able to distinguish among his customers n different groups, 
separated from one another more or less by some practicable 
mark, and could charge a separate monopoly price to the 
members of each group," Economics of Welfare, p. 279.
53Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charge," p. 26.
54Dupuit, "Toll," p. 21.
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utility, or monopoly profits, but it would eliminate all
consumers' surplus: utilization of the service would be
expanded however. Additionally, Dupuit felt that such
discrimination should be invoked "provided that this does
55not involve the company m  a loss."
Although he recommended first degree discrimination, 
it is significant that Dupuit1s examples do not entertain 
such conditions. The example given in Table 4-2 showed 
two-class railroad tariffs. In this connection Dupuit 
knew that a three-class tariff would increase receipts 
and the number of passengers, adding that "by multiplying 
classes indefinitely, the passengers could be made to pay 
over all the utility they derive from the railway.
But, conscious of the infeasibility of carrying this to the 
limit of first-degree discrimination, Dupuit adjudged this 
a "very difficult matter" in practical application.^7 As 
a practical matter then, Dupuit thought that first-degree 
discrimination was difficult to achieve. He believed 
other forms more viable, however, and thought that the task 
of the entrepreneur was to define "the general characteristics
^5Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 26.
56Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 23.
^7Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 23.
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by which consumers may be classified in the tariff 
58schedule.' This surely connotes a form of discrimin­
ation other than first-degree.
Dupuit thought that discrimination was desirable 
because it increased the total utility and consumers' 
surplus (utility remaining to consumers) of a good when 
contrasted to simple monopoly pricing. Referring to Table 
4-2, discrimination increased consumers' surplus in all 
cases where output is increased over that of simple 
monopoly. Dupuit clearly pronounced profit-maximizing 
discriminatory output to be greater than simple monopoly 
output in the "necessary case," i.e., the case where no 
output would be forthcoming in the long-run with a single 
monopoly price. In this case discrimination always 
increases output. But Dupuit presented no real analysis 
of other cases in which discrimination may increase, 
decrease, or leave output unchanged over simple monopoly 
pricing. A full discussion of these problems awaited 
Mrs. Joan Robinson's elegant and penetrating work.^9
S^Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 16.
59See Joan Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect 
Competition (London: Macmillan and Co., 1961), particularly
Chapters 15 and 16. The analysis in these chapters probably 
represents the high-point of theoretical formulations of 
price discrimination to date.
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Dupuit's discussion contained the strong presumption 
that if only one of the markets could be served by the 
simple monopoly price, discrimination would cause output 
to increase. If discrimination brings in additional 
markets, output should increase. Dupuit, however, showed 
that if both markets could be served at the simple 
monopoly tariff 6 in Table 4-2, a discriminatory tariff 
of 6 and 8 would conceivably cause traffic to remain 
constant at 26 passengers. The tariff combination 2 and 
6 yielded an increase in output over the simple monopoly 
price from 26 to 63. Here both markets could not have been 
served at the simple monopoly price. All of the other 
tariff combinations involve rates both above and below 
the simple monopoly rate. This suggests that Dupuit 
was not really aware of the problem of comparing simple 
monopoly output with discriminatory output in order to 
assess the relative desirability of simple and discrimin­
ating market forms.
The most important point to Dupuit was the effect of 
discrimination on the utility of the project. If discrim­
ination increased output, it also increased utility. The 
relative "share of utility" accruing to the monopolist and 
the share remaining to consumers was also an issue. The
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effect, as pointed out earlier in this chapter, depended on 
the exploiter. If the exploiter is a private non-regulated 
monopoly, the aim is profit maximization? and if discrimin­
ation is practicable, profits can be increased. Utility 
remaining to consumers, or consumers' surplus, could also 
be enlarged by such discrimination. It was the size and 
distribution of utility that concerned Dupuit. In the event 
of private ownership, profit maximization was the goal of 
the monopolist who concerned himself not at all with con­
sumers' interests. Absolute utility (monopoly revenue and 
consumers' surplus) of the good was made larger by discrim­
ination, however, _if output was increased over simple 
monopoly pricing.
Dupuit envisioned very different principles for a 
governmentally owned or regulated project. In this case, 
as discussed above in connection with Table 4-2, Dupuit 
thought that the government should maximize consumers' 
surplus under the constraint of recouping all costs of the 
project.^ As Dupuit pointed out, the government would
k^This is in contrast to his famous "bridge example" 
to be considered in the following chapter. In this 
example Dupuit advocated a type of "marginal cost pricing" 
by the government, with a possible recommendation that any 
attenuating losses to be recovered by taxation.
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choose the discriminatory two-class tariff (2,6), "because 
it would cover all c o s t s . A l t h o u g h  Dupuit's example is 
of the "necessary case," he seemed by it to strongly imply 
that the government should recoup all costs in any and all 
cases where discrimination was practiced. This result may 
be contradicted by one of his other pricing techniques to 
be developed in the succeeding chapter. But it is clear 
that the size and manipulation of the total utility of a 
commodity was the heart of the problem to Dupuit. He was 
not interested per se in the effect of discrimination on 
output and on prices: it was the issue of utility that 
held his attention. As he put it:
By varying the price or differentiating it 
in various manners, /.the/ three parts of total 
utility assume variable proportions at each 
other's expense.
The conduct of a monopoly raises a series 
of important questions . . .  Is the largest 
possible profit to be earned? Is the yield to 
be a fixed sum and the loss of utility reduced 
to a minimum?^2
It was one of Dupuit's great contributions to have discerned 
the principles allowing a solution to the questions posed in 
the above quotation. Dupuit's reference to the possible 
recovery of a "fixed sum" is not necessarily compatible
^Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 23. 
62Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 31.
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with his advocacy of recouping "all costs," but this 
merely illustrates the generality of Dupuit1s theory of 
discrimination. It was a tool which would provide a frame 
of analysis for either profit maximization or, under govern­
ment ownership or control, the recovery of variable costs, 
total costs or some other variant. The theory was per­
fectly general in its description of the pricing technique.
It was a theory of how monopolists, given certain conditions, 
behave. Dupuit1s contribution was to provide a scientific 
analysis of this behavior and to. show that profit maximiza­
tion was not sacroscanct. Given the preponderance of the 
public interest in any industry, the government could 
regulate so as to maximize the utility from the commodity 
or service in question given the cost constraint. Addition­
ally, he showed that, under private control, the utility 
of certain projects could be enlarged by better utilization 
of plant via discriminatory pricing.
Dupuit's Influence on Subsequent Theorists
Literature on the theory of price discrimination from 
Dupuit to Joan Robinson was broadly of two types. Con­
tributions to the branch of theory have come from both 
the theoretical economist and from the practitioner, the 
latter consisting mainly of discourses on railway rates.
162
The discussion will be confined to the former types of
contribution, although the distinction is by no means
, , 63clear-cut.
Leon Walras unhesitatingly credited Dupuit with the 
first discussion on multiple prices for the same commod­
ity.®^ Walras, however, was content to present an 
analysis quite similar to Dupuit1s. He showed how total 
receipts could be increased by discrimination and, like 
Dupuit, stated that "this hypothetical situation is 
realized in the actual world of trade and industry more 
frequently than one generally supposes."®® Walras1 one
®®The exclusion of such material should not imply 
that it is not valuable or that it is unimportant. Many 
such discussions are in the nature of scholarly contri­
butions. In this class, several works may be mentioned.
The most important early work of this type was Dionysius 
Lardner, Railway Economy (New York: Harper and Brothers,
Publishers, 1850). Lardner's book influenced many aca­
demic economists, chief among them W. S. Jevons, (see his 
Theory of Political Economy, p. xviii)- Also see William 
Larrabee, The Railroad Question (Chicago: Schulte Pub­
lishing Co., 1893), particularly pp. 379 et_ passim;
Arthur Twining Hadley, Railroad Transportation (New York:
G.P. Putman's Sons, 1907); W.M. Acworth, The Elements of 
Railway Economics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911). Pro­
fessor Hadley, who was a scholar of truly catholic interests, 
is probably best known among economic theorists for his 
famous "oyster case" in which he- provided an example in 
which all parties benefited from discrimination. See his 
Railway Transportation, pp. 116-119.
®^Walras, Elements, p. 443 et passim.
®®Walras, Elements. p. 442.
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original contribution to the theory of price discrimination 
was to show that discrimination could exist in the short-run 
in a regime of pure competition. As he pointed out, how­
ever; under perfect competition "it is much more difficult 
to continue playing these artful tricks, precisely because 
the differences in price . . . tend constantly to be
narrowed by competition."^ This was Walras1 addition 
to Dupuit1s theory of discrimination. As pointed out 
earlier, Alfred Marshall was not among the contributors 
to the theory of price discrimination. Marshall, like 
Cournot before him, ignored the subject and it did not 
even appear in his index.
F. Y. Edgeworth, the neo-classical theorist, built 
his theory of discrimination on foundations laid by Dupuit. 
Of all the economists familiar with Dupuit1s writings, 
Edgeworth was his greatest champion.^ Edgeworth found
^Walras, Elements, p. 442.
^See F. Y. Edgeworth, "A Contribution to the Theory 
of Railway Rates," Economic Journal, XXII (1912); and 
"Applications of Probabilities to Economics," Economic 
Journal, XX (1910) , and his "Dupuit" in Palgrave1s 
Dictionary. The first two articles are reprinted in 
Edgeworth's Papers Relating to Political Economy (London: 
Macmillan and Co., 3 Vols., 1925) in Volumes I and II 
respectively. Edgeworth's brilliant contributions to 
economic analysis have, like Dupuit's, been largely ignored. 
As Professor Schumpeter remarked, these contributions 
"amount to as much as, or more than, do Marshall's 
Principles." History, p. 831.
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Dupuit's papers "epoch-making" and proceeded to review and
elaborate on his fundamental propositions regarding dis- 
6Rcrimination. Edgeworth set out the conditions and
motives necessary for discrimination with great care and
precision. He added, in a discussion similar to Marshall's
regarding simple monopoly theory, that the discriminating
monopolist may consider his "future interests" and may be
imbued with "altruistic motives" in his pricing practices.
In short, Edgeworth thought that the discriminating
monopolist may consider a kind of "compromise benefit"
in his pricing policies, a point Dupuit had made earlier.
Edgeworth, unlike Walras or any other economist who
felt Dupuit's influence, reached the crux of Dupuit's
message regarding discrimination and the public interest.
As Edgeworth said:
. . . the public interest which I here, after
Dupuit, emphasise, is one quite distinct . . .
It consists in minimising through discrimination 
that loss . . .  of consumers' benefit which is 
apt to result from unitary price.^9
It was indeed this ability to increase the absolute utility
of a good by discrimination that so intrigued Dupuit, and
68Edgeworth, "Railway Rates," Economic Journal 
p. 198. The entire article, pp. 198-218 is worth perusal.
^Edgeworth, "Railway Rates," p. 198.
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Edgeworth was the only neo-classical writer to appreciate 
the point. Unfortunately Edgeworth's projected contri­
butions to the theory of discrimination were not forth­
coming, but his article on "Railway Rates" is sufficient 
to credit him with the only adequate appreciation in his 
day of Dupuit's theory of discrimination.
A. C. Pigou, who has been mentioned in regard to 
the debate with Taussig, made important contributions to 
the theory of discrimination,^ although his relationship 
to Dupuit is uncertain. Pigou brilliantly analyzed three 
"degrees" of discrimination and discussed the relative 
desirability of pure competition, simple monopoly and - 
discriminating monopoly using as his criteria the effects 
of each on output and on welfare measured in terms of 
marginal social product, a concept invented by Pigou.
He also discussed, in some detail, the effects of increas­
ing and decreasing supply schedules on discriminatory 
price and output. There can be small doubt that Pigou's 
tightly reasoned argument was an important breakthrough 
in this area and it was to Pigou's contribution that
70 •The body of his contribution m  this area is con­
tained in his Wealth and Welfare (London: Macmillan and
Co., 1912), especially chapters XII and XIII, and in his 
Economics of Welfare, chapters XVII and XVIII.
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Mrs. Robinson looked in building the most elegant theoret­
ical analysis of discrimination to date.7-*- But, although 
Dupuit's name is nowhere mentioned in his writings, Pigou 
built on stones placed by Dupuit. The filiations between 
discrimination and economic welfare were, after all,
Dupuit1s main concern, and it is the analysis of these 
relationships which fill Pigou's pages.
An Evaluation of Dupuit1s Contribution
Dupuit was the earliest and, for many decades, the 
most thorough contributor to the theory of price discrim­
ination, although he was presaged by Cournot with the 
discussion of simple monopoly theory. Moreover, Dupuit 
was unquestionably the mentor of Alfred Marshall on the 
issue of the relationship between consumers' surplus and 
monopoly profits, a relationship which Cournot was ill- 
equipped to analyze. Dupuit's analysis of the method and 
purpose of product differentiation was also a contribution 
of the first order. But it is possible to place this 
phase of his work in an even better light.
Cournot is widely regarded as the precursor of 
modern theorists concerned with imperfect competition.
7-*-Robinson, Economics of Imperfect Competition, 
p. 186n and 187n.
Dupuit, it seems to this writer, is at least as deserving 
of such an evaluation. It is well known that Cournot's 
duopoly example involved a hypothetical mineral spring,
KV . •*
a curiosity. Although Professors Edgeworth and Bertrand 
tinkered with Cournot's analysis and in the process 
exposed the unrealistic assumption of a "conjectural 
variation" of zero, the theory of imperfect competition 
during the long period from Cournot to Chamberlin and 
Robinson is thought to have remained largely one of 
duopoly, a special case at best. Dupuit's writings could 
have been read profitably in this regard. His examples 
of monopolistic discrimination of such activities as book 
publishing, theater tickets, not to mention railroads, 
canals and all manner of public works, are filled with the 
suggestion that monopoly elements were present in 
industries which could certainly not be described as pure 
monopolies or even duopolies. Dupuit was adamant in his 
statement that monopoly control of_ some degree was necessary 
for such discrimination, but he always hastened to modify 
his results when competitive elements arose. In dis­
cussing the interindustry competition for example, between 
railroads and road transport he said, "whatever the 
merchandise, the railway cannot charge on it a fee much in
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excess of the price of road transport, unless speed itself 
be of the essence . . ."72 Such statements, together with 
the whole of Dupuit1s writings, show that he was well 
aware that the market forms of perfect competition on the 
one hand and pure monopoly, on the other, did not ade­
quately describe real world structures. In keeping with 
this awareness, he modified his conclusions whenever 
necessary. His writings, although not couched in mathe­
matical concisness, seem to be at least as suggestive of 
intermediate structures as were Cournot's.
Dupuit1s insistence that price discrimination is the 
general case where monopolistic elements are present is, 
in this writer's opinion, an important point and one with 
a modern ring. Although it would be naive to assert that 
Dupuit was on the brink of contributing to the theory of 
price discrimination and connected problems in multi­
product firms, his dogged persistence that discrimination 
is not in the least a "special case" is an approach which 
could have been followed up by later economists with 
great advantage. It is only in recent times that econo­
mists have attempted to add to the realism of the theory 
of the firm by discussing the existence of price
7^Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 20.
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discrimination in mul-tiple product firms. One economist 
concerned with the problem has pointed out that it is
"impossible to find in the whole of our economy a single
7 3firm that sells a single product at a single price."
Dupuit1s insistence that price discrimination be practiced
due to excess capacity, as long as marginal costs are
covered, exactly parallels Professor Clemens' dictum
that "what the firm has to sell is not a product, or even
74a line of products, but rather its capacity to produce." 
Dupuit1s whole analysis contains the flavor of such an 
approach.
Dupuit1s theory of discrimination, moreover, was 
woven into the fabric of neo-classical analysis, especially 
by Walras and Edgeworth, and, as such, it is part of 
received economic theory. Although the trappings of 
utility analysis, with which Dupuit encased his theory of
^Eli w. Clemens, "Price Discrimination and the 
Multiple-Product Firm," Review of Economic Studies, XIX 
(1950-1951), reprinted in American Economic Association 
Readings in Industrial Organization and Public Policy 
(Homewood; Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1958), p. 262.
7^Clemens in Readings, p. 263. Professor Clemens' 
conclusion that "price discrimination and multiple-product 
production are not exceptions to general practice, but 
are rather the essence of customary action," p. 276 could 
well be Dupuit's words.
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discrimination, have fallen into disfavor, the super­
structure remains. That tool of economic analysis by which 
economists study the phenomenon of multiple prices for the 
same commodity was Dupuit's invention. Additionally, 
his statement of the theory of price discrimination was 
more than an adventitious act. He analyzed problems with 
his tool and indicated possible solutions. The tool takes 
on new significance as contemporary economists, such as 
Clemens, begin to take a closer look at firm's pricing 
policies. Discriminatory pricing may well be as 
ubiquitous as Dupuit thought.
In short, it is this writer's opinion that Dupuit's 
early analysis of the facets of price discrimination was 
a stellar contribution to the economists "tool-kit."
His discussion does not require utility analysis for 
support or validity; it can stand alone as an explan­
ation of economic behavior. Indeed, in the light of the 
hostility heaped on utility doctrine, the analysis of 
price discrimination may well be Dupuit's most important 
and durable contribution to economic theory.
CHAPTER V
DUPUIT'S MARGINAL COST PRICING ARGUMENT: APPLICATIONS
OF ECONOMIC THEORY TO PUBLIC POLICY
Introduction
The theoretical market model of perfect competition, 
free from governmental restraint, implies, among other 
things, several important long-run conclusions respecting 
price, costs of production and, more generally, welfare.
If freedom of entry is allowed in the model, price will 
equal minimum production costs, a condition which success­
fully eliminates all "unnecessary" or "economic" profit. 
Moreover, and most importantly for welfare, price also 
equals marginal cost. If short-run marginal cost, (or 
the addition to total cost incurred by producing an 
additional unit of the good), represents the value of the 
sacrifice necessary to obtain additional units of the 
good in question in terms of "alternatives foregone," and 
price represents the money measure of "satisfaction" 
derived from the good, then it must follow that an 
efficient allocation of resources (and economic welfare)
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demands their equality. This benevolent equality, as 
economic theory assetts, does not necessarily obtain in 
imperfectly competitive market structures, to the end that 
resources are usually misallocated. An obvious recommenda­
tion would be to advocate policies to bring about such 
"marginal cost pricing" for each separately produced 
good in all industries, as Harold Hotelling did in the 
1930's.'*' But since marginal .cost is independent of the 
volume of fixed cost and is actually the rate of change 
in variable cost, losses may result. This depends in 
general on the slopes and positions of the demand and 
cost functions. Given that losses attend such a pricing 
scheme in decreasing cost industries, some means of 
reimbursement, itself designed to leave marginal conditions 
unaffected, must be devised to cover total costs. This, as 
has been pointed out, is no mean task, and the problem 
of financing such losses has constituted a serious difficulty 
in recent marginal cost pricing proposals.
•̂ •Harold Hotelling, "The General Welfare in Relation 
to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates," 
(1938). Hotelling's article was probably the most important 
contribution to marginal cost pricing in the period.
^See Nancy Ruggles, "Recent Developments in the 
Theory of Marginal Cost Pricing," Review of Economic 
Studies, 17 (1949-1950).
173
Moreover, the practical difficulties of simply 
defining marginal cost in any given situation, not to 
mention the problems of multi-product production, have 
discouraged theorists. Should long-run or short-run costs 
be used for such pricing schemes? As it will develop, 
the validity of Dupuit1s statements suggesting marginal 
cost pricing may hinge on the concept one considers as 
controlling; but the following discussion of Dupuit will 
evaluate his proposals in terms of short-run analysis, 
unless otherwise indicated.
The implications for economic welfare which inheres 
in such a pricing scheme have, nonetheless, been con­
sidered important by generations of economists. Alfred 
Marshall used an essentially similar, concept to justify, 
on welfare grounds, the subsidization of decreasing cost 
industries and the taxation of increasing cost industries.-^ 
The resurgence of interest in such a pricing technique as 
applied to transportation and public utilities in the 
pre-War and immediate post-War period"^ is evidence of the 
strength of such an idea. At present the French are 
experimenting with marginal cost techniques in the
•^Marshall, Principles, Chapter XIII, Book V, pp. 466-
469.
^Hotelling, "The General Welfare."
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provision of electric power.^ Economists concerned with 
public utilities eagerly await their findings. But the 
origin of the theoretical principle is of capital interest 
to this investigation. Jules Dupuit was the proclaimed 
mentor of the marginal cost theorist Hotelling, whose 
presentation was regarded, by at least one economist,^ 
as the best modern statement of the principle.
Thus, Dupuit1s alleged statement of the principle of 
marginal cost pricing in his famous bridge case (and other 
examples) will be dealt with in this chapter, along with 
his attitude towards taxation. Additionally, the overall 
relationships between his various pricing tools for public 
policy will be examined. It will be shown that Dupuit 
did not have only one all-efficacious tool to prescribe 
for the enlargement of "public utility." In order to 
fully understand Dupuit1s marginal cost argument, it will 
be necessary to discuss the demand curve and "utilite 
perdue" in some detail.
^See James R. Nelson (ed.) Marginal Cost Pricing in 
Practice, and Marcel Boitieux, translated by E. W. and 
L. C. Clemens, "The Green Tariff of the Electricite de 
France," Land Economics, 40 (May, 1964).
^See Ruggles, p. 110. Hotelling's original assess­
ment of Dupuit's achievement, however, was possibly not a 
wholly accurate one; see infra, Chapter V. pp. 209-210.
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The Demand Curve and Utilite Perdue
It is well, at this point, to briefly review Dupuit's 
notion of the demand curve and to elaborate on a conclusion 
Dupuit drew from it. The character of this demand curve, 
as it will be shown, has important welfare implications 
regarding the levy of a tax. In a passage on the law of 
consumption, Dupuit wrote:
One of these laws is that consumption expands 
when price falls; another, that the increase in 
consumption due to a fall will be greater, the 
lower the initial price. If a fall in the price
of an article from 100 to 95 francs brings in
another thousand consumers a further fall from 
95 to 90 will bring in more than a thousand.
This property reflects the structure of society 
which, if it is divided into groups according 
to income, and these groups are placed one on 
top of the other starting with the poorest, has 
a shape similar to one of those pyramids, of
cannon-balls which are to be seen in parks of
artillery . . . Thus, as the price of an
article falls, its use spreads to more and more 
consumers, quite apart from the fact that 
existing consumers purchase it in greater quan­
tities, as we have seen. All this is a fact of 
experience which has been verified statistically 
too often to need labouring her.e.^
The exact nature of the demand curve, that quantity
expands absolutely as price declines, is thus given by
Dupuit. Granting that the word tariff or toll can be
^Dupuit, "On the Measurement," (1844), p. 103.
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substituted for the word tax,8 and remembering also that 
the total area under the demand curve, for Dupuit, was an 
expression of the total absolute utility of the good, 
the effects of a tax (tariff, toll or price) can be 
measure. With the aid of the following Figure 5-1,
Dupuit's analysis can be synthesized.
FIGURE 5-1 
THE EFFECTS OF A TAX ON UTILITE PERDUE
P R I C E
0  M N Z  Q U A N T I T Y
The construction can be gleaned from Dupuit1s argu­
ment, although the axes have been reversed (i.e., contrary 
to Dupuit1s manner) for the sake of convention. The demand
^Hotelling thought the theory of taxation to be 
extensively analogous to the theory of public utility and 
transport rates. He said that although "two independent 
bodies of economic literature have grown up . . . the 
underlying unity is such that the considerations applicable 
to taxation are very nearly identical with those involved 
in proper rate making." "The General Welfare," pp. 242-243.
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curve PZ is of the nature of Dupuit's "law of consumption," 
and for simplicity it is drawn as a linear function. A 
constant marginal cost curve AA', which is closest to 
Dupuit1s intentions,^ and in any case makes no difference 
as to conclusions, is assumed. To further simplify the 
analysis, it is assumed that there are no fixed costs, 
and therefore that for quantity ON, total variable costs 
equals total costs equals DARN. In other words, there is 
no "producers' surplus." The total net benefit to society 
is the sum of consumers' and producers' surplus and, 
assuming marginal cost curve AA', is geometrically equal 
to the curvilinear triangle PAR, which is identical with 
consumers' surplus. Dupuit proposed that a per unit tax 
be levied on the commodity, which in Figure 5-1, would 
cause a parallel shift upward of marginal costs to BB'.
The effect of this per-unit tax is in contrast to the 
effect of a "lump-sum" tax, which would not change the 
position of the marginal cost curve.
The total net benefit of the commodity to society, 
after the increase in the marginal cost curve, is PR'B, 
consumers' surplus, plus the yield of the tax, ABR'Y to the
^See bridge example (infra.., p. 18^) and cost assump­
tions of Chapter IV.
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government, or the total area PR'YA. The tax receipts 
are included in net benefit on the premise that govern­
ment expenditures out of these revenues will be utility 
producing. The effect of the tax in the amount AB has 
been twofold: (1) to reduce consumers' surplus from PAR
to PBR1, which can be regarded as a shift in the dis­
tribution of utility or benefit, and (2) to reduce total 
utility from amount PAR to PAYR1. The amount of "utilite 
perdue," or utility lost to society, is then equal to the 
triangle R'YR, the "dead-loss" to society. It is this 
loss which bothered Dupuit, and led him to measure it and 
to discuss its important implications.
The Measure of Utilite Perdue
Dupuit, without the aid of geometrical presentation, 
presented an arithmetic estimate of this "utilite perdue." 
As he said:
. . . it is possible to lay down the principle
that the utility lost or gained through a change 
in price has for its upper limit the amount by 
which the quantity consumer changes, multiplied 
by half the change in price. If a tax of 5 francs 
reduces the number of consumers from 30,000 to 
10,000, the utility lost is below 20,000 X ^5 = 
50,000 francs. Further it is easily seen that the 
smaller the tax the nearer does this limit approach 
the actual figure.^0
■^Dupuit, "On the Measurement," p. 104.
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Increasing and equal increments of tax would cause con­
sumption to decrease. Thus "utilite perdue," due to the 
imposition of a tax, increases absolutely as, in Figure 
5-1, quantity is reduced. The measure of this lost 
utility is given by Dupuit as the reduction in quantity 
multiplied by one-half the amount of the tax. Geometric­
ally, with regard to Figure 5-1, it is the expression 
ig(YR X YR' ) , or roughly the area R'YR, as indicated 
earlier. Dupuit was even more specific. He also pointed 
out that "where 3. tax is small relative to the cost of 
manufacture . . .  it is legitimate to suppose a uniform 
rate of decrease /in quantity c o n s u m e d / . G r a n t i n g  
this, as Dupuit correctly suggested:
. . . the utility lost as a resmlt of a tax
of 1 franc is this unknown number /the amount by 
which., consumption decreased/ multiplied by \ of 
1; the utility lost through a tax of 2 francs will 
be twice this number /the same decrement in quan­
tity as the firs//7 multiplied by \ of 2; for 3 
francs, ^3X3. It may thus be said that the loss 
of utility is proportional to the square of the 
tax; so that a tax of 10 francs will lead to the
■'“■''Dupuit, "On the Measurement," p. 104.
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loss of 100 times more utility than a tax of 
1 franc.
■^Dupuit, "On the Measurement," p. 104. Dupuit offered 
no "proof" for this theorem, and although Hotelling mentions 
Dupuit's conclusion ("General Welfare," p. 246), he does 
not prove it for the single market case. The author of 
this dissertation is indebted to Professor William J. Stober 
for suggesting the following proof of "Dupuit's theorem." 
Consider- the linear demand function of Figure 5-12-1 
reproduced below. Dupuit's theorem is that the loss in
FIGURE 5-12-1 utility ( AUm ) is proportional 
to the square of the tax or price 
(Pf̂ ) . Or, algebraically,
,2AU,m = - at p.m
Q* ̂3 ̂2 A
where CL is a constant factor 
of proportionality. Since the 
price increments in Figure 5-12- 
1 are equal by construction, we 
have Pm = mP]_. Since quantity 
is a linear function of price, (equal increments of price 
produce equal decrements in quantity with an inverse func­
tion) , AQm = mAQ^
The area of the triangle which represents "utilite 
perdue" is equal to one-half the base times the height, or,
A Um = ^AQmP,m
= ^mAQimP]_ 
AQ-jJxî P-l





Aum = (î -i)P̂m 2P-]_ m
a we have A Um a  p.m
This result holds for any linear demand curve; and, with 
a curvilinear demand function, Dupuit1s result would obtain 
for small tax or price changes.
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It is clear then, that if demand curve segment R'R in 
Figure 5-1 can be considered a straight line, the 
decrement in utility caused by imposing taxes between OA 
and OB will be proportionate to the square of the tax.
When the demand curve can be approximated by a straight 
line, Dupuit's result will also be approximated.
Welfare Implications of Utilite Perdue
Dupuit's analysis of "lost utility" is central to his 
entire system for increasing public utility. Clearly, 
marginal cost pricing as a welfare tool finds its roots 
here. An increase in total utility can be achieved, 
following this portion of Dupuit1s analysis, by pricing 
goods, where monopoly power exists, at marginal costs. A 
price (rate or tariff) above marginal cost of production 
has an effect on the utility of goods to society which is 
totally analagous to the imposition of a tax. Dupuit, in 
this sense, was not so much interested in the distribution 
of utility between producer and consumer, as he was in 
increasing the net benefit (producers' and consumers' 
surplus), or alternatively, as he was in reducing "utilite 
perdue."
It is worthwhile to pause, at this point, to note 
that there is an inevitable loss of utility to society
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when a price is charged for a good. The portion under the 
demand curve, RNZ, in Figure 5-1 represents this unavoid­
able loss, a loss stemming from the fact that resources 
are not in limitless supply. This loss cannot be side­
stepped short of giving the good away. It is due to the 
very existence of an economic problem. Additionally, the 
area RNZ ^ill exist quite without reference to the slope 
and position of the marginal cost curve.
The monopolist (using the term in its broadest 
possible sense), by charging a price above marginal cost, 
is causing double damage. In the first place, he expro­
priates a larger share of net benefit and, most importantly 
in Dupuit1s view, he causes the total utility available to 
society to decline. Figure 5-2 is a more modern-flavored 
graph depicting the demand (PZ) and marginal revenue curve 
of the monopolist, together with a rising marginal cost 
curve (AA1) and average cost curve (C). The momentary 
departure from Dupuit1s presentation will be rewarding 
in clarifying the spirit of his views on this important 
issue.
The marginal cost pricing position at R (in Figure 
5-2) will yield, depending on the slopes of the demand 
and marginal cost curve, a given distribution of net
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FIGURE 5-2 
MONOPOLY EFFECTS ON UTILITE PERDUE
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benefit. In this example producers' surplus is represented 
by the area ABR, the difference between total receipts, 
OBRN, and the area under the marginal cost curve, OBRN, 
and the area under the marginal cost curve, OARN. Con­
sumers' surplus is equal to BPR. Evidently, marginal 
cost pricing does not mean that consumers' surplus will 
be equal to net benefit; rather, it means that total net 
benefit, or the curvilinear triangle APR will-be maximized. 
The monopolist, however, would have to be truly altru­
istic to engage in marginal cost pricing. In Figure 5-2, 
such "altruism" would be tolerable since there are 
"economic" profits at price OB (quantity ON). In other 
words, producers' surplus is greater than fixed
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13costs. This condition notwithstanding, the crucial point 
is that net benefit or utility remaining to society is at 
a maximum.
Unfortunately this analysis does not correspond with 
prevailing notions (and Dupuit1s notion) on the behavior 
of monopolists, who, under the assumptions of formal 
economic theory, are profit maximizers. The profit maxi­
mizing price OF and quantity OM are relevant in this 
situation. The amount of net benefit, however is lower 
than under marginal cost pricing by an amount XR'R. This 
is the loss to society, and portions of both consumers' 
surplus (YR'R) and producers' surplus (YXR) have been 
rendered extinct. Profit maximizing producers' surplus 
(AXR'F) is greater than it was under marginal cost 
pricing and consumers' surplus has declined (to PFR').
But the important thing as Dupuit pointed out, is not 
that the monopolist takes a larger share of net benefit, 
but that the price above marginal cost causes total net
-*-̂ One can imagine a situation, the intersection of 
the demand curve with falling marginal and average cost 
curves, for example, in which the monopolist's altruism 
would be put to the test. He would have to be willing, 
in such a case, to cover losses. The issue of the 
best manner in which to cover these losses, in the case 
of government ownership or regulation, has been a cen­
tral one in discussions of marginal cost pricing.
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benefit to be smaller than it would be under marginal 
cost pricing. The monopolist increases his surplus by- 
appropriating FBR'Y of consumers' surplus. Distribution, 
here, is not the thing. The maximization of total net 
benefit eclipses this latter issue. It is the "utilite 
perdue" which is the drag on society. As Dupuit said: 
"this loss of utility due to a price which is not payment 
for labour expended plays in political economy the part 
which friction plays in mechanics."-^ The engineering 
analogy was a good one. Just as friction impedes motion, 
"lost utility," due to the inequality of price and 
marginal cost, prevents society from obtaining maximum 
net benefit. The graphite, in this latter case, could be 
marginal cost pricing.
Dupuit and Marginal Cost Pricing
Several proposals could follow from Dupuit's desire 
to reduce or eliminate "utilite perdue." One such possi­
bility would involve the advocacy of ubiquitous marginal 
cost pricing. But obtrusive difficulties would arise 
immediately, especially where firms are operating on a
-^Dupuit, "On the Measurement," p. 105.
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decreasing segment of their average cost curves, as is 
often alleged for rail transport firms and for certain 
public utilities. The losses attending such a practice 
would have to be covered by subsidization, and taxes 
would have to be devised so as not to cause lost utility 
in other parts of the system.^ Moreover, the theoretical 
argument surrounding "utilite perdue" could have allowed 
Dupuit to adjudge excise taxes inferior to other forms 
of taxation. In shorti, many different proposals could 
follow from such reasoning.
Some crucial questions about Dupuit1s formulation 
remain unanswered. Was Dupuit's an explicit statement 
of the principle? To what extent did he wish to invoke 
the marginal cost principle in practical policy? How 
did he propose to finance attenuating losses? Exactly 
what was Dupuit1s theory of costs, and how developed 
was it? Under what circumstances would Dupuit depart 
from marginal cost pricing as a guide to policy? These 
questions have not been investigated by economists 
concerned with Dupuit. Dupuit did not provide a systematic 
analysis of these questions, unfortunately, and relevant
■^This is actually the problem which Hotelling 
faced.
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textual statements must be sifted from all of his various 
writings. Nonetheless, the following analysis will 
attempt to "uncover" Dupuit1s statements on issues 
apropos to the theory and application of marginal cost 
pricing.
The Case of the Bridge
It is of the moment, in discussing Dupuit1s marginal
cost argument, to note the ambiguity involved in referring
to "the" bridge example. There are no less than six
bridge examples in the writings of Dupuit, some of them
not illustrating what has come to be known as marginal 
17cost pricing. But it seems possible that a marginal cost 
agrument was his intent in at least several of these 
passages. His best discussion of the operation of the 
principle appeared in an arithmetic example in the 1849 
article "On Tolls and Transport Charges." In the example,
16This is an excellent example of the necessity of 
looking at the total of his work. One article will simply 
not do.
l^See, for example, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," 
p. 15. Although Dupuit did point out that "bridge tolls 
lend themselves less well to__the kind of varied combin­
ations /price discrimination/ which is possible with other 
transport charges, 1 p. 15. The difficulty with discrimin­
atory pricing on a bridge is the difficulty of grouping 
users according to some distinguishable mark.
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Dupuit considered the case of several bridges under monopoly 
control. Apparently Dupuit was assuming that the bridges 
were privately owned, or were given an exclusive right 
to operate from the government. If the latter was the case, 
he envisioned a non-regulatory situation because the 
bridge owners were free to charge any toll rate they desired.
Again, as in other examples, Dupuit was cognizant of 
the variability of the law of consumption from place to 
place. In other words, he knew that demand conditions 
were different due to differences in income, the prices of 
other goods and due to the portmanteau statement of the 
"thousand other circumstances."
The downward sloping nature of the demand curve was 
re-affirmed by Dupuit in his bridge examples. Moreover, 
the demand curve (as in the case of monopoly and price- 
discrimination) was a welfare tool. Never, in all of his 
writings, did Dupuit change his opinion on the ability 
of the demand measure to represent a utility measure­
ment. There is no evidence that he wished to modify his 
original statements on the measurement of utility. Thus,
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Dupuit analyzed the effect of tolls on the utility of 
three different bridges, each with a different "curve of 
consumption." His "Bridge C" is reproduced below as 
Table 5-1.18
The demand curve for bridge C, as can be verified 
by columns 2 and 3, conforms to Dupuit1s theory of demand. 
Column 8, representing "consumers1 surplus, it should be 
noted, was not included by Dupuit, but it is calculated 
here for convenience. The section "Utility," which is 
segmented into three columns, shows the marginal rate of 
lost utility caused by rate increases, along with a 
column of total utility lost by a given rate, as well 
as a column for the total utility yielded by a given toll. 
This latter column (column 6) is net benefit, (actually 
gross benefit, since, as yet there are no costs of pro­
duction) , that is, the sum of consumers1 and producers1 
surplus (revenue). Column 7 Dupuit called "the yield of 
the toll, 1 and is, in more modern terminology, total 
revenue receipts. It should be observed that Dupuit did 
not include a provision for costs at the outset. The 
information of Table 5-1 is solely in the province of 
demand.
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The utility produced, evidently, is divided between 
the monopolist and his consumers. In order to determine 
consumers' surplus produced by any rate, total receipts 
must be subtracted from the "total utility produced" 
corresponding to that rate. It is apparent that con­
sumers' surplus varies inversely with the toll. Pro­
ducers' surplus or total receipts (in the absence of 
costs) increase up to the rate 5 and diminish thereafter. 
Dupuit, referring to this example, noted that "the 
distribution of utility is very different . . . "  with 
different rates.19 Again, however, the effect of rates 
(prices) on the total utility produced (absolute utility) 
concerned him.
Dupuit made it clear that the total utility of the 
bridge would depend on where ownership resided. "If the 
road or bridge or canal is private property, the owner 
company has only one aim, and that is to get the largest 
possible income from the toll," as Dupuit pointed out.
With Bridge C in Table 5-1, the income (profit) maximizing 
rate would be 5, producing a total utility of 276 and a 
"utilite perdue" of 169. The total utility produced of
■'■^Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 10.
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276 would be partitioned into 111 of consumers' surplus 
and 165 of producers' surplus.
In discussing the alternative to the private owner­
ship of Bridge C, Dupuit invoked a "marginal cpst" argu­
ment. In Dupuit's own words:
If . . . the bridge is public property, the 
government .will want to recover from the toll 
merely a fixed sum representing interest on the 
capital spent for construction, maintenance cost 
and perhaps amortization. Suppose, for example, 
that bridge C cost 150,000 francs to build and 
that the relative figures shown in the table for 
crossings are one-hundredth of the real traffic 
figures; the government will rest content with 
toll rate 1, because the proceeds of 8000 are 
enough to cover interest at 4 per cent and leave 
over 2000 francs for upkeep and amortization.
The company would charge 5, the government only 
1 . . . Surely, the extra 8500 francs to_be paid 
by the consumers /under private monopoly/ are 
reason enough to declare for public operation, 
yet this is a secondary consideration in the 
light of a comparison of the utility of the
bridge in the two c a s e s . 20 
This last statement crystallizes Dupuit's opinion on 
distribution. He would not be so opposed to tariffs 
if they had no other effect than to change the distri­
bution of utility. But tariffs (or taxes or prices) did 
positive harm if they diminished the total utility which 
commodities were capable of producing above costs which 
were necessary to recoup.
o nDupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 11.
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But it is not yet clear where marginal cost pricing 
emerges from these statements. With reference to the 
last quotation, a rather liberal interpretation of 
Dupuit1s statement concerning costs would be required. 
Dupuit there indicated that the government would require 
a fixed sum which included interest on the original 
investment, maintenance cost and "perhaps" amortization.
Can these costs be interpreted as "variable or marginal" 
somehow, and if they are to be so considered, did Dupuit 
believe them to be of constant, increasing or decreasing 
character? If they are not marginal costs, then how can 
Dupuit be credited as the originator of marginal cost 
pricing? This, then, is a problem which deserves close 
consideration.
The Issue of Costs
A qlear analysis of costs was one of Dupuit's most 
serious weaknesses. Interest and amortization, as in 
the above example, cannot be easily construed as short- 
run marginal costs with respect to the number of 
travelers who cross the bridge. Maintenance costs 
have perhaps a better claim. In an example of the Parisian 
Pont des Arts bridge, which followed closely on the heels 
of Dupuit1s "theoretical" bridges, he indicated that when
a private company could double the number of crossings
by cutting its rate in half, and at the same time, " . . .
still earn enough extra to cover the slight increase in
21maintenance expenses and the costs of collection," 
that it should do so. This would suggest that maintenance 
expense is indeed marginal with respect to quantity. But 
the statement, taken by itself, is not especially con­
vincing, particularly in view of Dupuit1s prior insis­
tence that the government recover a "fixed sum" from the 
bridge users. Dupuit seems to have intended for this 
fixed sum to be independent of quantity, a situation not 
particularly evocative of an incremental cost, either
constant or changing with quantity. Rather this implies
2 2a cost with no relation whatsoever to quantity.
Other references in his writings shed some light 
on this important issue. In his 1844 article, Dupuit 
made sdveral interesting statements concerning costs of 
production. Dupuit presented his utility argument in 
yet an earlier bridge example, concluding, that with a 
high enough tariff, it was possible to render the bridge 
useless. He then queried whether this means "that there
^Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 12.
22Excluding, for the moment, his treatment of costs 
under price discrimination.
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should only be very low tolls or even that there should
2 3be none at all?" He answered the rhetorical question 
in the negative and cited the need to study tariffs 
. . according to rational principles, in order to
produce the greatest possible utility and at the same 
time a revenue sufficient to cover the cost of upkeep
Q Aand interest on capital." If Dupuit were using a 
short-run marginal cost argument, his answer to the 
question would have possibly been 'yes.' The short-run 
marginal costs of traversing the bridge would certainly 
be negligible, and quite possibly zero.
Another statement in the same article is a bit more 
telling in that it involves the pricing of goods other 
than bridges. Dupuit generalized the "bridge concept" 
in the following statement:
Loss of utility resulting from a rise in 
price is not peculiar to tolls and taxes; it 
applies to the very price, representing costs 
of production, which could be considered__as a 
kind of tax upon natural resources . . /This
calculation of lost utility/. . . is one which 
we have already performed above for the case 
of a bridge which it cost nothing to cross.
Instead of a charge for crossing a bridge we can 
consider the price of some object or other and 
arrive at exactly the same result. This loss
of utility due to a price which is not a. payment
22Dupuit, "On the Measurement," p. 97.
Dupuit, "On the Measurement," p. 98.
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for labour expended plays in political economy 
the part which friction plays in mechanics.^5 
(Emphasis supplied)
Here Dupuit departed from a discussion of the bridge, and 
in doing so, gave a better statement of his intent on 
the matter of costs. Whether "labour expended" is to be 
considered a "marginal" cost or not, it is certainly a 
variable expense. Thus, Dupuit1s intent becomes clearer.
He looked upon the monopolist's price above "labour 
expended" as the primary cause of "utilite perdue." Any 
price, then, above "marginal" or "variable" expense 
(Dupuit unfortunately does not add "per-unit") is detri­
mental to society's total utility or welfare. If this is 
not a lucid statement of the short-run marginal cost 
principle, it is, at least, strongly evocative of it.
Another part of the above quotation leaves Dupuit's 
views on the bridge case uncertain. He indicated that the 
bridge cost "nothing to cross," implying, at least, that 
marginal costs were zero. Yet in two statements, just 
encountered, he advocated the charge of a toll to cover 
the "fixed expenses" of maintenance and interest on 
capital expended. It must be noted that these amortization 
and interest expenses are indeed marginal costs if Dupuit
25Dupuit, "On the Measurement," pp. 104-105.
197
was considering a long-run market period. But an
incongruity emerges if Dupuit's was a short-run concept.
.At least a partial explanation for this seeming incongruity 
between short-run marginal cost pricing and Dupuit1s 
recommendation that certain fixed costs be recouped, even 
by the government, can be offered.
In an earlier discussion, Dupuit quoted a statement 
by an engineer, M. Navier, who wrote an article appearing 
in the Annales of 1832 (1st half year). Navier was 
concerned with measuring the "utility" of public works, 
but, as Dupuit pointed out, he was under the spell of 
Say's dictum that costs of production equaled price and 
also equaled the measure of utility. This point was of 
course criticized by Dupuit, but in the quotation Navier 
made a separate point. He indicated that in order for 
government " . . .  operation not to be a burden on the 
taxpayer, the annual economy effected by the transport 
must be at least equal to the interest on the capital 
expended together with the costs of maintenance."
Navier consequently thought that the public provision 
should at least bear interest and maintenance expense 
so as not to burden the taxpayer. Dupuit apparently
26m . Navier quoted in Dupuit, "On the Measurement,"
p. 92.
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accepted this argument, for he took the proposal as his
own. The expenditures are not marginal in the strict
sense, but they are in the realm of current or operating
costs. Thus Dupuit concluded that these "fixed" expenses
must be covered by a publicly provided good. Again, while
not using the concept of marginal cost, Dupuit's ideas
2 7would strongly suggest a "marginal cost argument."
The above analysis, it must be pointed out, does not 
apply if Dupuit's concept was one of long-run marginal 
cost. The "fixed costs" would be marginal if Dupuit 
were discussing the building of the bridge. His argument 
could then be interpreted as a long-run marginal cost 
approach. This does not seem, however, to have been 
Dupuit1s intent since, in discussing Bridge C, he
1‘analyzed governmental ownership of the bridge as an 
alternative to private ownership after the bridge was 
built. His other examples appear to have been of similar 
character. From this it seems proper to conclude that
27The statement of marginal costs relating to a 
half-filled goods train or one leaving at a fixed hour 
(as discussed in Chapter IV of this dissertation) is 
conclusive proof that Dupuit understood the principle.
But, as will be remembered, he was not speaking of a single 
price policy there, but of a policy of price discrimin­
ation.
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Dupuit's was probably not a long-run conception, and that 
his discussion is more properly juxtaposed against the 
principles of short-run marginal cost pricing. But it 
must be remembered, that if reason could be found 'to impute 
to Dupuit a long-run market conception, his analysis would 
be an explicit statement of long-run marginal cost pricing.
The Issue of Taxation
Dupuit1s statements on the necessity of recouping 
losses due to such a pricing arrangement (recovery of 
"fixed costs") may add weight to the claim that he was the 
first economist to explicitly state the short-run marginal 
cost theory, although an alternative interpretation of his 
"theory of taxation," to be considered later, does not 
support this position. Such taxation would be necessary 
with industries of decreasing costs, although there is no 
evidence that Dupuit thought that the cost functions of 
any or all public projects were of this character. But 
it would be totally unnecessary, in this context, to 
discuss the subsidization of industries or public projects 
to redress losses if Dupuit did not have some form of 
pricing below full coats in view. Dupuit may have known 
that some projects recouping only his "fixed" expenses or 
costs on "labour expended" would require such subsidization.
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A relevant passage is the following:
A tariff reduction does, in fact, involve a 
far greater risk of loss for a private company than 
for the government . . . /The decrease in total
receipts/ for the company . . . is a real loss with
nothing to compensate for it, but for the govern­
ment it is only a fiscal loss. The money which 
escapes the fisc stays in the pockets of the old 
users, together with all the profit they have made 
through the rate reduction, and new users have 
profited in their turn; the government can, there­
fore, recover its loss by levying in other forms 
the money it lost by lowering the toll.28
Dupuit was not explicit on the nature of the "other forms,"
but other statements make it clear that he did not have
an income or "lump sum" tax in mind. In connection with
tariffs on water, for instance, he said that "the State
and towns can give something freely only on the condition
of making other services more highly paid . . . whatever
the method /of taxation/ to which it has recourse, the
2 9water must always be paid for."
2RDupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 12.
29Jules Dupuit, "Disadvantages of the Method of Inter­
mittent Distribution," translated by Candace Uter and edited 
by R.B. Ekelund, Jr., from Bernardi collection entitled De 
Utilite et sa Mesure. In the Introduction to his collection 
of Dupuit1s writings Bernardi noted that this selection is 
the complete "fourth chapter of the second edition of the 
Theoretical and Practical Treatise on the Conduction and 
Distribution of Waters, which appeared in 1865, edited by 
Dunod in Paris," and added that this "chapter reproduces 
textually the second chapter of the original edition which 
appeared in 1854 in Paris, and was edited by De Lacroix- 
Cornon," "Introduction by Mario de Bernardi," translated 
by Candace Uter and edited by R.B. Ekelund, Jr., pp. 10-11.
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The condition that the State must make other services
yield more revenue shows that Dupuit was thinking more in
terms of excise taxes to finance losses, a position
diametrically opposed to the results of Hotelling's inquiry.3®
But Dupuit urged caution in the levy of such taxes because
of their effect on "utilite perdue," as depicted in Figure
5-1. He concluded that "the enormous advantage of spreading
taxes out is apparent; instead of putting a tax of 10 francs
on one article, taxing 10 articles at 1 franc each may
31reduce the loss of utility by 90 per cent." Hence,
Dupuit was unopposed to using excise taxes, "sensibly" 
levied, on commodities in order to raise government revenue.
Thus the failure to fully develop a cost theory may 
have led Dupuit to advocate a violation of the "marginal 
conditions" in some areas of the economy in order to finance 
rates below full costs of production in other a r e a s . jjad
(continued) Both of these translations are available 
only in the library of Louisiana State University. Page 
references are to the translations.
3®See Hotelling, "The General Welfare."
3^Dupuit, "On the Measurement," p. 104. The utility 
lost by the first increment of tax on a commodity is less 
due to the fact that the first units of the good given up 
possess little utility. In other words, the marginal 
utility of these first units given up is low.
32If other forms of taxation were unavailable,
Dupuit1s argument concerning the spreading of taxes would 
represent a "second-best" solution.
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Dupuit developed an adequate marginal theory of costs, he 
would have possibly been able to posit the advantages of a 
lump sum tax over commodity excises with respect to 
utility lost.^ Theoretically the true lump sum tax 
leaves the marginal cost curve unaffected and, therefore, 
does not affect "utilite perdue" (in the short-run at 
least). Dupuit1s obscurity in this important area of 
costs is lamentable since it leaves many questions unanr 
swered. An analysis of the welfare effects of various 
types of taxes, which may have emerged with a full-blown 
cost theory, would have been a fitting complement to his 
formidable contributions to the theory of demand.
There is yet another interpretation of Dupuit's 
attitude towards taxation which must be considered. It 
is that Dupuit was entirely opposed to the use of general 
taxation to finance losses in specific public projects.
This view can be supported by numerous textual references 
to his writings, such as in the piece on water distri­
bution,^^ in the railroad rate example,^ and in his article,
■^commodity excise taxes on goods absolutely fixed 
in supply would also have no effect on marginal costs of 
production. See Hotelling, "General Welfare," p. 257.
■^Dppuit, "Disadvantages of the Method."
•^Supra, chapter IV, pp. 159-160.
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"Ways of Communication" which appeared in the Diction-
Dupuit made it clear, in the case of water distri­
bution, that water should not be made free and that 
differential subscription should be designed so as to 
exactly cover full costs.37 In the case of railroad 
rates, considered in Cahpter IV of this dissertation, 
the conclusion was identical. In his "Ways of Communi­
cation, " Dupuit defended government operation of the 
railroads, pointing out that, as far as possible, the 
direct beneficiaries should be made to pay for the
*3 Oservices received. In these and other cases, Dupuit 
expressed a marked distaste for general taxation to 
finance specific projects. It could be concluded, 
therefore, that Dupuit was of similar mind in the case of 
the bridge. The quotation presented above to the effect 
that the government should recover in other forms the
Dupuit, "Ways of Communication," translated by 
Candace Uter and edited by R.B. Ekelund, Jr., Dictionnaire 
de I1Economie Politique (Paris: Guillaumin and Co., II,
1853). Future reference is to the translation available 
only in the library of Louisiana State University.
37Dupuit, "Disadvantages of the Method," pp. 13-14.
^^Dupuit, "Ways of Communication," pp. 6-7 et
passim.
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revenue it lost by "lowering the toll" itself could be 
taken to mean that the profit maximizing revenue would 
"escape the fisc" and that the government should price to 
cover full costs. This interpretation of Dupuit1s attitude 
towards taxation would necessitate the conclusion that he 
could not be termed an advocate of marginal cost pricing in 
decreasing cost industries, for in this case, full costs 
would not be covered. Dupuit could still have advocated 
marginal cost pricing in increasing cost industries along 
with his refusal to finance losses out of taxation, since 
total costs would be covered (and economic profits might 
even exist). This reluctance to tax which led to the 
conclusion that projects bear full costs may then be 
closest to Dupuit's real intent in the bridge example.
Some Conclusions
Dupuit can rightly be regarded as a most important ~ 
precursor of marginal cost theorists, although, in this 
area, as in the theory of price discrimination, the 
starring role is given by Dupuit to utility and demand.
But this does not mean that a total and utter lack of 
appreciation for the role of cost extrudes from his 
discussion* Although he desired to cover certain elements 
of costs (interest and maintenance) in the case of bridges
in order that an undue burden on the taxpayer could be 
avoided, he clearly knew that marginal costs were zero. 
Moreover, there are some statements, for example the 
"labour expended" quotation, which convey the flavor of a 
true marginal cost argument. There is, however, no 
rigorous treatment of marginal costs in his writings, 
although Professor Stigler may have gone too far in 
boldly stating that Dupuit "did not devise a coherent
o Qtheory of costs." As has been shown in Chapter IV of 
this dissertation, Dupuit made accurate statements on 
the nature of monopoly price maximization. Although he 
reasoned in terms of "net revenue" instead of the marginal 
cost - marginal revenue conditions, his approach was 
essentially correct. He also distinguished between fixed 
cost and "traction" costs, the latter of which could be 
viewed as marginal.^® In this context, it will be 
remembered, he treated "traction" costs as constant, 
possibly for simplicity. This, together with the fact 
that, in regard to "marginal cost arguments" he made no
39Stigler, "The Development of Utility Theory," 
in Essays, p. 81. See Appendix III of this dissertation 
for a comment on Stigler's evaluation of Dupuit.
^ Supra, Chapter IV, pp. 129-130, e_t passim.
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assumptions concerning the direction of "marginal costs,"
leads to the conclusion that a constant marginal cost, as
depicted in Figure 5-1, was probably closest to Dupuit's 
41intent. But whether one regards Dupuit1s conception of 
costs as "interest and maintenance" expense or traction 
costs, variable or marginal, constant, increasing or 
decreasing, the apparatus for the analysis of the welfare 
effects of marginal cost pricing was stated in his work 
with force. The theoretical background for an analysis 
of public utility pricing, the welfare effects of taxes, 
and the adverse welfare effects in monopoly pricing, must 
be credited to him.
But, it must be added, unless Dupuit1s was a long- 
run market period, it is difficult to ascribe to him a 
clear statement of the marginal cost principles. Addition­
ally, if one chooses to adhere to the argument that 
Dupuit disallowed taxation to finance specific projects, 
any statement of the marginal cost pricing principle to 
be found in his writings, regardless of the market period
41Again one can only speculate on the benefits Dupuit 
could have derived from a close reading of Cournot, who 
presented a formulation of marginal costs. Dupuit1s 
somewhat loose statements in regard to costs are but addi­
tional proof for the allegation that their paths never 
crossed.
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chosen, would apply only to increasing cost industries.
And this is a limitation which ordinarily would not be 
imposed on the tool.
The conclusion must be drawn, then, that Dupuit was 
an important anticipator of the doctrine, providing as 
he did the welfare backdrop for an explicit formulation 
of the principle. In addition, as the following section 
will show, Dupuit was the inspiration of important mar­
ginal cost theorists. But an explicit statement of the 
short-run marginal cost pricing principle is not to be 
found in his writings.
The Development of Welfare Theory, Marginal Cost 
Pricing and Dupuit's Contribution— A Brief Discussion
Dupuit1s tacit use of the demand curve as a utility 
measure has, as one might guess, been a most serious 
weakness in his "formulation" of marginal cost pricing.
In short, all of the criticisms relating to the use of the 
demand curve to measure utility and consumers' surplus, 
as outlined in Chapter III, apply with equal force to 
this argument. But before this weakness made the theory 
of cardinal utility moribund, Marshall had occasion to use 
the frame of Dupuit1s analysis to justify the subsidization
of decreasing cost industries and the taxation of increas-
A 0ing cost industries. This argument, radical m  its 
implications, gave rise to a celebrated controversy over 
whether "boxes," containing information as to the nature of 
costs in specific industries, would be "empty" or not.^
The arguments over whether one could identify increasing, 
decreasing or constant cost industries in fact, though 
interesting, are not of concern here. The interesting 
point is that the polemics, at this juncture, were not 
particularly directed against Marshall's utility measure­
ment, which was part and parcel of the subsidization 
solution.
But, by 1938, due in part to the Hicks-Allen rehabil­
itation of value theory, the wicked chimera of cardinal 
utility measurement had been cast from positive economics. 
Harold Hotelling, in that year, attempted to refurbish an 
argument he attributed to Dupuit. The argument concerned
42Marshall, Principles, Chapter XIII, Book V.
43See J. H. Clapham, "Of Empty Economic Boxes," 
Economic Journal, XXXII (1922), a reply by A. C. Pigou and 
rejoinder by Clapham in the same volume. Also see D. H. 
Robertson, "Those Empty Boxes," Economic Journal, XXXIV 
(1924). All are reprinted in the American Economic Associ­
ation, Readings in Price Theory (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1952).
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the welfare effects of marginal cost pricing, but in 
non-cardinal dress.44 Hotelling originally overstated 
the role that Dupuit assigned to marginal cost pricing, 
if Dupuit1s concept is to be considered that. He main­
tained that Dupuit's argument was "that the optimum of 
the general welfare corresponds to the sale of everything
4cat marginal cost." If this were true, it would be diffi­
cult to explain Dupuit's strong emphasis on price discrim­
ination. Burnham P. Beckwith in his Marginal-Cost 
Price-Output Control has shed some light on this issue.46 
Beckwith points out:
. . . that the attribution of this theory to 
Dupuit has little basis. Dupuit was a pioneer in 
the use of marginal analysis and consumers' sur­
plus, but no one except Hotelling has ever attributed 
the theory of marginal-cost control to him, and in a 
June, 1949, letter to the author he qualified his 
attribution as follows: 'Dupuit mentions . . . the
idea of a zero toll for which I argued in my 1938 
paper. However, he fails to endorse it explicitly 
as he carried along at this point the common idea 
that maintenance costs and interest should be paid 
out of tolls. Thus, the writers to whom you allude 
are correct in so far as they imply that Dupuit
^^Hotelling, "The General Welfare," (1938). 
45Hotelling, "The General Welfare," p. 242.
^Beckwith, Marginal-Cost Price-Output Control 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1955).
47Beckwith, p. 83.
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This writer is in substantial agreement with Hotelling's 
qualification. But, while it is true that Dupuit eschewed 
a "pure" statement of short-run marginal cost pricing in 
favor of recovering "fixed expenses," Hotelling did fail 
to mention Dupuit's justification, which was the avoidance 
of an undue burden on the taxpayer. In short, while not 
providing an explicit formulation of marginal cost theory, 
Dupuit's writings are but a short step away, and he must 
be given credit for having -suggested the principle in the 
frame of his analysis. Actually, there is no evidence that 
Hotelling does not acknowledge this, and on his point that 
Dupuit did not explicitly endorse sales at marginal cost, 
there can be no argument.
Hotelling thus began with Dupuit's argument (or
rather with his interpretation of it), and generalized the
analysis using an ordinal preference function, and sought
to apply it. He thought the argument to be particularly
applicable to certain public utilities, such as "electric
power plants, waterworks, railroads, and other industries
Aft .in which fixed costs are large.1 0  Hotelling analyzed 
Dupuit's "utilite perdue," utilizing, however, an upward 
sloping marginal cost curve which, as has been shown, was
^Hotelling, "The General Welfare," p. 242.
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not particularly in the spirit of Dupuit's whole presen­
tation. Moving from the "classic" argument to the one 
based only on the necessity of ordinal calculation, 
Hotelling mathematically arrived at several important 
conclusions: (1) that the general welfare function would
be maximized by the institution of ubiquitous marginal 
cost pricing; (2) that losses attending marginal cost 
pricing in decreasing cost industries could be made up by
certain "lump-sum" taxes, such as on "income, inheritances,
49and the site value of land;" (3) that, given a fixed 
amount of revenue desired by government, the decrease in 
welfare corresponding to obtaining this fixed amount by an 
excise or sales tax would be greater than the loss due to 
obtaining this revenue by an income tax. Although Hotelling 
thought that his argument had special applicability to
^Hotelling, p. 242. Hotelling also advocated taxes 
on other goods "whose quantity is nearly or quite unre­
sponsive to changes in price, and which is not available 
in such quantities as to satisfy all demands," p. 257. 
Hotelling's examples along these lines were holiday 
travel which caused overcrowding in railroad passenger 
cars. Here, in a manner quite analagous to Dupuit 
/supra, Chapter IV, pp. 128-129/ Hotelling argued for the 
increase in fares due to the increase in marginal cost. 
Another interesting example which he provided is a tax 
on advertising, due to the unlimited demands it forced on 
the limited "attention supply" of people.
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public utilities and transportation, his analysis was
generalized to all industries and services. In brief,
Hotelling thought that if all industries, those of
increasing and decreasing costs, engaged in marginal cost
pricing, net social benefit or welfare could be improved.
Losses were to be financed by his menu of lump-sum taxes.
R. H. Montgomery, in several articles, presented a similar
argument respecting public utilities and the railroads,
in the end recommending government ownership as the most
50viable alternative. Montgomery's arguments possessed
none of the rigor and precision of Hotelling's, however,
and it was Hotelling's treatment which elicited the "first-
rate" criticism.
Ragnar Frisch, writing on the "Dupuit Taxation 
51Theorem," was one of the earliest critics of Hotelling's 
position. His two most important observations were:
(1) that price did not have to be equal to marginal cost,
^®R. H. Montgomery, "Government Ownership and Oper­
ation of the Railroads," Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science (January, 1939). Also see 
his "Government Ownership and Operation of the Electric 
Industry," in the same issue.
^^Ragnar Frisch, "The Dupuit Taxation Theorem," 
Econometrica, VII (1939); also see Hotelling's rejoinder, 
"The Relation of Prices to Marginal Costs in an Optimum 
System," and Frisch's reply, "A Further Note on the Dupuit 
Taxation Theorem" all in the same issue.
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but could be proportional to it with the same result,52
and? (2) that in any move from one welfare situation to
another, where there are both losers and gainers involved,
an illegitimate interpersonal comparison is made.^
Hotelling in his rejoinder agreed with the first criticism
and ignored the second on interpersonal comparisons.
Although the situation where prices are proportional to
marginal costs would eliminate the need for subsidies in
decreasing cost industries, it has been found to be
54theoretically unacceptable.
E. W. Clemens p r o p o s e d ^  something close to perfect 
discrimination as an alternative to marginal cost pricing, 
but with the "block rates" necessary to implement such a 
proposal, price would not equal marginal costs for some 
units to all consumers, and the marginal conditions 
would consequently be violated. It should be noted that 
output, under such a scheme, would be carried to the 
point where price - marginal cost in the last market. The 
great advantage would be that revenues would cover costs
52Frisch, "Dupuit Taxation Theorem," p. 145.
^3prisch, "Dupuit Taxation Theorem," p. 150.
CABoth Hotelling and Frisch were proved wrong on 
this point by Samuelson in the Foundations, especially 
pp. 241-243.
CC . . .E. W. Clemens, "Price Discrimination m  Decreasing 
Cost Industries," American Economic Review, XXXI (1941).
and the necessity for interpersonal comparisons would be 
avoided (Frisch's second criticism). But in the final 
analysis this is not really marginal cost p r i c i n g ^  as 
it is more commonly accepted.
One of the most important qualifications of Hotelling 
proposal is the one surrounding the nature of the "lump 
sum" income tax. Professor Meade pointed out^7 that the 
income tax may not be a true "lump sum" tax since a tax 
on income disturbs the marginal rate of substitution 
between income (work) and leisure, and is therefore 
unacceptable as a means for providing revenue in Hotelling 
system.
In general, then, Hotelling's presentation, derived 
from Dupuit's earlier approach, possessed two serious 
flaws. In the transference of satisfaction from lump-sum 
tax payers to consumers of the products of decreasing cost 
industries, an interpersonal utility comparison is, of 
necessity, involved. In order to say that the change 
results in a net increase in welfare, one must assume 
either that the distribution of income is a matter of
5^As noted in Chapter IV of this dissertation,
Clemens has renewed his proposal for such discrimination 
in the multi-product firm.
■^J.E. Meade, "Price and Output Policy of State 
Enterprises," Economic Journal, LIV (1944).
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indifference, or that the resultant change in distribution 
involves a net gain in satisfaction. For the latter to 
be the case, either a knowledge of the aggregate welfare 
function must be assumed, or the gainers must compensate 
the losers. As Nancy Ruggles, paraphrasing Samuelson, 
has said:
. . .  The economist cannot say that the change 
should be made and the compensation paid; he can 
only say that the change could be made and the 
compensation could be paid with an increase in wel­
fare. He cannot say that it is better to pay the 
compensation than not to; he simply cannot say 
anything at all about the case in which compensation 
is not p a i d . 58
Thus compensation must be paid in order to say that a 
change has increased welfare.
Further, in order for distribution to be a matter 
of indifference, income distribution must either be elimin­
ated from the concern of the economist, as in the manner of 
Dupuit, or the marginal utility of income must be assumed 
constant for the economy as a whole. Interestingly, then, 
this latter assumption may be as important in the "new" 
welfare economics, as it was in the "old" welfare theory 
of Dupuit.
The second serious difficulty in marginal cost pricing, 
a_ _la Hotelling, is the issue of the tax. An income tax
5^RUggies, "Recent Developments," p. 120.
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must be, in effect, a tax on work. This point takes on
additional importance in the event that adequate revenues
cannot be obtained from true "lump-sum" taxes. One path
out of the dilemma would be to place- excise taxes (in
addition to the income tax) on goods related to leisure,
for example, on golf-clubs, sport rifles, etc. But
adequately defining the goods would be a problem, since
leisure means many things, some of them not involving
goods. Additionally, defining an "optimal" levy would
59be practically impossible.
A larger problem emerges from these brief consider­
ations. Unless society1s welfare function can be determined
C QIt is obviously impossible to cover all of the 
relevant issues involved in marginal cost pricing in the 
space of a few pages. The question of what concept of 
marginal cost, long or short-run, should be used, together 
with the important issue of investment criteria under 
marginal cost pricing, for example, have not been touched 
upon. For a resolution of the former issue see Clemens, 
"Price Discrimination in Decreasing Cost Industries," and 
for a discussion on investment criteria see William 
Vickery, "Some Objections to Marginal Cost Pricing,"
Journal of Political Economy, 56 (1948), and also his 
"Some Implications of Marginal Cost Pricing for Public 
Utilities," American Economic Review, 45 (May, 1955). 
Rather, the foregoing has attempted to point out the two 
major theoretical objections to such a pricing tool. Two 
of the most comprehensive treatments of the proposal are 
Ruggles, "Recent Developments," and Samuelson, Foundations, 
Chapter VIII, "Welfare Economics." The first, a bit 
dated, is non-mathematical; the second is largely so.
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and defined, statements about the "optimal" distribution 
are meaningless. And the problems involved in defining an 
aggregate welfare function are of Herculean proportions, as 
contemporary welfare discussions attest. Kenneth Arrow 
has shown^ that the political voting process may be an
inadequate criterion on which to define such a function.
61 62 Bergson and Gunnar Myrdal have urged that an explicit
value judgement be made on the part of the economist, 
researcher or perhaps the legislature. But is this not 
exactly what Dupuit was doing? By his own admission, the 
distribution of income did not matter and from this he 
at least pointed the way to the conclusion that if 
public utilities would price at "marginal costs," and the 
loss was reimbursed by the public at large through taxa­
tion, a net increase in utility could be realized. Why 
is this not sound practice in the absence of information 
regarding the welfare effects of distribution and the
6C>Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual 
Values.
6J-Abram Bergson, "A Reformulation of Certain Aspects 
of Welfare Economics."
6^Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Develop­
ment of Economic Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
Ltd., 1953); also see his Rich Lands and Poor (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1957), especially pp. 124-125 and 135.
Joan Robinson in her Economic Philosophy (Chicago: Aldine 
Publishing Company, 1962) has made similar points.
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social welfare function. Economists would be fossilized 
if they were forced to wait for such information in order 
to make recommendations for public policy. Dupuit1s 
solution, although it rests on the theoretically unacceptable 
cardinal utility measurement, _is the solution of contemporary 
economists in effect.^ To paraphrase Bernard Shaw, "if 
economists cannot have what they want, they had well 
better settle for what they can get," adding of course,
"until something better is available."
Marginal cost pricing in public utilities still has 
relevance for the proper allocation of resources and for 
the public welfare. Dupuit was, without doubt, the 
precursor of this pricing tool, which has been developed
^Consider along this line the marginal cost experi­
ments in the Electricite de France, a nationalized industry. 
If Nelson is correct, this practical side of Dupuit's 
proposal "has never died in France," Marginal Cost Pricing 
in Practice, p. viii. Nelson's view is that the French 
have retained the emphasis which Dupuit originally put 
on practical applications, allowing "the relationship of 
pricing to consumers' surplus or the allocation of 
resources" to assume a supporting role, p. viii. This 
latter issue, according to Nelson, is controlling in 
English-speaking countries. But Nelson misinterprets 
Dupuit's position. Although Dupuit was concerned to a 
great degree with "practical applications," the welfare 
argument (consumers' surplus) was a major ingredient in 
the overall proposal. Indeed, what does marginal cost 
pricing mean if no reference is made to welfare or the 
allocation of resources?
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and refined over the decades. If value judgements are 
necessary in the absence of better data, then it is best 
to make them. Otherwise economics becomes barren in its 
most important role, which is the implementation of public 
policy, always with a view towards the maximization of 
society's well-being.
Dupuit's Application of Economic Theory 
To Public Policy
Some evaluation of Dupuit's overall "system" can now 
be made. It should be clear that Dupuit cannot be regarded 
as an advocate of any one single pricing tool. The point 
which Dupuit made so clear, that there was a marked 
difference between the pricing principles of the govern- 
mentally owned or operated industry and the "private 
propertied" firm, was missed by Hotelling. Dupuit made 
no such case for marginal cost pricing in every industry, 
or, if an explicit formulation of such pricing is required, 
in any'industry. As was earlier indicated, he felt that 
competition, more or less, guided resources in the private 
economy, reali.zing the salutary effects of such compe­
tition on public welfare. He did not even advocate his 
version of "marginal cost pricing" as an exclusive tool in
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public utilities. Rather, Dupuit1s eclectic contention 
was that the tool used should best fit the problem. Dupuit 
saw that price discrimination, as well as other pricing 
systems, could make important contributions to "public 
utility."
Perfect price discrimination would apparently elim­
inate "utilite perdue." As Dupuit said regarding railroad 
rates, "the foremost principle is to ask the passenger to 
pay . . .  a sum . . . just below the price which would
make him give up his journey, provided that this does
64not involve the company in a loss." He obviously did 
not believe perfect discrimination to be workable, however, 
and all of his examples involve two and three-class 
tariffs. But Dupuit thought that price discrimination in 
the railroad industry would have the same beneficent 
effect on welfare as "marginal cost pricing." The state­
ment can be interpreted as recommending price discrimination 
as long as marginal costs are covered. Output would be 
carried to the point where price equaled marginal cost, 
although the marginal conditions would not obtain in, some 
markets. It is notable that distribution of utility would
64Dupuit, "On Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 26.
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be affected in favor of the producer, but the distribution 
of welfare was not of great concern to Dupuit. He was 
interested only that someone appropriate the "utilite 
perdue." In the case of a privately owned railroad 
company, profits would be maximized by such a scheme. In 
the case of a nationalized railroad, Dupuit recommended 
discrimination sufficient to cover total costs (both 
traction and fixed costs). ̂  In proposing that total net 
benefit be maximized under the constraint that total 
costs are covered, Dupuit exhibited a distaste for having 
to seek out other sources of revenue. In this, it should 
be noted, he also avoided the need for interpersonal com­
parisons regarding the tax-subsidy, for no subsidy is 
necessary. Dupuit would thus advocate, in regard to the 
railroads, a scaling down of rates, which would provide 
revenue just sufficient to cover total costs.
Another public utility in which Dupuit used essentially 
the same tool was in water distribution. In an analysis 
of water distribution, he applied the same reasoning as he 
had to governmentally owned or operated railroads. After
^ Supra, chapter IV, pp. 159-160 et passim. Also see 
Dupuit, "Ways of Communication" in which Dupuit pressed 
for government ownership of the railroads, p. 19 el: passim.
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categorically rejecting a single price policy for water 
distributed in cities, he showed how the consumption of 
water could be increased with discriminatory pricing. He 
concluded that "water . . . must be sold by differential 
subscription, at a price proportional to the utility 
which the subscriber takes from it."^6 Again the condition 
that "interest and maintenance costs" be covered is 
obtrusively present.^ Roads and canals received the same 
treatment. Actually, then, Dupuit's rational system of 
price discrimination was his most important application 
to policy. The elimination of "utilite perdue" is, again, 
the most important point.
The "marginal cost pricing proposal" entered Dupuit's 
analysis due to the difficulties of instituting discrim­
ination on bridges. Although Dupuit acknowledged that 
price discrimination may be possible in the "worker's 
frock" case,k® he noted that universal dishonesty limited
^Dupuit, '.'Disadvantages of the Method of Inter­
mittent Distribution," p. 11.
67Dupuit, "Disadvantages," p. 14. Dupuit added 
that "the study of the tariff of water sale is, we think, 
an altogether local study; a tariff successful in one 
town would not succeed in another," p. 13. Once again 
Dupuit, the practitioner, acknowledged the variability of 
the law of consumption from place to place.
^®See "Tolls and Transport Charges," p. 15.
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its use. Thus he turned to a "marginal cost argument."
It must be noted that he only applied the single price 
policy specifically to bridges, and then only where price 
discrimination was not a viable alternative. But his 
generalization regarding industries where price is greater 
than "labour expended" could be interpreted to mean that 
he wished the "marginal cost principle" to be applied in 
other areas. No statement can be found in Dupuit1s writ­
ings, however, to the effect that specific industries should 
be forced to price at marginal cost, whether governmentally 
owned or regulated. In fact, no explicit statement of 
the principle can be found in his writings.
Dupuit, judging from statements made in his treatise
i
on Commercial Freedom^  and in his other writings, had 
faith in the welfare effects of competition. Increased 
absolute utility under conditions of discriminating private 
monopoly, to Dupuit, would reduce "utilite perdue" and 
would therefore be desirable. In all those industries 
where competition prevailed, "utilite perdue" would tend 
to be minimized. The whole issue of "utilite perdue" would 
be pointless, however, in a world of pure competition.
^ Supra, Chapter . I, p. 15.
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That is the reason why Dupuit1s theories necessarily
involve imperfect competition.
Dupuit1s prescriptions for public policy, therefore,
are several. In the vagt domain of private property,
competition should prevail for the maximum enlargement
70of welfare. As indicated m  Chapter I, Dupuit was a
vigorous proponent of anti-monopoly legislation, a policy
prescription which is obtrusively compatible with his
views on welfare. In this he goes beyond Adam Smith, who
71noted such tendencies, but stood firmly on the laissez- 
faire tenet of limited government. But Dupuit's logic 
is paradoxical in that he would prefer the discriminating 
monopolist, i.e., one who would maximize discriminatory 
profits, to the single price monopolist. It was the 
middle ground between^pure competition and monopoly dis­
crimination that Dupuit would not like. In this huge 
area, "utilite perdue" could be reduced by using price 
discrimination, where possible, or, as another possible 
alternative, "marginal cost pricing." But Dupuit was 
truly a 19th century liberal in this regard, and he never 
suggested the regulation or nationalization of industries
^QSupra, Chapter I, p. 17.
^Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 128.
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other than those regarded as "public utilities." Public 
utility pricing was a different matter. Here the full 
range of his welfare pricing techniques would be in order.
His examples all attest to this belief.
Public policy in the area of utilities, then, should 
aim at increased welfare through the "rational" design of 
a pricing system. It could be maintained that on a 
theoretical plane, Dupuit failed to develop an "optimum" 
system of prices, possibly due to a failure to develop a 
full-blown theory of costs. One may also allege that his 
advocacy of various pricing tools was a mark of inconsist­
ency. But on the policy level, Dupuit sagely incorporated 
the "possible" with his theoretical constructions.
Ruggles1 conclusions regarding pricing tools could well 
have been Dupuit's. As she said:
. . . the search for a panacea, for a single
simple rule by which to guide all conduct, is, 
because of . . . problems . . .  a vain search and 
even a foolish one. A set of tools is available 
with which to accomplish a complicated job. A 
better job can be done if each tool is used where 
it is appropriate, instead of throwing away all 
but one and expecting it to serve all p u r p o s e s .
Dupuit1s writings reflected this eclecticism with respect to
policy. He applied not only one tool, but a boxfull instead.
72 Ruggles, "Recent Development," p. 126.
CHAPTER VI
THE CONTRIBUTION OF DUPUIT: AN EVALUATION
IN PERSPECTIVE
Dupuit as an Economic Theorist-
Dupuit, as this dissertation has shown, made important 
and original contributions to economic theory. His develop­
ment of theoretical tools was, however, less organized 
(though no less scientific), than, for example, Cournot's 
compact statements. This difference in approach reflects, 
to some degree, Dupuit1s attitude on the methodology of 
economics. He believed that economics was a science with 
a body of principles that should be accepted by all.-*-. 
Unfortunately, thought Dupuit, economists argued far too 
much over basic precepts, and this had two results: (1)
to cause the public to distrust economics as a-science,2 
and; (2) to shift attention from the necessary and fertile 
field of application.
^Jules Dupuit, "Is Political Economy a Science or is it 
a Study?" Journal des Economistes, 2nd Ser., XXXVII (1863).
2Dupuit, "Is Political Economy a Science or is it a 
Study?"- particularly pp. 238-239 and 247.
226
227
Dupuit's economic theory was bound up with applications. 
He drew demand and utility curves, to be sure, but it was 
not for mere logical exercise. There was always a potential 
application close at hand, and, more often, the theoretical 
tool was interwoven with an example. This does not mean 
that Dupuit was not rigorous. His training as an engineer 
served him well in economics and his discussions were not 
without theoretical sophistication. Dupuit1s distinctive 
method of approaching economic problems yielded some tools 
of great theoretical interest.
The first important statement of the subjective theory
4of value was made by Dupuit. The statement did not consist 
in merely showing that satisfaction or utility diminished 
with quantity. Dupuit went on to elaborate on the doctrine 
and to show that a complete theory of value must consider 
utility, as well as costs. The fusion of the demand curve 
with the marginal utility curve was also performed by 
Dupuit.^ This identification, as pointed out in Chapter II,
3The effect of a tax on "utilite perdue" is a good 
example of Dupuit1s mathematical sophistication. Supra, 
Chapter V, n. 12.
^Supra, Chapter II, pp. 29-30.
^Supra, Chapter IV, pp. 129-13Q„
^Infra, Appendix II.
was strictly a legitimate procedure only in the case of an 
assumption of a~constant marginal utility of money. Nonethe­
less, the concept of consumers' surplus emerged in Dupuit1s 
writings from the identification of demand and utility 
curves. The statement that consumers' surplus (or as 
Dupuit termed it "utility remaining to consumers") is the 
difference between the amount that individuals would be 
willing to pay for a quantity of a commodity and the amount 
that they must pay for it is Dupuit's. The greatest problem 
is that the use of the demand curve to measure such a 
surplus requires some quite restrictive assumptions. The 
marginal utility of money must be assumed constant for 
Dupuit's money measure of consumers' surplus under the 
demand curve to be a valid one (plus a host of other 
assumptions). Alfred Marshall, who drew inspiration from 
Dupuit on this issue, encountered similar problems in ~ 
attempting to enlist a money measure, and the doctrine 
finally fell into disrepute. Attempts have been made to 
rehabilitate Dupuit's (and Marshall's) concept of a sur­
plus, notably by J. R. Hicks, and it has been turned into 
a "compensating" or "equivalent" amount of money income.
The actual definition of the surplus is Dupuit's, but his
229
demand curve measure has been adjudged faulty.^
The concept of consumers1 surplus played a starring 
role in several important interpretations of the pricing 
behavior of firms. The theory of profit maximization under 
monopoly, although developed earlier by Cournot, was stated 
(probably independently) by Dupuit. Dupuit reasoned in 
terms of net revenue, i.e., total receipts less total 
costs, rather than in terms of the marginal cost? - marginal 
revenue apparatus. Dupuit1s approach to monopoly theory 
was valid, however, although the use of marginal analysis is
Qpreferred by most contemporary economists. A distinctive 
part of Dupuit1s contribution was an analysis of the 
effects of monopoly on the size and distribution of welfare. 
In this part of his discussion, however, Dupuit1s account 
hinges on the validity of the demand curve as a measure 
of welfare. But it is interesting to note that Marshall's 
doctrines of "net benefit" and "compromise benefit" bear 
striking resemblance to Dupuit1s earlier statements on 
monopoly and welfare.
nDupuit1s measure has been found to be acceptable 
where compensation is not actually paid, or where the 
Hicksian critera are inapplicable. Supra, Chapter III,
p. 122.
QThe use of marginal revenue analysis has attained 
currency only since Joan Robinson revived the concept in her 
Economics of Imperfect Competition (1933) .
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A discussion of price discrimination was possibly one
of Dupuit1s most important theoretical achievements. As
late as 1910 Edgeworth found Dupuit to be ". . . the
earliest, and still, I think, the highest authority on the
gtheory of discrimination." Dupuit showed that two prices 
for one and the same commodity could exist with differences 
in "buyer estimates," with the ability to segment the market 
and with some degree of monopoly power. High fixed costs 
together with the desire to maximize profits provided 
the motives for such discrimination. Dupuit admirably 
analyzed the effects of such discrimination on quantity and 
revenue, but his attention was ultimately focused on the 
welfare effects of discrimination. The distribution of 
welfare (or "absolute" utility) was of less concern to 
him than the size of the "benefit," which the practice of 
price discrimination could increase. Once again the wel­
fare argument required the identity of utility and demand 
curves for validity. But the discussion of profit maxi­
mizing pricing behavior and the conditions required for 
price discrimination do not require the utility argument 
for support. Dupuit1s contribution in this area would not
gF. Y. Edgeworth, "Applications of Probabilities to 
Economics," Economic Journal (September, 1910), p. 441.
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be surpassed for many decades.^®
Marginal cost pricing as a welfare tool finds its 
origins in Dupuit1s writings. Although it is true that 
the theory is not given explicit treatment, Dupuit did 
mention the possibility of using such a tool, and, by way 
of examples, exhibited some understanding of the concept. 
While Dupuit's statements must be stretched to find an 
explicit formulation of the principle, his analysis, as is, 
is sufficient to credit him as the precursor of the mar­
ginal cost argument. The welfare basis for marginal cost 
pricing is certainly present, and this was the point which 
Hotelling extracted from Dupuit.
All of Dupuit's theoretical contributions are 
juxtaposed on a matrix of welfare economics. Public util­
ity or "the general welfare" was Dupuit's prime concern. He 
considered not only individual welfare, but the conglomerate 
of society's welfare. This is shown clearly by Dupuit's 
major emphasis on consumers' surplus. As such he was the 
first modern welfare theorist. The conception of an 
aggregate welfare function is implicit in Dupuit's writings, 
and, although welfare theory is often treated as the
"^It should be noted that both Cournot and Marshall 
neglected price discrimination in their writings on economic 
theory.
232
"adopted child" by economists, it is notable that Dupuit's 
contribution was the beginning of an entire branch of 
economic theory. Nor were these beginnings meager in 
scope. Dupuit knew that the welfare economist must concern 
himself with the effects of monopoly, taxation and pricing 
techniques on utility; and he set out to provide a frame 
adequate to the tasks at hand. And, although Dupuit was 
unaware of many of the problems associated with modern 
welfare theory, his contribution was amazing in its time. 
Additionally, he anticipated some of the problems, such as 
interpersonal comparisons and the distribution of income, 
facing welfare theorists today.
For the economist who rejects welfare economics out 
of hand, there are still important theoretical tools to 
be found in Dupuit. The definition of consumers' surplus 
and the analysis of profit maximization under pure monopoly 
are "objective" contributions. The most important 
theoretical contribution to "positive" economics, however, 
is Dupuit's enlightening discussion of price discrimination. 
He discussed not only the mechanics of discrimination, but 
the motives, possibilities and problems associated with it 
as well. This discussion represented the best nineteenth 
century formulation of the tool.
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Dupuit1s contributions to economic theory were not 
without flaws. He was infatuated with the analysis of 
demand, almost to the exclusion of the cost side of value 
theory. He was, of course, aware of the necessary partici­
pation of costs in value theory, but he gave no clear and 
consistent theoretical presentation of a cost theory. One 
must ferret the cost theory from his works, and the results 
are by no means clear-cut. But it should be remembered 
that Dupuit was a pioneer in utility and demand theory, 
and that, as a pioneer in this area, his natural tendency 
was to neglect the study of concepts which he was initially 
obliged to attack. There is, retrospectively, some benefit 
in having given the leading role to demand at this time, 
for, to achieve the necessary balance in value theory, the 
"pendulum" had to swing far from costs of production.
These considerations do not exonerate Dupuit with regard 
to his neglect of costs, however.
Dupuit1s theoretical performance, when all is con­
sidered, was one of genuine importance and originality.
The attempt to build a welfare concept from value theory 
was without parallel in Dupuit1s time. The development of 
purely microeconomic tools, such as those of price discrim­
ination, monopoly, and marginal cost pricing, were part of
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this larger plan; and the theories of marginal utility.and 
consumers' surplus were basic ingredients in the approach.
A more sophisticated contemporary economic theory uses some 
of the tools forged by Dupuit; and, although the results are 
much better, the questions Dupuit raised and the problems 
he encountered are much the same.
Dupuit and Economic Policy
Dupuit was not a theorist for theory's sake, although 
he thought that economics was a science and that economic 
theory was of paramount importance in the development of 
the science. The protracted battle over the subjective 
theory of value, in which his theoretical successors found 
so much pleasure, would have probably been looked upon by 
Dupuit as a waste of valuable effort and time.̂ -*- His tack
Not that Dupuit was above this sort of intellectual 
warfare himself. His seething reply to Bordas is a case in 
point. Although he deplored the quibbling over issues of 
principle (see Dupuit, "Is Political Economy a Science or 
is it a Study?"), M. Henri Baudrillart in a dissenting 
reply to that article,. "Observations on Mr. Dupuit1 s 
Article," Journal des Economistes, 2nd Ser., XXXVII (1863), 
pointed out that there was a gulf between Dupuit1s opinions 
and his actual behavior. Baudrillart said that ". . .we
ask if our honorable colleague himself, who loves discussion 
so much, and who has reason, for he succeeds at it, would be 
content /to follow his own advice/. . ."p. 253. Dupuit 
would not be moved by Baudrillart's jibe, however, and in 
his response entitled "Mr. Dupuit's Answer to Mr. Baudrillart
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was to use the best theoretical knowledge available to 
attack economic problems. Theoretical constructs for their 
own sake were not for Dupuit. His firm belief in the 
validity of the welfare tools he had developed led to 
advocate their adoption at a policy level.^ Dupuit 
eclectically favored the use of tools to fit particular 
problems. The desire to maximize absolute utility (or 
minimize "utilite perdue") under the constraint of covering
(continued) on the Subject of the Article 'Is 
Political Economy a Science or is it a Study?, 111 Journal 
des Economistes, 2nd Ser., XXXVII (1863), Dupuit reasserted 
his position that political economy was a science. He 
defended "demonstrations of basic principles," and again 
cited the need for fundamental agreement on them to elim­
inate some of the public hostility thrust on the science.
l^See in particular his article entitled "On Present 
Transport Legislation," Journal des Economistes, 1st Ser., 
XXIII (1849), in which he urged the legislative adoption 
of "rational" principles, i.e., those tending to maximize 
utility, in the establishment and operation of public 
projects. In another interesting piece, Dupuit attacked 
the granting of privilege by the State. In his "About the 
Tax Paid to Postmasters by Owners of Public Vehicles," 
Journal des Economistes, 1st Ser., XXVII (1851), Dupuit 
attacked an ancient institution which had economic effects 
on the direction and establishment of railroad traffic. 
Postmasters, because of their establishment, demanded an 
"indemnity" of 25 centimes on railroad travel where rail­
road routes were parallel. Dupuit noted that it was 
ridiculous for the state to "preserve these relays on 
routes parallel to the railroads," adding that "it should 
let die those who cannot live with their receipts," 
p. 151.
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some "fixed costs" of production was the basis of such 
recommendations for public policy. Those industries which 
were to be considered public should be regulated or operated 
according to "rational" principles. The criterion was the 
contribution to aggregate welfare.
The application of "rational" principles to public 
projects, according to Dupuit, required great study and 
care since the law of consumption varied from project to 
project and since each industry possessed distinctive 
peculiarities. He knew that the development of sound 
economic policy was no mean task and that such development 
was a slow process. In these matters a strain of good 
common sense runs through his writings. He wanted his 
ideas on "public utility" to be accepted, to be sure, but 
he foresaw resistance and the problems of application.
Dupuit deplored the outmoded laws regulating transpor­
tation in France. He attacked legislators who granted
privilege or who acted on the "caprice of the moment" in
1 3the development of the French transport system. Instead 
he proposed a rational, objective course of action and the 
adoption of policies designed to maximize the utility of
13Dupuit, "On Present Transport Legislation," p. 219.
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projects. His boldness in the approach to policy is proof
that Dupuit desired to implement his theoretical ideas and
see them through to application. His tome on water distri-
14bution carried specific policy recommendations, as did 
most of his other work.
Dupuit, then, was the complete economist, beginning 
with the development of economic theory derived from obser­
vation, all the way to policy prescription based on his 
theoretical findings. In short, Dupuit did not divorce 
the tool-making function from the tool-using function. This 
is a quality not to be taken lightly in any assessment of 
Dupuit's achievement. His insistence that the functions 
of the economist should not be dichotomized, as well as 
the example he set in attempting to apply the tools of 
economic analysis to economic problems are points on which 
modern economists could seek inspiration. Except for 
purposes of exposition, then, there was no "Dupuit the 
theorist" or "Dupuit the implementor of policy." The two 
were happily combined in the writings of one man.
14See Dupuit, "Disadvantages of the Method of Inter­
mittent Distribution," and supra, Chapter V, pp. 200-201.
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Dupuit and the Polemics of his Period
The judgement tendered above, that Dupuit consistently 
and arduously combined his theoretical findings with his 
policy pronouncements, is not invalidated when one examines 
his views on pressing issues of the day. In this vein 
Dupuit authored several contributions (of lesser importance 
from a theoretical standpoint) in the Journal des Economistes. 
These contributions, although consisting primarily of 
polemics on Malthusianism, free trade, the nature of 
property, etc., deserve some consideration, especially 
insofar as they illuminate the nature of Dupuit's total 
contribution.
As noted in Chapter I, Dupuit was a Malthusian. He
forcefully exhibited his beliefs on this issue in a statis-
1 5tical study of the cause of the fecundity of populations.
The study had special relevance for France, the population 
of which Dupuit examined by provincial incidence. Addition­
ally, Dupuit compared the rate of increase in the population 
of various countries, noting that the United States had the 
fastest rate of growth (4.40%);^ and, in the Malthusian
ISJules Dupuit, "Causes Influencing the Length of the 
Average Life-Span of Populations," Journal des Economistes,
2nd Ser., XLVII (1865), pp. 5-36.
■^Dupuit, "Causes Influencing," Table 4, p. 22.
frame, he related population trends to the cultivation of
the.soil, (extensive cultivation in the U.S. case), and to
17the progress of technology. In the end Dupuit concluded 
that " . . .  the most recent figures from official statistics 
confirm completely the doctrine of Malthus . . . " An
— --iamusing incident will serve to illustrate the tenacity with 
which Dupuit held to the Malthusian theory. In his article 
on "Is Political Economy a Science or a Study?" Dupuit 
pointed out that the questioning of the population theory 
by the American economist Carey would lead to no good end, 
and, most importantly, would rightly cause the layman to 
question the scientific character of political economy. 
Dupuit was attacked for this stand by a contemporary 
economist, M. de Fontenay. Dupuit replied to this attack, 
and in his reply, still maintained that Carey's quibbling 
could lead only to socialism. Dupuit implied, moreover, 
that Carey was not as wise as the founders and masters 
of the s c i e n c e . D u p u i t  asked indignantly, "What does 
M. de Fontenay reply to this? That Mr. Carey is a dignified
i 7Dupuit, "Causes Influencing," pp. 24-25 et passim.
l^Dupuit, "Causes Influencing," p. 25.
19̂Jules Dupuit, "In Response to a Letter from Mr. de 
Fontenay, on the Malthusian Question," Journal des Econo­
mistes, 2nd Ser., XXXVII (1853), pp. 283-284.
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20old man, inoffensive, a perfect gentleman." In short, 
Dupuit implied that Fontenay had missed the point entirely, 
and that he ludicrously assumed that Dupuit's was a personal 
attack on Carey. In any case, Dupuit1s mind remained 
unchanged on the Malthusian question.
Dupuit was an avid free-trader and his only full- 
length study, Commercial Freedom,was as much an anti­
protectionist plea as it was a clear enunciation of the 
benefits of competition.^ He reaffirmed this view in his
"Answer to Mr. Dunoyer in Regard to his Report on the Work
2 2Entitled 'Commercial Freedorti, ' " He also took this 
opportunity to reassert his belief that "the exact sciences 
are an excellent preparation for political economy," and 
that this "pure" political economy is "a science whose 
principles are susceptible to a rigorous demonstration."23
^Dupuit, "In Response," p. 284.
21 .Fleury m  his "Life and Works of Mr. Dupuit," des­
cribed the volume as constituting " . . .  the very advanced 
kernel of a veritable treatise on pure political economics, 
with developed application of the scientific principles to 
international commerce," p. 32.
22 Jules Dupuit, "Answer to Mr. Dunoyer m  Regard to 
His Report on the Work Entitled 'Commercial Freedom,'" 
Journal des Economistes, 2nd Ser., XXXI (1861). See in 
particular p. 116 where Dupuit defended free trade against 
a system of prohibitions.
23Dupuit, "Answer to Mr. Dunoyer," p. 111.
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Dupuit1s classical liberalism is further illustrated 
by his hostility to labor unions and to the activities of 
the government in redressing the evils of food shortages. 
Dupuit took the classical position that unions cannot 
increase wages and that through "accidental unemployment, 
they diminish society's products and, consequently, the
apart of these products which return to the workers." In 
his article on "Food Crises and Means Used to Remedy 
Them, "2!̂ Dupuit showed, in "classical" fashion, that the 
charitable instincts which motivated government during food 
crises merely aggravated the problem. Specifically Dupuit 
opposed the "ceiling price" on food because of the effect 
on demand and future supply. As he said, "a system of
24̂Dupuit quoted in Fleury, p. 20. The quotation is 
from The French Economist (January 21 and February 18, 1864), 
pp. 20 and 50. Also see Dupuit1s "Questions of Political 
Economy and of Public Law by Mr. G. de Molinari," Journal 
des Economistes, 2nd Ser., XXXVII (1863). In this article 
Dupuit examined Molinari's views on a number of issues, 
including labor unions. Molinari thought that laborers had 
a natural right to associate, as did employers. Dupuit 
dissented and found that the ". . . great moving force of
work is the private, individual interest," p. 116. Dupuit 
concluded that "one may not always take the advice of this 
author, but one is always obliged to render hommage to the 
purity of his doctrines,- to his talent and to his sincere 
faith," p. 119.
25Dupuit, "Food Crises and Means Used to Remedy Them," 
Journal des Economistes, 2nd Ser., XXII (1859), pp. 161- 
176 and 346-365.
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maximum prices rests on the same sophism as the use of 
average prices, which is that it does not take account of 
the relation which exists between price and consumption."^ 
After dispensing with the "charitable" policies of government, 
Dupuit arrived at "le grand principe: Laissez faire] 
laissez passer]," noting that it is only "necessary to 
know the most elementary principles in order to resolve 
the most difficult problems."27
Dupuit also engaged in a debate, with Joseph Garnier
(editor of the Journal des Economistes) and other members
of the Soceity of Political Economists, on the nature of 
28property. Dupuit1s views on property explain, to a 
degree, the nature of Dupuit1s contribution. Dupuit 
defended the "personal appropriation of the soil" against 
"communal property" on the grounds that it makes " . . .  
society infinitely more productive," and. because it is the
2^Dupuit, "Food Crises," p. 351.
27Dupuit, "Food Crises," p. 365. Again Dupuit slapped
at the protectionists, who were so active in times of high
grain prices.
28Jules Dupuit, "About the Property Principle. The
Just - The Useful," Journal des Economistes, 2nd Ser.,
XXIXX (1861), pp. 321-347 and XXX (1861), pp. 28-55. Dupuit 
did not favor, of course, the unlimited right to property.
In his "About the Freedom of Experiment," Journal des 
Economistes. 2nd Ser., XLVII (1865), for example, Dupuit 
espoused, against the opinion of Mr. Courcelle-Seneuil, 
limits to inheritance rights.
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source . . of an infinite number of intellectual enjoy­
ments which did not exist before that institution."2^
Dupuit questioned the economic progress of society under 
communal property, noting that inventors, authors, etc., 
without patents, would have to forego individual reward; 
and this, Dupuit thought, would stifle i n i t i a t i v e .
But the philosophical point of departure for Dupuit's 
"public utility" is found in Dupuit1s amendments to the 
foregoing liberal ideas. Dupuit warned: "remember the 
necessity of the law in the measure of the public interest, 
that it cannot justify abuse," and that ". . .to ask for
a radical, complete and absolute liberty is to ask for the 
31savage state." In his conclusions on property Dupuit 
underscored the justification for his economic theory by 
saying that:
. . . the end of society is the well being of
the members composing it . ., . It /property/ only 
exists by virtue of certain laws or conventions
2^Dupuit, "About the Property Principle," pp. 346-347.
2^*Dupuit, "About the Property Principle," pp. 44-45.
He also cited the socialist criticism that a liberal eco­
nomic system is "materialistic;" Dupuit countered this 
criticism by arguing that the reason for progress under 
such a system was " . . .  the great pecuniary rewards for 
intellectual work," p; 51.
31Dupuit, "About the Property Principle," p. 51.
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which rule the relations of these members and the 
usage of certain objects and limit the freedom and 
the natural rights of each . . . The principle of 
public utility only gives the solution to all of 
the numerous problems ,
The different economic principles involved in the industries 
of navigation, transportation, agriculture and public 
security called for " . . .  appropriation in a different 
manner in the public interest," and to this Dupuit added
-  **-k
that " . . .  the appropriation must always be made in view
33of the consumer." Dupuit's ideas on property, then, 
are not only consistent with his theoretical devices for 
increasing "public utility," but they represent a philo­
sophical basis for his "system," and are interwoven into 
his economic theory. As he pointed out, "the exploitation 
of any industry by the State . . . must always be justified 
by exceptional circumstances, and the circumstance . . .  is 
monopoly.1 ̂
In regard to his "polemical" writings, it is important 
to note that nowhere did Dupuit contradict, modify or 
retract his earlier theoretical presentations and
32Dupuit, "About the Property Principle," p. 53.
33Dupuit, "About the Property Principle," p. 54.
34Dupuit, "Ways of Communication," p. 19.
of wealth and of many other economic questions
prouncements on public utility and welfare. Rather, they 
tend to amplify and explain his earlier theoretical beliefs. 
This does not mean that Dupuit was a thoroughgoing economic 
liberal, for he clearly envisioned a positive role for the 
government to play in the expansion of public utility.
Dupuit1s concept of the role of property in the economic 
system, together with his utility theory, justified the 
enriched governmental participation in the area of public 
policy. But Dupuit was no extremist in this regard, and he 
saw definite limits to the government's role. He viewed 
competition as the guiding principle across the £>road face 
of economic activity, and there was enough of the "classical" 
economist in him to allow him to stubbornly refuse to 
question the Malthusian and wages-fund doctrines. Yet his 
investigation of utility theory and pricing techniques 
caused him to modify the "hard" line, and it is this 
modification, so suggestive of Marshall's, which stamps his 
total contribution as one of genuine originality.
Dupuit's Influence on the History of Economic Theory
These important contributions to economic theory 
and policy did not go entirely unnoticed by later gener­
ations of economists. Jevons, Marshall, Edgeworth, Walras
and Pantaleoni, among others, took note of his analysis.
These acknowledgments referred only to specific points of
Dupuit1s work, however, and, with the possible exception
of Edgeworth, none of these economists attempted a detailed
probe into Dupuit1s writings. Marshall, whose intellectual
debt to Dupuit was probably greatest of the aforementioned,
did little more than acknowledge Dupuit's name. Yet it
was from these neo-classical sources that modern theorists
were introduced to Dupuit. Almost every modern price theory
text, for example, mentions Dupuit1s name in reference to
utility theory or consumers' surplus. George Stigler has
provided a more detailed, if not wholly accurate, explana-
35tion of Dupuit' s contribution to utility theory.. Harold 
Hotelling was moved in the 19301s to credit Dupuit with the 
first statement of marginal cost pricing. Hotelling, as
*3 c\"his later qualification to Beckwith and Chapter V of 
this dissertation implies, was possibly unaware of Dupuit's 
actual position on the issue. The same must be said of the 
modern French theorists who attribute the "pure" form 
of the marginal cost theory to Dupuit.
^See Stigler, "Development of Utility Theory," and 
Appendix III of this dissertation.
^ Supra, Chapter V, p. 209.
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The problem with all of the above evaluations is that 
Dupuit1s contribution is seen atomistically. A particular 
theory is attributed to Dupuit with little attempt to 
justify the attribution. This procedure has fostered the 
neglect of Dupuit1s overall performance. Nowhere, for 
example, is Dupuit's conception of "public utility" or 
welfare economics mentioned. Nowhere have his statements 
on the marginal cost argument, the theory of price discrim­
ination or the theory of marginal utility been quoted and/or 
analyzed. Edgeworth, who otherwise exhibited more than a 
cursory understanding of Dupuit, presented his reader with 
only a few brief quotations on price discrimination from 
the original source. The result has been to leave uncertain 
the nature of the total contribution of Jules Dupuit.
In consequence, contradictions and outright mis-statements 
have appeared in the sparse literature on his- economic 
writings. It is hoped that this research has contributed 
toward setting the record aright as to the real nature of 
Dupuit1 s p.ccomplishment.
Perhaps a larger and more important point emerges from 
the study of Dupuit1s writings. It is that there can be 
positive value in the study of the origins of economic 
theory. Accretions to the body of economic analysis are
painfully slow, and at every stage in their development, 
doctrines must be re-examined and thought through again.
The study of the origins and development of theory, such 
as that of marginal cost pricing or of price discriminatipn, 
yields new insight into the problems being faced by modern 
economic theorists. Not that a study of past formulations 
would necessarily provide solutions to vexing problems at 
hand. Rather it is that in studying the manner in which 
-earlier theorists justified their theoretical constructions 
and conclusions one may find a potentially important line 
of analysis which has not been adequately pursued, or even 
a "deadend." In this manner contemporary economic theory 
may possibly be improved.
It is important, moreover, and particularly in the 
social sciences, to be aware of the origins of contemporary 
thought; for it is in these origins, either by reaction or 
affirmation, that contemporary thought is formed. In 
economic theory, as in less esoteric areas of human 
knowledge, the past is always with us. And, as an oft- 
forgotten phrase explains, the past is not dead, it is not 
even past. This dissertation has depicted Dupuit1s "past" 
achievement as a contribution to economic analysis in 
the Schumpeterian sense, rather than as a contribution to
37economic thought, (although Dupuit's views on free-trade, 
the Malthusian question, and on economic policy have been 
given some consideration). It is this writer's opinion 
that Dupuit, in his effort to understand and present a 
unified explanation of economic phenomena, placed himself 
far beyond mere "history of thought" interest; and it is 
this contribution to economic theory which must surely com­
prise a great analytic achievement. It is important to 
acknowledge and understand Dupuit1s theoretical performance 
precisely because his achievement is so obviously still with 
us.
37Schumpeter defined economic thought as "the sum 
total of all opinions and desires concerning economic 
subjects, especially concerning public policy bearing 
upon these subjects that, at any given time and place, 
float in the public mind, " History, p. 3.8..
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APPENDIX II
DUPUIT'S DEMAND CURVE AND UTILITY: 
A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
The following table from Dupuit's 1853 article^ illus­
trates, via a numerical example, the identity he posited 










0 100 0 445 .0
1 80 80 425 20
2 63 126 391 54
3 50 150 352 93
4 41 164 316 129
5 33 165 276 169
6 26 156 234 211
7 20 140 192 253
8 14 112 144 301
9 9 81 99 346
10 6 60 69 376
11 3 33 36 409
12 0 0 0 445
Dupuit presented a demand curve for some "way of
communication ," but stated that the same principles applied
to all goocjs. There is an inverse relationship between
quantity demanded" ("frequentation" ) and the toll. The
third column labeled "returns" is total receipts, and since
•̂ •Dupuit, "On Utility and Its Measure," (1953), p. 42
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Dupuit abstracted from costs in the example, these returns 
are also profits. It is the fourth column, labeled "utility 
corresponding to the tariff," which clearly indicates that 
Dupuit identified the demand curve with a marginal utility 
function. Column-4 represents the total utility corres­
ponding to any given toll, or what Dupuit called absolute 
2utility. Dupuit arrived at this absolute utility by 
considering the effect that tolls would have on traffic.
It is perhaps best expressed in. his own words:
One could say, in effect, that the 100 con­
sumers given by the toll zero, can be considered 
as drawing a utility of 1, since there are only 
20 which this tariff causes to disappear, which 
gives 100 utility; that the remaining 80 can be 
considered as drawing a utility of 1 over and_ _ 
above, that is 80; that among these 80, 68 £'sic/ 
draw a utility of 1 over and above the others,-3that is 63, etc., etc.
Thus the summation of "frequentation" would yield the 
absolute utility corresponding to a toll of zero. One 
could say that the marginal utility for 20 of the 100 
passengers is represented by (actually just under) 1 franc. 
The ̂ absolute utility corresponding to a toll of 1 franc is 
the loss (20 X 1) subtracted from absolute utility at the
^Supra, Chapter V, pp. 190-191.
■^Dupuit, "On Utility and Its Measure," (1853), p. 43.
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toll of zero, (or 425). Absolute utility corresponding to
the other tolls is found in an analagous manner.
Dupuit directed the calculation of the fifth column
in the following manner:
To find the lost utility caused by the tariff 
or the figures in the 5th column, one reasons thus: 
from tariff zero to tariff one the frequency descends 
from 100 to 80, there are then 20 consumers who 
are no longer satisfied and who attached a utility 
of one to the service rendered; from tariff one to 
tariff two, a loss of 17 consumers who attached a 
utility of 2, that is 34, which added to the pre­
ceding ones, make a total loss of 54 . . .4
This "utilite perdue" increases with the toll, and with a
linear demand curve, the loss would be proportionate to
Cthe square of the tax or toll.
In the numerical example above Dupuit aggregated the 
marginal utility (demand) functions of individuals and 
obtained an "aggregate marginal utility curve." It is 
also the market demand curve. This identification, as 
pointed out in Chapter II and Chapter III of this 
dissertation, would be legitimate only under some quite 
restrictive assumptions.
^Dupuit, "On Utility and Its Measure," (1853), p. 42.
5 Supra, Chapter V, note 12.
^Supra, Chapter II, pp. 55-56.
^Supra, Chapter III, pp. 74-76.
APPENDIX III
A COMMENT ON STIGLER1S ASSESSMENT OF DUPUIT
George Stigler in his "Development of Utility Theory,"
unhesitatingly credited Dupuit with the first non-
adventitious discussion of marginal utility.-^ Additionally,
he found that "the explicit formulation of the concept of
2consumer surplus is elegant." But Stigler was not so 
generous in dealing with Dupuit1s cost of production 
theory (or lack of it). His comment was that "Dupuit could 
not reach a complete theory of optimum prices because he 
did; not devise a coherent theory of cost," a criticism not 
without some-justification.^ But this reason for the 
previous allegation is questionable. Stigler extracted a 
passage from the Bernardi collection of Dupuit1s writings 
to support his view,5 and he prefaces the quotation with
■̂-Supra, Chapter II, p. 46, n. 40.
2Stigler, "Development," p. 81.
•^Stigler, "Development, " P. 81.
^Supra, Chapter V, pp. 193-194.
^Apparently Stigler translated the passage himself.
The reference is to Bernardi, pp. 52-53. The above version 
of the quotation is from the International Economic Associa­
tion, "On the Measurement of the Utility of Public Works." 
Both translations agree in meaning, however.
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the remark that "this /the failure to devise a coherent
theory of cost/ is illustrated by the following quotation
in which price fluctuations are treated as exercises of
6arbitrary power." The quotation at issue is the following:
For an increase or decrease of utility to 
take place, there must be, provided there is no 
change in quality, a decrease or increase in the 
costs of production. When there is merely a change 
in the market price, the consumer gains what the 
producer loses, or vice versa. Thus, when an object 
costing 20 francs to produce, is sold at 50 francs 
because of a monopoly or concession, the producer 
exacts 30 francs' worth of utility from each pur­
chaser. If for some reason or another he is forced 
to cut his price by 10 francs, his profit falls by 
10 francs per article and each purchaser gains by 
that amount. It is a question of compensation, but 
no utility has been produced. There would have 
been an increase of utility if the drop in the market 
price had been due to a fall in the costs of pro­
duction, because the gain to consumers would not 
have been offset by any loss to the producer/
It is clear that Dupuit was illustrating in the quota­
tion the important distinction between the distribution of 
absolute utility (both consumers' and producers' suxplus) 
and the manner in which absolute utility itself is 
increased. The statement is perfectly valid given the 
proper assumptions for Dupuit indicated that quantity was
^Stigler, "Development," p. 81, n. 36.
7 ..Dupuit, "On the Measurement," p. 99.
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gto be considered constant. The consideration of a given 
quantity was legitimate since Dupuit was investigating the 
distribution of utility with changes in price. The argu­
ment can be expressed conveniently in diagrammatic terms, 
as in Figure III-l "below. ̂
FIGURE Ill-rl
THE DISTRIBUTION OF UTILITY WITH 
FIXED QUANTITY
P R I C E
Q U A N T I T Y
The monopolist faces demand curve PZ and he is selling 
a given amount OM. His costs are constant at AA1. Exacting 
a price OF for OM quantity will yield the monopolist a 
"profit" (or producers' surplus) of AFNR. At price OF,
gNote that in the quotation Dupuit specified "an 
object." Stigler!s translation used the words "an article."
gFigure III-l is similar to Figure 5-1, p.176.
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given the constancy of the marginal utility of money, FPN 
represents consumers' surplus. Absolute utility, then, 
equals the area APNR. Dupuit1s point in the quotation was 
to show that the price change (say to OG) would not change 
the amount of absolute utility afforded by quantity OM, but 
would change the distribution of the benefit. At the 
lower price OG, consumers would gain FNTG in utility, and 
the producer- would lose exactly that amount. If costs 
decreased (say to BB'), however, the absolute utility of 
quantity OM would increase to ARBY, and the immediate 
effect would be an augmentation of producers 1 surplus or 
"profits."
Professor Stigler has possibly interpreted Dupuit's 
quotation incorrectly. Dupuit, in this case, was merely 
using a simple example to show the above results. How 
else, in a monopoly situation involving a fixed quantity, 
could one show a change in the distribution of utility if 
not by a change in price? Dupuit was discussing not price 
determination in this passage, but the principles behind 
changes in the distribution of utility. It is hardly 
likely that Dupuit considered price fluctuations as the 
result of "arbitrary power," since, in his discussion of 
monopoly price determination, he showed clearly that the
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profit maximizing position occurred at the toll rate associ­
ated with maximum net revenues.^ He further pointed out, 
in the context, that the profit maximizing toll rate would 
increase with the increase in costs. These price (toll) 
changes were not the result of "arbitrary power," but were 
the stated result of the interaction of costs and demand.
The example given by Dupuit in the quotation above is no 
more than a simple illustration, and, given Dupuit1s intent, 
a good one.
It is correct, then, to maintain that Dupuit did not 
develop an elaborate and consistent theory of costs, but 
the reason is not that he treated price changes as exer­
cises of "arbitrary power."
^ Supra, Chapter IV, p. 128.
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